

V. KHOROS

POPULISM:

Its Past,
Present
and
Future



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**INTRODUCTION.
POSING THE PROBLEM.
ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT
CONCEPTIONS OF POPULISM IN WORLD LITERATURE.
NEED TO DIFFERENTIATE POPULIST TRENDS**

Ideologies have different fates. Sometimes, a versatile, well-thought-out and logical doctrine barely survives its progenitor, becoming the realm of a few devotees or historians. And sometimes a relatively simple conception, charged with strong emotions in addition to reflecting grass-roots public interests, takes, in the words of Marx, a hold over the masses and becomes a material force. It may happen that a major ideological trend has a great ideological impact on different countries and regions, but, in entering a different social environment, undergoes such profound transformations, making it but a shadow of the original. Yet in another case, outwardly independent and unconnected ideological conceptions, historically and geographically separate, may nevertheless have something in common intrinsically, may inadvertently copy each other and reveal the similarity of objective problems that gave rise to these conceptions.

The 20th century has presented an abundant palette of novel ideological colours which is explained primarily by the inclusion into the world historical process of the former colonial and dependent "periphery". The rise of the national liberation movement, the emergence of new independent national states in Asia, Africa and Latin America—this all was bound to stimulate a rapid genesis of diverse ideological currents. The "ideological explosion" in the developing world has long become a topic of research. As history has shown inquiry into new material is rarely limited to its mere description, systematization and labelling. More often than not, it stimulates a theoretical search.

As the study of ideologies of the contemporary national liberation movement continues and as Asia, Africa and Latin America spurn out new doctrines and teachings, it becomes increasingly evident that there is a need for working out general methodological approaches to the ideological amalgam of the developing countries. And the need is not only to classify the various ideologies but to uncover their internal motivation. The answers must be discovered as to why many new ideological constructions in the liberated countries prove contradictory and why they envelop incompatible features—traditionalism and modernism, radicalism and conservatism, nationalism and socialism, etc. This task is entirely dialectic, for Marxist dialectics holds that, far from eliminating contradictions of an object under study, it is, on the contrary, necessary through them to arrive at the inner motive force of the object's self-movement and development.

Two tendencies can be traced in the works devoted to social thought in the developing countries (as well as to problems of the developing world as a whole). The first tendency highlights the specifics and uniqueness of the developing countries' situation, their position at the crossroads of the major flows of ideas: those of traditional cultures and those of the developed states. There is talk of conceptual syncretism, of "multistructural" ideologies, of ideological-political coalitions, of the peculiarities of modernizing traditional consciousness in the context of this or that cultural heritage, etc. In terms of methodology, this approach includes, as a rule, the use of familiar categories and concepts which are then specified to cope with existing realities; the thought moves "ahead" from the general to the particular.

The second tendency consists in the study of ideological processes in the developing countries from the viewpoint of much broader universals and the laws of world history. In this case, analysis of modern reality involves simultaneous elaboration of general theoretical problems, such as comprehension of nationalism in general, understanding of the origin of ideologies, etc. In this case the thought moves "backward", from the particular to the general, which can result in the transformation of former ideas, in the creation of new sociological hypotheses and constructions.

Both approaches are in principle not only legitimate but must be complementary, for it is impossible to understand

the specifics of modernity without leaving its framework, without taking into consideration already known regularities and concepts, which in turn are inevitably enriched when applied to new material. The difficulty here lies in striking the balance between theoretico-sociological and concrete-historical views, for any tilt to either direction leads away from the truth.

Comparative historical analysis is a natural path and an integral part of the second approach. Of late such analysis has been used ever more frequently in the study of the developing countries by scholars both in the USSR and abroad. "Present-day revolutionary democrats," writes Soviet scholar K. N. Brutents, "much resemble their, relatively speaking, predecessors that attracted Lenin's attention."¹ T. B. Goncharova, another Soviet scholar, gives the following assessment of the conception of "Indianism" spread in a number of Latin American countries: "Diverse variants of this conception were found in the past in the countries of underdeveloped capitalism with patriarchal vestiges in the village (for example, in Russia in the second half of the 19th century), and they are found at present in many developing countries in Asia and Africa."² "The modernizing efforts of students and intellectuals in nineteenth-century Russia," says American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, "are, in many respects, a prototype for their twentieth-century counterparts in Asia, Africa and Latin America."³ Seeking the roots of the contemporary ideological trends in the developing countries, an American author, Crawford B. MacPherson notes that ideologists of the young states "have rejected almost wholly the liberal individualist utilitarianism of the West, but have drawn heavily on its earlier democratic tradition, the tradition of Rousseau and Populism."⁴ Janet G. Vaillant of Harvard University compares Negritude with Slavophilism.⁵ A British author, Isaiah Berlin, finds that "it is Populist ideas which lie at the base of much of the socialist economic policy" pursued today by the developing countries.⁶ Similar examples could easily be multiplied. Leaving aside the purport of these appraisals and views, let us note their common direction—a search for typological characteristics, for steady lines of development of social thought. Worthy of note is also the turning of several authors to 19th-century Russia as a source of ideological stereotypes to analyze ideological trends of the developing world,

The purpose of this work is to study one of the stable ideological traditions of the 19th-20th centuries, one which has received broad attention in the intellectual and political segments of the present-day developing countries—the tradition of populism (Narodism). The posing of this problem is by no means new. In Marxist literature it was studied by Lenin who, comparing Sun Yatsen to his Russian predecessors in the article “Two Utopias” stripped populism of its Russian clothes and theorized on the possibility of it appearing “in a number of Asiatic countries”.⁷

This methodological idea of Lenin has been given repeated attention in Soviet literature. Soviet historians and orientalists (A. B. Belenky, K. N. Brutents, R. A. Ulyanovsky, A. F. Shulgovsky, T. B. Goncharova, I. K. Samarkina, and others) have in various forms compared the contemporary nationalist ideologists with the Russian democratic thinkers, attaching in various ways a typological status to Russian Narodism.⁸ I have also proceeded from Narodism in considering problems of the developing countries.⁹ It became gradually feasible for elaborating and broadening the initial methodological base (Narodism in Russia), approaching a wider intellectual and cultural tradition in relation to which both Russian Narodism and its modern populist offshoots in the developing countries constitute but different varieties.¹⁰

Interesting ideas of comparative historical type are offered in the latest works of Ulyanovsky. He poses bluntly the “question of populism in the present conditions” and notes “whole layers of populist ideology” in the developing countries today. At the same time he points out a fundamental difference between the modern and past petty-bourgeois ideologies: whereas in the 19th and the early 20th centuries the anti-capitalist plans of Russian Narodniks were utopian and objectively indicated a prospect of radical bourgeois-democratic transformations, at the present historical stage, given the support of the socialist world system for the anti-imperialist struggle of the young states of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the alternative of their non-capitalist development along the socialist lines becomes a real, objective possibility.¹¹

All of the above shows that contemporary literature, including Marxist, leads to a typological assessment of modern petty-bourgeois-democratic thought in the developing countries by way of comparative historical analysis,

by seeking out the roots of present-day ideological conceptions in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

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* *

The concept of populism as a typological label for intellectual and political phenomena has acquired even greater currency in the last decade in scholarly literature abroad (including the developing countries).¹² Historically, the term "populism" goes back to the farmers' movement of "Grangers" and "Greenbackers" in the U.S. in the 1870s-1890s which resulted in an abortive attempt to form a "third" party in America. In 1892, during the formation of the People's party in the U.S., its activists were searching for a term which would set the new party apart from Democrats and Republicans. David Overmyer coined the term "populism" which rapidly took root.¹³ Since then the concept of "populism" has far surpassed its initial historical setting. In contemporary literature it is used mainly as a typological category to denote certain intellectual trends and social movements and it claims a deeper understanding of the ideological and political behaviour of the petty-bourgeois strata in different countries and in different historical epochs.

Theoretical substantiation of such an approach has been attempted by a number of authors (Edward Shils, Peter Worsley, Jean Leca and others), as well as by a special discussion organized by the London School of Economics and Political Science.¹⁴ However different students treat populism in different ways. Some authors, such as British sociologist Angus Stewart, doubt the possibility of giving a single definition to populism because "a certain shapelessness in ideas and organization is inherent in populism".¹⁵ Others, such as Peter Wiles, dare present the broadest definition possible: populism is "any creed or movement based on the following major premise: virtue resides in the simple people ... and in their collective traditions".¹⁶ The London discussion also entertained the suggestion that populism is "a sort of recurring mentality appearing in different historical and geographic contexts as a result of a special social situation".¹⁷ However, a "special" situation is understood in a rather broad sense: it implies conflicts brought about by rapid social change, clashes of old and

new, urbanization, modernization, destitution of the rural population, etc.¹⁸⁻¹⁹

The discussion concluded with the following definition of populism: "Populist movements are movements aimed at power for the benefit of the people as a whole which result from the reaction of those, usually intellectuals, alienated from the existing power structure, to the stresses of rapid economic, social, cultural or political change. These movements are characterized by a belief in a return to, or adaptation of, more simple and traditional forms and values emanating from the people, particularly the more archaic sections of the people who are taken to be the repository of virtue."²⁰

Let us cite some other attempts to define populism. In the opinion of American sociologist Shils, shared by another American author, Worsley, populism is based on two principles: the priority of the "will of the people" over any political standard and the striving of leaders for direct contacts with the masses, obviating any intermediary political institutions.²¹ French political scientist Leca singles out the following main components of populism: quasi-religious faith in the virtues of the simple man who is not "soiled" by the city, its temptations and corrupted leaders; distrust of the powers that be; contempt for politicians and officials. At the same time Leca defines populism as "one [ideology] of a society unified by the general will and in conflict with other societies that it accuses of domination".²²

Some students are washed of any doubt that populism is a self-dependent ideological and political phenomenon, while others deny this. For example, Wiles, one of the authors of the London discussion group, holds that populism is not a doctrine or movement, but an ideological and political tendency, a "syndrome" stemming from the belief in the people as a repository of truth, so that populism can be part of different currents.²³ There is much disagreement also regarding the socio-political complexion of populism. According to the same Wiles, "populism ... is very seldom revolutionary".²⁴ Other scholars, on the contrary, emphasize the radical character of populism and its close connection with socialism. For example, Argentinean scholar Ernesto Laclau, working in Britain at present, writes that "the highest form of populism is socialism",²⁵

Nor is there unanimity among Western authors regarding the phasico-historical characteristics of populism or social situations that give rise to it. Laclau fails to see populism's link with any definite stage of socio-historical development, merely connecting it with the decay of a society's dominant ideology and power structure, i.e. with a social crisis in general.²⁶ American political scientist David Apter, who embraces under populism "almost all" the ideological and political trends in the developing countries, defines them mainly as "*predemocratic*".²⁷ Dutch scholar Willem Wertheim links the "stage of populism" with the heritage of traditional political "patron-client" ties.²⁸

Latin-American author Gino Germani views populism as a product of "asynchronism" in the process of transition from traditional society to modern and at the same time as a consequence of "premature" involvement of the masses in political life that subjects them to manipulation by various political forces.²⁹ Argentinean scholar Torcuato di Tella, in agreeing with Germani that populism is a product of "asynchronism" and disproportions during the transition of traditional society into an industrial one, singles out such characteristics of the given social situation as the "demonstration effect" and the "revolution of rising expectations". But the main traits of populist movements denoted by di Tella are rather vague: an elite rising on the wave of the mass movement and propounding the ideology of "anti-status quo", creation of an ideology or a "wide-spread emotional state", etc.³⁰

On the whole, judging by the works of different authors, the list of characteristics and components of the populist complex is a mixed bag: "mysticism" of political behaviour, proclivity to inflationary slogans in the economic programme, anti-Semitism, conspiracy and at the same time fear of conspiracies, anti-intellectualism, xenophobia, etc.

This abundance of approaches towards the problem of populism can be explained by the fact that in many cases the authors limit themselves to intuitive or descriptive characterization of the phenomenon, without probing its "ontological" status, i.e. the concrete conditions of its origin, its historical determinants, the objective problems that give rise to populism, its connections with mass socio-psychological consciousness. No doubt, to determine the "ontological" substance of populism is not easy, but without such an attempt, the labelling of this or that intellec-

tual or political phenomenon as populism or the criteria of such labelling will inevitably appear arbitrary.

Hence the excessively motley and "metahistorical" assortment of historical events and intellectual currents that are shelved under populism. Judging by the London discussion, some authors trace the origin of populism to the Gracchus brothers and Vergil's "Bucolics". Populism is extended to the Levellers and Diggers of the English Bourgeois Revolution, Chartism, North American Populism, Narodism, "peasantism" in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia and others) in the first decades of the 20th century, the Labour Party, the Farmers' Alliance in Canada's province of Saskatchewan, contemporary ideologies in the developing countries, the "New Left", etc.³¹ Some authors throw in McCarthyism³² and Maoism.³³ There is also a "small" model of populism which includes mainly the contemporary ideological trends in Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as those in the developed countries of the West (the U.S.A., Italy, Finland, and others).³⁴ It is in this latter sense that the concept of populism, used more as a term of classification than a developed theoretical idea, figures in contemporary Western literature.

In principle, such an approach cannot be denied either realism or broadness of theoretical insight. In certain respects the authors manage to single out and analyse doubtless ideological characteristics of populism (its peasant orientation, inner contradictions of ideological constructions, reliance on traditional heritage, denial of class antagonisms within the people, etc.). With all that, one is struck by the vagueness of the meaning attached to the concept of populism by Western scholars.

In our opinion, there are two reasons for this. First, because two aspects of the problem have been confused: 1) populism as a system of ideas, a certain ideological tradition; and 2) populism as a socio-political movement, a peculiar kind of political culture. In the former case, it is a matter of integral elements of the ideological system of populism (Wiles, Leca, and others), in the latter, it is a question of the movement's political forms, relationships between leaders and masses, charismatic leadership (Shils, Worsley).

Of course, the two aspects are to a certain degree related. But the relationship is by no means direct, for the ideolog-

ical and political spheres are relatively independent of each other in general. Therefore this or that populist trend in practice can lean towards methods of "direct" democracy or charismatic leadership, or it can favour more "quiet" political forms and act within the framework of a parliamentary system. And, conversely, not every form of charismatic "leadership" that maintains "direct" contacts with the masses or paternalistic style of political guidance, can be included under populism—otherwise it would be necessary to group Russian Narodism or trends of contemporary "African socialism" together with fascism or some other authoritarian political movements.

And this is just what some authors do. According to Laclau, that which connects diverse populist trends is the concept of "the people" which virtually stands outside the class division of society. The objective reason for this is that, despite class divisions, society retains certain "popular traditions", the social and cultural heritage of the past which is relatively self-dependent and can be used by different classes and political forces for various purposes. This is a kind of "ideological raw material" (for example, egalitarian motives that since time immemorial are part of the collective consciousness, agrarian utopias, etc.) which is processed by intellectuals and turned into elements of class ideologies. Any political creed or movement wherein such popular appeals play a significant or leading role can be classed as populist.³⁵

Laclau distinguishes populism of the "dominant class" and populism of "dominated classes". The former seeks to smooth over and remove social antagonisms, i.e. to use "popular" slogans against the people themselves; the latter is out to resolve social contradictions by revolutionary means. But in both cases popular interpellations are a means in the fight for a "power bloc". Thus, according to Laclau, such figures as Hitler, Peron, Tito's followers, Italian Communists—all happen to be populists. And this is because for all of them popular appeals are a "form of antagonism".³⁶

"Classes cannot assert their hegemony," concludes Laclau, "without articulating the people in their discourse; and the specific form of this articulation in the case of a class which seeks to confront the power bloc as a whole, in order to assert its hegemony, will be populism."³⁷ Some of Laclau's observations and arguments arouse interest but the net

result is disappointing: his concept of populism is too formal and dissolves in ideological and political currents of the most diverse social and class distinctions.

Secondly, those definitions which treat populism as an ideological tradition also suffer from excessive broadness and vagueness. For example, Shils, who does not limit populism to the political cultural sphere but treats it as an old intellectual tradition, defines it from the latter point of view as a faith in the creative power, the spiritual and moral superiority of common people whose virtues contrast with the vices of the higher (the educated) classes.³⁸ I. Berlin's definition takes even wider proportions. Populism, he maintains, is a faith in the value of belonging to a group or culture, a search for the "roots".³⁹ The framework has been so enlarged that it can include nationalism, and fascism, and racism, because all of them are prone to search out "roots". This appears to be just the case where an abstract sociological approach dominates a concrete historical one. The point is that any sociological model, any search for analogy in history must be founded on the relevant characteristics of a stage or formation. Otherwise, one could easily discover, say, capitalism in ancient Rome, which Marx heatedly refuted.⁴⁰

Therefore the list of phenomena included under populism needs concrete historical and corresponding sociological differentiation. First of all, it is necessary to set aside pre-capitalist ideological trends. No matter how much resemblance can be proved between the Gracchi brothers and Russian Narodniks or between peasant utopias of the Middle Ages and the village cult of Frantz Fanon, these phenomena are essentially dissimilar in their tendencies. "Pro-peasant" ideas of pre-bourgeois epochs are conservative by their very nature, with their aim to defend and preserve traditional relations.⁴¹⁻⁴² Anti-feudal peasant uprisings—from Wat Tyler's rebellion or Yemelyan Pugachev's revolt to Taiping Rebellion—even if successful, on the whole did not go beyond the traditional system, the slogans in favour of a "good czar", etc. This process, after all, remained a circular movement. The type of the state was not changed, for the rebels imitated the ruling classes. On the contrary, the ideas of the petty-bourgeois and peasant democracy of the new and modern time, though traditional in form, reveal a different, essentially reformatory and modernizing substance. That is why the labelling of populism as "romantic

primitivism", made by British sociologist David MacRae, a member of the London discussion group, merely scratches at the surface.

Nor is it correct to identify the theory of "peasant socialism" in Russia or the contemporary movements of non-capitalist orientation in the developing countries with the "normal" bourgeois-democratic agrarian movements. The latter mainly give expression to the interests of the individualistic parcelled (or farm) peasantry. Such was American populism of the 1870s-1890s with its demand of a monetary reform, lower taxes, control of big companies, etc. which stemmed from the farmers' reaction to the growth of big capital and on the whole did not run foul of the already shaped and developed system of bourgeois relations. Such was "peasantism" in Romania or Czechoslovakia in the first decades of the 20th century with its bent towards economic individualism rather than communal collectivism. These and similar movements, both of early and mature capitalist epochs, remained within the framework of bourgeois relations and managed the tasks of organizing and safeguarding the peasants' private economies.

It is indicative that American scholar Ken Post, explaining peasant consciousness and peasant movements in the developing countries by the "model of populism", defines the latter as "rural reaction of varying kinds in incorporation into capitalism", but at a stage when such "incorporation" has not gone too far.⁴³ In other words, he distinguishes populism from bourgeois agrarian movements that correspond to a different and more mature phase of bourgeois development.

It is also necessary to differentiate populist trends by their socio-class characteristics. A serious flaw of both "big" and "small" models of populism is their ignoring the socio-class aspect of the phenomenon, their bracketing together trends and movements that are quite different in their social nature. Thus, Narodism was the ideology of peasants in the period of belated capitalist development in Russia; Chartism was an early proletarian movement in Europe; Poujadism was a movement of urban petty-bourgeoisie in France in the 1950s; New Leftism is the ideology of the oppositional bourgeois youth and students in the "post-industrial" epoch; labourism is in the sphere of Social-Democratic ideology and expresses the "trade-unionist" ideas of the working class. Similarly, it is only possible to fix some

common elements in such different, in their class tendency, movements and thinkers as "pochvennichestvo" (from the Russian *pochva*, meaning land), Slavophilism, Henry George and others. Populism ought to be specially separated from the close and similar doctrines and creeds—not only "pure" or "normal" bourgeois-democratic trends but also from all kinds of conservative utopianism, right-wing nationalism, reactionary romanticism, "feudal socialism", etc. And here of utmost importance (though it is not the only one, since demarcation must be also done in accordance with the logical structure of ideologies under consideration) is the socio-class criterion, that is, the linkage of corresponding ideological trends with their "own" class or their "own" mass social base.

Let us take the above-mentioned two main characteristics of populism proposed by Shils. In themselves, they do not lack basis but are merely insufficient for comprehending the essence of populism. For slogans of popular power as the highest political standard and leanings towards charismatic leadership at different stages of history and in different social environments can be the hallmark of rather varying intellectual currents and political movements. Such a definition remains solely institutional, devoid of socio-class content.

To our mind, it is not correct in principle to identify petty-bourgeois radicalism in the developing countries with the intellectual currents of the developed capitalist world ("New Left", "Italian populism", "Finnish populism", etc.). Even with admission of certain similarities among them—for example, there is some ideological echoing between Fanon's ideas and those of the New Left—there can be no doubt that the latter have their roots in rather dissimilar social soil and therefore differ in their orientation.

This is not to say that the concept of "populism" is not applicable to the realities of developed capitalist countries. But here, as we shall attempt to show below, the concept represents a different kind of trend and movement that act in a social context dissimilar to that in the developing countries, though it has certain affinity with populism in the developing countries. For the time being, let us conditionally denote these two kinds of populism as "political" and "intellectual". The point here is to keep them separate (not ignoring their connection, which will be dealt with later on).

Intellectual populism is typical of societies that found or find themselves in conditions of relatively late ("secondary" or "tertiary") development of capitalism, where the latter penetrates vast peasant territories and traditional, pre-capitalist structures. The process of "going bourgeois" in this case engenders certain social collisions, disproportions in socio-economic, political and cultural development and causes rather complex and contradictory ideological reaction. Anticipating further conclusions, we can describe this reaction as an argument in favour of a "special", non-capitalist way of development through integration into the process of modernization of traditional collectivist values and institutions, in other words, as a special branch of non-Marxist socialism. The socio-political contents of such theories and programmes may be quite diverse—from liberal-reformist to revolutionary-democratic.

Such ideological tendencies appeared in the 19th century in a number of European countries that were "late" in developing capitalism as compared with England. In a developed form the ideology of "peasant socialism" first appeared in Russia where Narodism as an ideology and social movement was active during a rather long historical epoch (the second half of the 19th-the beginning of the 20th century). Then followed another wave of petty-bourgeois-peasant ideologies fused during the surge of the national liberation movement in some parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America (from about the beginning of the 20th century) and remaining typical of many developing countries today, after the attainment of political independence.

The above-mentioned group of ideologies can be denoted both as "populism" and "Narodism" (or more precisely "ideological trends of the Narodist type"). After all, the choice of terms is not that important. Etymologically, "populism" and "Narodism" are identical and in principle one or the other term can be used for a typological category. Each has its pros and cons. This author initially preferred "Narodism", especially because an excessively broad and vague meaning has been attached to "populism" in foreign literature.⁴⁴ However, Russian Narodism was not the first ideology of this type. Similar ideological tendencies were known earlier in a number of European countries, even though they did not develop into such a systematized and significant ideology as Narodism. Moreover, the contemporary petty-bourgeois-peasant ideologies differ from those

of the past in a number of important respects. Therefore, the concept of "populism", being more international in its character (for in foreign literature it is not limited to its initial American source and is used in a general sense), seems terminologically more convenient.

As for "political" populism (in the developed countries), here the slogans of peasantphilism or "people-worshipping" (to borrow the expression coined by Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyev) have different content and different socio-political functions. Reflecting the sentiments of the marginal (as a rule, petty-bourgeois) strata of society suppressed by big capital but still remaining within the stereotypes of bourgeois thinking and behaviour, these slogans are mainly used by various political battling for a partial redistribution of power within the framework of the bourgeois political structure.

A certain amount of empirical material has been collected on the problem of populism. Attempts to understand it theoretically open up the perspective and great scope of this problem. Thus today we can state with certainty the feasibility and timeliness of the Marxist understanding of the phenomenon of populism in relation first of all to the study of the present-day developing countries.

This seems important not only from the viewpoint of theoretical understanding of ideological processes proper but also for determining (and specifying) their socio-class origins. For here it is a question of a wide spectrum of ideological currents and socio-political groups that find themselves straddling the line between apparent liberal-bourgeois reformists, and consistent revolutionary democrats leaning to a certain degree to scientific socialism. In Soviet literature this conglomeration of social doctrines and currents is usually termed petty-bourgeois. However, in some works this appellation, when applied to concrete ideological trends in the developing countries, becomes too vague. Not infrequently the concept of petty-bourgeois is used to "explain away" all ideological waverings and peculiarities of various movements and the zigzags in political thought. That is why we can't but agree with the opinion that to label as "petty-bourgeois" all ideologies of the young independent states, except proletarian and liberal-bourgeois ideologies, so that this labelling "becomes a sort of master-key to all complex ideological (and not only ideological) problems of the developing

countries, is quite groundless".⁴⁵ In other words, the concept of "petty-bourgeois" in relation to ideological trends and their socio-class foundations in the developing countries needs to be given definite form.

This purpose seems to be served to a certain degree by elaborating on the concept of populism. Analysis of the ideological traditions of populism just aims at such definition of form for it reveals the ideological and philosophic base of the trends under examination. In turn, the discovery of philosophic characteristics of these social trends helps us understand why they can have rather diverse political orientations—from petty-bourgeois-reformist to revolutionary-democratic.

Further, the concept of populism contributes to uncovering not only the historical roots of modern trends in the developing world but also, and most significant, their profound socio-historical preconditions, their *raison d'être*. In other words, such an approach aims at analysis from "within" as distinct from an "outside" point of view, which is sometimes abused by those studying the problems of the developing countries.

For instance, a number of bourgeois specialists on Asia, Africa and Latin America view populism as a synonym of authoritarian political thinking opposed to "Western democracy". This one-sided view apparently stems from a measure of "West centrism" which in turn is recognized today by many students as an external and one-sided criterion.

Regrettably, an "external" approach to ideological and political currents in the developing countries sometimes is to be found in Marxist works as well. Some authors assess the views of national ideologists and representatives of non-Marxist socialism only from the viewpoint of their correspondence or non-correspondence to the principles of scientific socialism. We hold however—and the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism provide ample proof of this—that a Marxist evaluation of the national and democratic trends demands above all an "inside" view, an estimation of those socio-class conditions and real problems that gave rise to these trends, followed by their definition on the basis of Marxist analysis of corresponding problems. This is even more so since in this case it is a question of creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the contemporary national liberation movement. In this respect anal-

ysis of the ideological and political environment in the developing countries with a view to a widespread ideological tradition of populism which has old historical roots and an inner logic of development (both social and ideological) seems useful and justified.

Of course, an attempt to trace any widespread ideological tradition involves some risk. Comparison of thinkers, social doctrines and movements separated in time and by the whole cultural-historical context can boil down to a discovery of certain "historical analogies" which may be (and author is aware of that) as much attractive as deceptive. Indeed, anthropological underpinnings of history—the singleness of "human nature" as that of a social being, certain community of human stimuli, interests, and values,—often lead the student to the discovery of a kind of "echoing" of different eras and generations, causing him to look for precedents. Very often such analogies turn out to be superficial, the clues happen to be false, and likenesses may obscure essential differences. And yet there may be cases when behind superficial resemblance stands a profound and essential connection which provides for a sociological hypothesis, a model of political structures, a typology of a revolution, etc. It stands to reason that in all cases it is necessary to stick to the principles of historicism, to take into account the differences and specifics of concrete conditions or historical epochs. But when a student of modernity turns away from the study of the past for fear of "going anti-historical" or under the pretext of the "difference of epochs", he thereby shuts himself off from theoretico-sociological analysis.

Sometimes such fears can be found in literature. For example, A. A. Iskanderov believes that to compare Russian revolutionary democrats with the contemporary figures of the national liberation movement is "very risky because these two phenomena are almost a hundred years apart during which the character of the epoch has radically changed and this has decisively affected all social processes and phenomena". "Of course, a formal analysis of these phenomena," continues the author, "reveals many things in common in them. Russian revolutionary democrats, and Sun Yatsen, and modern revolutionary democrats seem to have a common social base—the peasantry. All of them are spokesmen of the revolutionary democratic peasant masses. All of them oppose capitalism. But this is only an apparent

and superficial likeness which does not reflect the essence of the phenomenon."⁴⁶ And the essence lies in their different relation to scientific socialism, in the character of the new epoch "when the ideas of socialism have taken possession of the minds of millions of people in the developing countries".⁴⁷

Iskanderov is absolutely right about the new character of the epoch. Nevertheless, some of his propositions are subject to dispute. For one, when dealing with many "common characteristics" we can hardly speak of only a "formal", "purely apparent" and "superficial" likeness. For another, an historical epoch can be different in some (and very important) respects from the preceding one, and in some other respects, also very essential, be akin to it and constitute its continuation. For example, imperialism is a new historical epoch in comparison with classic capitalism of the 19th century, and yet it retains all the basic features of capitalism. It would be incorrect to ignore this unity because of the "new epoch" which Lenin pointed out when discussing the programme of the Communist Party at the 8th Congress.⁴⁸ By the same token, the contemporary historical epoch is a transitional one from capitalism (as well as from the early-capitalist and pre-capitalist relations in the developing countries) to socialism, and consequently retains continuity with the epoch of capitalism. Lastly, the modern epoch is characterized by the growing influence of scientific socialism. And this contributes to the development of today's revolutionary democracy and non-Marxist socialist theories (including populist varieties). This characteristic feature needs to be studied by means of socio-historical analysis, noting the changes of the present day in comparison with the past.

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This work examines the problem of populism as a whole, both in its theoretico-sociological and historical aspects. It is an attempt to build a general model of populist ideology, both sociologico-historical (from the viewpoint of its genesis, its socio-class and socio-cultural roots) and logical (definite stereotypes of thinking and ideological structures). Such analysis precedes concrete historical examination of the geographically oriented material, the national varieties of populism. Of course, it would seem natural to reverse the order of study, but for the purpose of a scientific expo-

sition and unfolding of the problem the path "from the abstract to the concrete", as demonstrated by Marx in *Capital*, is more justified.

But the work's great scope needs some reservations. Firstly, the book's main attention is focused on the populism of developing societies—from Russia of the 19th century to contemporary states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This circumstance is explained not only by the author's professional interests but also by the fact that populism, which arose on the periphery of world bourgeois development, is historically and genetically primary and constitutes a case study of the populist tradition. As for populist tendencies in the developed bourgeois structures, the author confines himself to general theoretical comparison of such phenomena with the populism of transitional societies and analyzes one national populist tradition (in the U.S.). This kind of populism forms a topic of its own and calls for special research.

Secondly, the book considers populism mainly in the sphere of ideas and as a type of ideology. The practical activity of contemporary ideologists and political figureheads of the populist type remains on the whole beyond the scope of this work. Undoubtedly, comprehensive analysis of populism in the developing countries implies shedding light on its practical applications in concrete political activity. This is especially important for the contemporary developing world since populism there manifests itself not only in social thought but in the programmes and practical political activity of certain ruling parties. However, this aspect of the problem, in view of its great scope and complexity, demands special and separate study. The sphere of social practice of modern populist ideologies will be touched upon mainly during the exposition of the socio-historical genesis of these ideologies, of the social conditions and causes of their origin and formation.

Lastly, analysis of populism as a whole involves such a great number of theoretical problems and such a vast amount of empirical material, that all of that can in no way be mastered by one author and in one monograph. Therefore, the author is cognizant of the inevitable incompleteness and insufficiency of this study. But his purpose was not to "explain everything" but to make a definite contribution to the study of this sizable problem and stimulate further efforts on this topic.

Part I

POPULISM AS A WORLD-WIDE PHENOMENON. AN ATTEMPT TO BUILD AN HISTORICO-SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL

A. POPULISM OF DEVELOPING SOCIETIES: A SEARCH FOR NON-CAPITALIST (OR NON-CLASSICAL BOURGEOIS) WAY OF DEVELOPMENT

1. MARX, ENGELS AND LENIN ABOUT NARODISM: METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

For a Marxist researcher the task of analyzing contemporary populist trends (and populism on the whole) is facilitated by the existence in Marxism-Leninism of an old and steady theoretical tradition of assessment of the populist and related ideologies and movements. It is difficult not to agree with Polish scholar Andrzej Walicki that of all diverse approaches Lenin's concept of Narodism is "still the best point of departure". Walicki specially stresses that Lenin's treatment of Narodism opens "a broad comparative perspective" and makes it possible to see Russian populism as a particular variety of an ideological model which appears in various underdeveloped societies reflecting the class position of the peasantry.¹

Therefore, our turning to the Marxist heritage is of a methodological significance for our theme, especially since Narodism is a typical, if not to say classical, variety of this ideological phenomenon. Marx, Engels and Lenin subjected the Narodnik ideology to many-sided criticism. Yet this criticism was constructive. For one, the founders of Marxism-Leninism saw in the Narodnik ideas a reflection of certain class interests, they noted the existence (from the viewpoint of these interests) of real social problems and offered a scientifically based solution to the latter. More, they examined populism in Russia not only in a specific historical context but also sociologically in the context of such general issues as the relationship of the proletariat and the peasantry, the interconnection between a bourgeois-democratic and a socialist revolution, etc. In a

number of cases they analyzed the international aspect of Narodism and some related problems.

Marx and Engels on Anti-Capitalist Tendencies of the Narodnik Movement. In formulating the problems of scientific socialism in Europe, the founders of Marxism also pondered the question of whether the proletarian struggle for socialism in the developed countries would be opposed by social movements in the world periphery where the "movement of bourgeois society is still in the ascendant".² That is why they met with interest the emergence in peasant Russia of forces that advocated "bypassing" the bourgeois stage of development.

Some authors suppose that Narodniks themselves "led" Marx and Engels to the problem of non-capitalist development and the possibility of socialist transformation of the peasant commune.³ We think, however, that the founders of Marxism approached this problem on their own. This is evidenced by their interest (since the beginning of the 1850s) in the pre-capitalist formations and communal ownership. Suffice it to name such works by Marx as "Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations" and "The British Rule in India". Also indicative is his letter to Engels, dated March 25, 1868, wherein he notes related features of communal and socialist collectivism.⁴ But undoubtedly the founders of Marxism did not ignore theoretical searches of Russian revolutionaries, having noted that they had posed an important problem. It is in this light that the attitude of Marx and Engels towards Narodism should be viewed.

Carefully watching populism in Russia, Marx and Engels evaluated this movement first of all in connection with its peasant base, moods and strivings. "The intellectual movement now taking place in Russia," Marx wrote, "testifies to the fact that fermentation is going on deep below the surface. Minds are always connected by invisible threads with the body of the people."⁵ He noted in particular the adherence of the peasants to the communal form of landownership.⁶

The founders of Marxism also noted the peculiarity of Russia's capitalist development which created a specific social situation giving rise to populist ideas. Even though in Europe, as Marx showed in *Capital*, primary accumulation was accompanied by mass violence and expropriation of the peasantry, in distinction from tsarist Russia, dissolution of pre-capitalist forms there was relatively gradual

and began long ago, before the industrial revolution. Hence in the West the transition to capitalism meant, in Marx's words, "*the turning of one form of private property into another form of private property*".⁷ Conversely, Russia faced a rapid destruction of the remaining forms of communal peasant property entailing inexorable pauperization of the rural masses. It was not for nothing that Marx wrote of the "dreadful vicissitudes"⁸ and the Caudine Forks of capitalism in relation to Russia.

Similarly, Engels emphasised that since Russia was "a country involved in the development of large-scale capitalist industry and at the same time a country with a *rather numerous peasant population*", it meant that the "impact made by ... the economic revolution could be more intense and acute here than elsewhere".⁹

It was exactly for this reason that Marx and Engels paid serious attention to the anti-capitalist tendencies of the Narodnik programmes and movement. Of course, they did see elements of utopianism in the Narodnik theories and criticized their "agrarian mysticism." But the problem of bypassing capitalism posed by the Narodniks was not discounted by them. Marx, in particular, touched on this topic in his letter to the editorial board of the journal *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (in reply to N. K. Mikhailovsky's article about *Capital*). He makes a very cautious assessment of the efforts "of Russians to find a path of development for their country different from that which Western Europe pursued and still pursues". On the one hand, Marx notes that Russia "has been taking a lot of trouble" in the direction of bourgeois development, and, on the other, he finds that the possibility in principle of non-capitalist development has not been lost yet, which would be "the finest chance."¹⁰

Under what conditions could this possibility be realized? Marx got a chance to explain his idea when he received a letter from V. I. Zasulich who sought an answer to whether the peasant commune could develop in the direction of socialism.

Marx was fully aware of the responsibility and complexity that the solution of this problem involved. This is attested to by three extensive and most interesting drafts of an uncompleted letter in reply. In a short letter addressed to Zasulich, Marx answered her question in the affirmative: the village commune could in principle become the starting point for a socialist revival of Russia. But this called for

a revolution in Russia that would manage first of all to remove the noxious influences which affect it [the commune] from all sides, and then to ensure it normal conditions of free development.^{10a}

This is not, of course, a socialist programme. Realizing that Russia faced a bourgeois-democratic revolution, Marx and Engels did not link it with socialist objectives. But, firstly, the founders of Marxism believed that Russia faced a revolution of special depth and force, of the 1793 type, which would go far beyond the limits of the 1848 type of revolution.^{10b} Such a revolution could in principle ensure a free development of the rural commune, and then "the latter will soon emerge as the regenerative force in Russian society and as something superior to those countries which are still enslaved by the capitalist regime".¹¹

Secondly, a Russian revolution would provide a powerful stimulus for the action of the socialist proletariat in Europe, so that both revolutions complement each other. This thesis which was expounded by Marx and Engels in the "Preface" to the Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto* in 1882 put the finishing touches to their conception of the non-capitalist development of a backward country (Russia): the linking of such a possibility with a socialist revolution in the developed countries. This proposition also underscores the central difference between the position of Marx and Engels and the conceptions of the Narodniks whose subjectivism and "agrarian mysticism" were constantly criticized by the founders of Marxism.¹²

Of course, the prognosis of a non-capitalist way of development, outlined by Marx and Engels, was primarily theoretical. Not only the external factor (revolution in Europe) but also the internal one (the likelihood of a mass peasant uprising in Russia) in the 1870s-1880s were rather problematic. Nevertheless, the general sociological statement of the problem by the founders of Marxism was of great theoretical value. It is also very important for the assessment of populist ideologies, for revealing their duality, the coexistence in them of bourgeois-democratic and anti-capitalist tendencies.

The Dialectic of Lenin's Appraisal of Narodism. Of special importance is the assessment of Narodism by Lenin who observed this social movement in an epoch of developed political struggle during which "the testing of Na-

rodnik theories by the *movement* of the masses" became possible.¹³

Soviet authors sometimes emphasize Lenin's negative pronouncements regarding Narodism. No doubt, he consistently criticized Narodnik views from the standpoint of scientific socialism. The acuteness of this criticism was also due to the fact that the Narodniks of the 1900s (mostly Socialist Revolutionaries) strongly competed with Revolutionary Social-Democrats for influence over the working-class movement and adhered to their own interpretation of Marxism. However, just as with Marx and Engels, Lenin's critique of Narodism was many-sided and substantial while his stance on it was objective and dialectic.

Lenin defined Narodism classically as an ideology of the peasantry as a whole and especially of its middle strata.¹⁴ He showed the real meaning of Narodnik "agrarian democratism" (having set it aside from Narodnik petty-bourgeois-socialist utopianism): the anti-feudal slogan of land nationalization during a bourgeois-democratic revolution meant, in fact, an "American", farmers' way of capitalist development.

This is not to say however that Lenin regarded the Narodniks as merely bourgeois democrats in disguise and their socialist "supplements" as mere cosmetics and nonsense. He showed that the Narodnik theories and programmes had to be appraised, firstly, in connection with their base—the social psychology of the peasant masses, and, secondly, in the context of a concrete revolutionary epoch in Russia. In the given epoch (in 1905 and especially in 1917) the significance of land nationalization was not limited by its bourgeois-democratic function. "A blow struck at landed property," wrote Lenin, "will facilitate the inevitable further blows at property in general."^{14a} In other words, under certain favourable conditions (the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolutionary movement), implementation of the Narodnik programme of "agrarian democracy" could create a kind of momentum for further radical social transformations and aid the working class in creating a proletarian revolution.

Therefore, ruthlessly criticizing the Narodniks' petty-bourgeois socialism—as in themselves their egalitarian ideals were nothing but an illusion of socialism never escaping bourgeois consciousness—Lenin at the same time pointed out the legitimacy of the socialist garb of Narodnik

democratism and the close connection of democratic and anti-capitalist elements in Narodnik conceptions and programmes. "*Inevitable* colouring of revolutionary democrats into S-Rs [Socialist Revolutionaries], taking S-R as a type,"¹⁵ he wrote in 1905. That is because Lenin took the socialist "supplements" of Narodism not simply as a product of the theoretical thinking by individual intellectuals but to a certain degree as an ideological equivalent of the moods and strivings of the popular masses. "Is it not natural," he wrote about the Narodnik-peasant utopia, "that the millions who are marching to battle, who for ages have lived in unheard-of ignorance, want, poverty ... should magnify tenfold the fruits of an eventual victory?"¹⁶

The "natural" strivings and exaggerations of the peasantry mattered a lot for the proletariat not only in a bourgeois-democratic but also socialist revolution. That is why in October 1917 the Bolsheviks incorporated in the Decree on Land peasants' mandates based on the Narodnik ideas of a "labour" norm of landownership, a ban on hired labour, etc. In a proletarian state these measures contributed to a certain limitation of capitalist relations in the village and constituted its virtual transitional stage to gradual socialist transformations in alliance with the working sector of the peasantry.

Thus, if the testing of the Narodnik doctrine by the "movement of the masses" in 1905 showed the historical significance of Narodnik democratism (in the struggle against the liberal and Stolypin solution of the agrarian problem which meant the "Prussian" way of the development of capitalism), then 1917 revealed the real meaning of the Narodnik "supplements" to democratism, the "supplements" that were misunderstood by Narodnik theorists themselves. The implementation of peasants' mandates, Lenin said, "laid the foundation, the most perfect from the point of view of the development of capitalism ... and at the same time created an agrarian system which is the *most flexible* from the point of view of the transition to socialism".¹⁷ And it was not only social institutions but also the wants and opinions of the peasantry itself which had been strongly radicalized in the conditions of a general revolutionary upsurge, war, devastation, discreditation of the bourgeois parties, etc. "History, accelerated by the war," Lenin explained, "has forged so far ahead that the old formulas have acquired a new meaning. 'A ban on wage-labour'

was formerly *only* an empty phrase bandied about by the petty-bourgeois intellectual. In the light of today, it means something different: the millions of peasant poor say in their 242 mandates that they want hired labour abolished but do not know how to do it. We know how. We know that this can be done only in alliance with the workers, under their leadership."¹⁸

Proceeding from the fact that Narodnik theories to a certain degree reflected not only democratic but also anti-capitalist potentials of the peasant movement, Lenin found it possible to say at the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets that "there was a sound, virile and great socialist core in the teachings of those who wanted to unite the working section of the peasants with the great socialist movement of the workers of the whole world".¹⁹ This was said in the period of cooperation of the Bolshevik party with the left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries that strove to maintain the revolutionary-democratic traditions of Narodism longer than other Narodnik factions but failed to hold firm to those positions. On the whole the Narodnik leaders in this period stood not only beneath the level of their "supplements" to democratism but even failed to be consistent democrats.

Lenin on the International Traits of Narodnik-Type Movements. However the undoing of the Narodnik leaders in Russia did not alleviate Lenin of the problem of appraising the rising petty-bourgeois peasant democracy in colonial and dependent countries, especially in the conditions of a new historical epoch opened by the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Hence Lenin's statement on the feasibility of non-capitalist development in the countries of the East after 1917.²⁰ Proceeding from Russian experience, Lenin explained that petty-bourgeois elements "are not by any means necessarily hostile to socialism under all conditions, or in all countries".²¹ He assumed that there could appear in the countries of the East some leading personalities in favour of, just as the Russian Narodniks were, a non-capitalist path of development.

This is evidenced by Lenin's afore-mentioned assessment of Sun Yatsen. In the article "Democracy and Narodism in China" Lenin wrote of Sun Yatsen: "His similarity to a Russian Narodnik is so great that it goes as far as a complete identity of fundamental ideas and of many individual expressions."²² Lenin realized that such a telling likeness

could not be fortuitous, hence his hypothesis on the probable existence or emergence of Narodism, or ideologies of a Narodnik type in "a whole number of Asiatic countries".

That Lenin singled out certain typological characteristics in Narodism is seen already in his early works, particularly, in the article "A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism" in which he undertook a detailed and extensive comparative analysis of economic views of Narodism and Sismondism. On the whole Lenin's appraisal of Narodism was an integral part of the proletariat's stance on the peasantry and its ideological representatives, i.e. one of the key problems of Marxist social theory in general.

The ideas of the classics of Marxism-Leninism regarding their evaluation of Narodism remain topical today. What's more, perhaps today they acquire even greater theoretical significance. The reason for this is that in the 19th century Russian Narodism remained mostly a local phenomenon and its advocacy of the possibility of non-capitalist development seemed rather academic. Now that the petty-bourgeois democracy has become an active force in the national liberation movement, and the ideas of non-capitalist development have become the basis of practical work for a number of ruling parties and groups in the liberated states, history cannot but touch modernity. It is natural, therefore, that the Marxist theoretical tradition of studying Narodism, both in a narrow and broad sense, is becoming topical.

In our opinion, of most value in the heritage of the classics of Marxism-Leninism in regard to ideological currents of Narodism is the noting of the contradictions, of the dual nature of these currents, of their symbiosis of bourgeois-democratic and anti-capitalist tendencies. Criticizing theories of petty-bourgeois-Narodnik socialism, the classics of Marxism-Leninism pointed out the links of Narodnik anti-capitalism with the peasant movement as well as the conditions under which the anti-capitalist movement of activists of the Narodnik type could result in something more than just illusions (that is, above all, under conditions of combining the peasant movement with the struggle of the working class for socialism).

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The 20th century, with its growing national liberation movement, has been increasingly proof of the profundity and farsightedness of Lenin's prognosis regarding the possible emergence of ideas of the Narodnik type in the backward countries entering the process of world development. A student of contemporary ideological currents in the developing states, familiar with Russian Narodism, should have no difficulty whatsoever in establishing in many cases a complete identity of fundamental ideas and of many individual expressions. Equally proof has been forthcoming of the inner contradictory nature of intellectual currents of the Narodnik type which were outlined by the classics of Marxism-Leninism.

Take the idea of non-capitalist development, of "skipping" or substantially curtailing the capitalist stage, which is most typical of the ideologists of the liberated states. Capitalism is repudiated in principle as an unjust social order and is contrasted to a society which is "motivated by a 'sense of service' and not driven by a greedy desire for personal gain".²³ Exposed is the one-sided technicist character of bourgeois civilization and mention is made in this connection of the danger of underestimating the "human cost of progress".²⁴ "Europe has never stopped talking about man ... we know now what suffering has been paid by mankind for each victory of its spirit."²⁵ These words of Frantz Fanon bring to mind the discourse of P. L. Lavrov in his "Historical Letters" on the price of progress.

Relevant are not only the immanent vices of capitalism but also its destructive influence on the traditional structures, on the national and cultural values. "It is difficult to measure the harm that Manchester has done to us," Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi wrote. "It is due to Manchester that Indian handicraft has all but disappeared."²⁶ Spiritual losses are even harder to compensate. The capitalist system brought in by neocolonialism, pointed out African political figure Tom Mboya, has deformed the traditional African structures of community based on mutual assistance and one-sidedly subjected them to the "profit motive".²⁷

Therefore it is necessary to return to the "wisdom and values of our fathers".^{27a} This is contemplated not as moving backward but as fertilizing scientific-technical progress by the national cultural heritage. "The philosophy of our revolution," emphasized Houari Boumediène, "must find its inspiration in our past, in our civilization, in our values

and faith."²⁸⁻²⁹ In a similar way, according to Ahmed Sékou Touré, a national liberation revolution should be understood as the restoration of a people's national identity. Mobilization of the cultural heritage, of traditional values and institutions, of the principle of community ("To us ... land was always recognized as belonging to the community"³⁰) as indispensable integral elements of a future society and non-capitalist way of development is a key idea in the doctrines of national theorists. "Socialism, therefore," Kwame Nkrumah wrote, "can be and is the defence of the principles of communalism in a modern setting."³¹

And here is a thesis proclaiming the "advantage of backwardness". The revolutionary energy of the Africans, says Senegalese theorist Abdoulaye Ly "is determined ... by the ability of a backward country to jump the stages passed by the developed countries and thus assimilate the material and ideological achievements of its predecessors in social evolution".³² It is even for the better that the country is underdeveloped and thus "unspoiled" for it can immediately embark on the right road. It is fortunate for the Africans, writes Nigerian author Bede Onuoha, that "they will not be encumbered by age-old structures... It will be with a virgin land, unsophisticated people and a young country that they will have to deal".³³

Along with the above points, just as in the past, the priority of the ethical factor in history and social life is being proclaimed. For instance, Arab ideologist Ismail Mazhar finds the feeling of solidarity one of the major determinants of society's life. History presents an alternation of periods of solidarity and its ebbing (wars, dissolution of states, etc.)³⁴ If hatred and envy, according to contemporary followers of Gandhism in India, provide a motive force of human nature, then love and sympathy can in no less degree contribute to putting into life social changes through society's voluntary consent to alterations.³⁵

The category of "the people" is central in the ideological and political thinking of many national ideologists. It is necessary, called Modibo Keita, "to go among the people, to share their joys and griefs even if this may involve the loss of certain advantages, in order that the people on whom one leans in liberating the country could aspire to a better life".³⁶ This "going among the people", "returning" to them is interpreted by contemporary intellectuals in the

young states as fulfillment of their duty towards the people, towards the destitute masses. "Where the poor have already begun to demand a just society," writes Julius Nyerere, "at least some members of the privileged classes must help them and encourage them. Where they have not begun to do so, it is the responsibility of those who have had greater opportunities for development to arouse the poor out of their poverty-induced apathy."³⁷ This is close to the ideas of Lavrov and Mikhailovsky on critically thinking personalities and their moral imperatives.

The resemblance to Narodism is not limited by separate points and elements but is evident in the very structure of these intellectual entities. Contemporary ideologies in the developing countries show the same antinomy, i.e. coexistence of contradictory and even opposing views. Orientation towards the peasantry ("Our experience", points out, for example, Sékou Touré, "constitutes a new attempt of socialist development in regard to peasant realities"³⁸) does not preclude a connection between the peasant and the worker: the peasant in the Third World countries, according to a Tanzanian newspaper, can be regarded as an agricultural worker.³⁹ The cult of the people is combined with its criticism and emphasis on the leading role of the cultural elite. "In marching towards socialist economy," the Burmese leaders believe, "it is imperative that we first reorientate all erroneous views of our people."⁴⁰ The inter-ideological antinomies also manifest themselves in the slogan of industrialization and fear of the latter, apology of the village commune and statement of its conservatism, etc.

The various ideologies have nearly the same intellectual ramifications: Fanon's resort to force and his reliance on "the undivided masses, ever keeping their Middle Ages character"⁴¹ (the peasantry, the lumpen-proletariat) are akin to Bakunin's ideas of "creative destruction"; there are also "etatists", intellectual avant-gardism theorists, adherents of the "soil", etc. Also indicative is the same spectrum of political trends, including such opposites as reformism and revolutionary democratism, mixed economy planks and radical egalitarianism, advocacy of peaceful ways and justification of armed struggle. There is also similarity in the "reflection" of Marxism when strong inclination and empathy for it are alternated with distrust, misunderstanding and alienation.

Whence this affinity and recurrence of ideas, this persistent ideological current running through different times and social conditions?

This question is relevant also (and especially) because of the spontaneity that is specific for the populist intellectual tradition whose phenomena mainly arise not as a result of continuity and intellectual borrowing but spontaneously. Thus the majority of ideologists of the contemporary developing states are not even acquainted with the Narodnik thought in Russia. But this only underscores the fact that the discovered resemblance between them is neither fortuitous nor superficial. If ideologies functioning in so greatly different epochs and rather varying socio-cultural contexts reveal similar motives, ideas and "bundles" of ideas, it is apparent that there must be general and deep-lying causes that give rise to such intellectual constructions. We mean a certain similarity between the social situation in Russia eighty to one hundred years ago and in the contemporary developing countries.

2. BELATED, PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM AS HISTORICAL SOIL OF POPULISM

Let us take a closer look at the social situation that the Narodnik thinkers in Russia attempted repeatedly to describe and whose appraisals are to be found in the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. In accordance with the general direction of our analysis we shall mostly rely on the material of the present-day developing countries.

Crisis Processes of "Transplanting" Capitalism. World capitalism developed and advanced by stages. We can single out the region of primary or classical capitalism (Western Europe and North America), secondary capitalism (Russia, Japan, Turkey and some East-European countries), and tertiary capitalism (colonial and dependent "periphery" of Asia, Africa and most of Latin America). The difference between them lies not only and not so much in time, i.e. in the sense of "quantitative" falling behind (Germany, for example, was behind Britain in the rate of bourgeois development and only slightly ahead of Russia), as in the type and quality of emerging capitalist structures. In the first case there was a spontaneous and organic origin of

bourgeois relations in the depth of a traditional society. In the second and especially third case, capitalism in its completed forms, borrowed or transferred from the central capitalist region, is placed in unprepared soil of backward countries where pre-capitalist structures still predominate. Hence various disproportions compounding the development of peripheral non-organic capitalism.

Social problems of the contemporary developing world have provided evidence that the process of primary accumulation in the countries of "secondary" and "tertiary" capitalism, preserving the general characteristics of primary accumulation as such (concentration of the means of production in the hands of an exploiting minority, taking over land from small producers, etc.), shows at the same time some important specifics, for it proceeds in very conflicting, crisis forms.

First of all, bourgeois relations in this case are not so much engendered within society as introduced from outside. The growth of a commodity economy in a backward and dependent country is prompted mainly by the demand of developed capitalist countries for cheap agricultural products and raw materials usually obtained on the spot by the old primitive methods. Thus, artificial introduction by the colonizers of compulsory crops on the African continent "had led to a characteristic ... hypertrophy of the sphere of commerce".¹ On the whole, the developing countries, as Finnish researcher Pentti Kouri noted, receive 70 per cent of their export revenues from the export of raw materials.² This feature is common to all economically backward countries which in many cases produce raw materials by primitive traditional methods.

The drawing of the aboriginal population into the commodity-money relations could be different in degree. For example, in the 1950s in Ghana almost 80 per cent of adult population in one way or another took part in commodity-money relations, in Nigeria 43 per cent, in Kenya 30 per cent³, but everywhere there was a gap between the spheres of commerce and production, the latter lagging behind the former. As pointed out in his day by Lenin, the colonies had been drawn into "commodity exchange but not into capitalist production".⁴

Of course, the development of trade, exchange and commodity-money relations has always been a necessary condition of capitalism. But it is not a question of commodity-

money relations per se (they were present in all pre-capitalist formations), but of "the *level* of development of exchange, commodity-money relations and, above all, their *links with production*".⁵ The level of development of exchange, corresponding to the emerging capitalist formation, is determined in the final analysis by the progress of production and growth of social division of labour, as demonstrated by the example of Western Europe. If a "trade boom" is not organically connected with the growth of national productive forces, is not "synchronized" with it, but only induced from outside by the influence and pressure of foreign capital, and if there is a "drastic shift of the agrarian economy towards the production of exchange values while preserving the natural basis of reproduction of its economic organism",⁶ then the expansion of the sphere of commerce only superficially resembles corresponding processes in Europe and North America. Such a boost in the commodity-money relations stunts the development of national productive forces and, consequently, the genesis of national capitalism.

The growth of commodity-money relations in the countries of "secondary" and "tertiary" bourgeois development was stimulated by other measures, besides export of raw materials, such as import of commodities for the benefit of the local wealthy buyers;⁷ introduction of compulsory low-paid labour, as was the case in Indonesia under Dutch colonialism, increased taxation. The undoing of the natural economy, points out Jack Woddis, a British Marxist Africanist, was carried out "not only through land seizures and forced labour but by the introduction of the cash poll tax system which compelled Africans to obtain cash".⁸ Ransom payments in Russia after the 1861 reform are also known to be of great significance for the involvement of the peasantry into the commodity-money relations.⁹ Parallel to this indirect taxation grows in a developing country.

The pressure of the commodity-money economy on the traditional population and domination of extensive raw material production result in a stratification of small producers, their mass ruin, and sheer physical degradation, undernourishment of the toilers in economically backward countries where "under-consumption on a vast scale is normal".¹⁰ A peasant, say, in Burma, selling high-grade rice to a buyer-up, was obliged to buy for his own consumption

lower kinds of rice and low-calorie foods (manioc, batata, etc.)¹¹ As pointed out by Czechoslovak economist, Ladislav Dvořák, production in underdeveloped countries is not designed in its major part for their own consumption, and, conversely, consumption in these countries is not covered to a large degree by their own production.¹²

All of this is bound to undermine the pre-capitalist sectors of the economy. Yet it is the specifics of the developing countries that the traditional economy is not only and not so much ousted by the capitalist one, but coexists with it, sometimes even strengthening its positions. And this is for a number of reasons. For one, traditional forms of economy are bound to stand their ground. On the part of small producers this finds expression in "involution" (a concept introduced by the American scholar Clifford Geertz), i.e. a passive adaptation of the peasantry to new market relations at the expense of overtaking their strength.¹³ As for the exploiting top layer of the society, it also tries to adapt to the disturbed economic conditions but at the expense of the peasantry. For example, in 19th-century Russia a period of relative growth of bourgeois relations was followed by "a second edition of serfdom", i.e. the counter-reforms of the 1880s implemented in the interests of the landlords. The latter shored themselves up against ruin by backing up serfdom vestiges in the village (metayage, artificially sustained communality, etc.).¹⁴ This kind of reanimation of pre-capitalist relations is very characteristic. For instance, in Algeria the growing concentration of land property in the hands of white colonists was paralleled by the strengthening of the local landed aristocracy that revived the traditional forms of extracting ground-rent, ways of tribal economy, *khamessat* (metayage), etc.¹⁵ Besides, in the conditions of a developing society, under the influence of intruding bourgeois relations, there is a strong tendency of "clearing" agrarian relations from patriarchal and early feudal customs and traditions. This tendency is typical of late feudalism which is adapting to bourgeois relations.¹⁶

A Latin-American economist, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, makes a special note that quite often penetration of bourgeois relations into a backward society results in strengthening traditional forms of exploitation of the population. There is, for example, a strengthening of control by the commune and its leaders over the cultivated and reserve lands, there

is an increase in money payments within the patron-client system (for instance, in the Indian commune *jajmani*). Also on the rise are various requisitions in favour of traditional chieftains and religious leaders, along with an increasing role of prestige-raising ceremonies and celebrations which become more luxuriant thanks to the concentration of revenues in the hands of the organizers. What calls for understanding here is the fact that a disproportionate development of commodity-money relations, not backed up by a corresponding growth of production, is the main cause of the contrast in the distribution of incomes and control over resources.¹⁷

Pre-capitalist forms are frequently conserved artificially by the local ruling elite and the bourgeoisie, both for economic and political reasons. This was also true of Russia in the past where for a long time bourgeois "predation" flourished just under conditions of vestiges of serfdom and on their basis, while the policy of the state aimed at strengthening the peasant commune for the purposes of easy surveillance and keeping peasants bound to the land. A similar policy was pursued by colonial authorities in the 20th century, relying politically on the traditional chieftains or feudal lords. Besides, under backward capitalism, the traditional sector was regarded as a necessary reservoir to siphon off redundant work force. "Thus capitalism has had a contradictory effect," writes Stavenhagen, "upon the traditional agricultural economy. While on the one hand it tends to destroy it, on the other it maintains and subordinates it to its own needs and interests."¹⁸

Thus, in the case of late and backward capitalism, measures that in principle facilitate the development of bourgeois relations very often have contrary effect. Though in contemporary developing countries "agrarian reforms have speeded up capitalist transformation of the landlord and top-peasant economy, they have also contributed to further spreading of the bondage lease, to an activization of trade and usurious capital, i.e. to furthering pre-capitalist forms of exploitation of peasantry".¹⁹

Undoubtedly, the existence and even revival of pre-capitalist relations cannot be examined without the general line of the capitalist relations, which envelop traditional structures. N. A. Simonia is right in pointing out that the evolution of trade and usurious capital that has grown recently in South-East Asia is heading in a bourgeois di-

rection, being a "special transitional stage" of emerging capitalism.²⁰ But the point is various kinds of pre-capitalist vestiges and structures (usury, bondage lease, etc.) in themselves have a rather low capacity for generating capitalist relations of production and consequently the process of bourgeois development proceeds in forms most ex-cruciating for small producers.

This situation of intermediary, transitional society, of which Lenin wrote in relation to 19th-century Russia ("old, semi-feudal, natural, economy had been eroded, while the *conditions for the new*, bourgeois economy had not yet been created"²¹), puts objective, endogenous obstacles on the way of capitalist development. Capitalism needs an internal market but the buying capacity of the majority of population is undermined by the very process of primary accumulation under the conditions of late, backward capitalism. The situation is further compounded by the imports from the developed capitalist countries. For this reason, for example, local fertilizer factories in most developing countries are only used to half of their capacity.²²

In such circumstances capitalism in a backward country is deprived of the necessary freedom to manoeuvre. This is shown, for instance, by the problem of low or high prices for agricultural production, as debated back at the end of the last century in Russia.²³ The growth of commodity production, implemented in the main by the upper layer of the peasantry, demands high prices for agricultural production which runs against the interests of the mass of buyers of these products, and consequently puts limits to the development of national, including industrial, capitalism.²⁴ Low prices, in their turn, extending the domestic market, have a negative effect on production growth. Ensues a kind of vicious circle. The capitalist sector stunts the traditional branches of the economy, above all agriculture, while the latter's stagnation is a serious limiting factor for industrial capitalism. According to British economist Maurice Dobb, one of the main factors limiting the industrialization of the developing countries is the lack of "marketable surplus of agriculture."²⁵ This structural disproportion between industry and agriculture, typical of the countries of the second and third echelons of bourgeois development, constitutes a tenacious and formidable obstacle in the development of national capitalism in these countries (as distinct from the countries of Europe and

North America in the 18th-19th centuries where industrial capitalism grew on a "healthy basis" of progressing agriculture and its marketable surplus).

The above rule is confirmed by the example of even such a country, relatively far advanced along the road of capitalism, as India. Let us refer to the analysis by R. Das Gupta, an Indian Marxist economist. India, he says, has gone some way in capitalist development but there is no certainty she will go it to the end because there is a number of limiting factors. For one, it is the limitation of the domestic market. The growth of population engaged in industry and outside agriculture in general, i.e. of the consumers of the commodity production of the village, is not so rapid as would suit the interests of capitalism in agriculture. The small and smallest producers squeezed out of agriculture are not becoming, due to their poverty, consumers of agricultural production either. On the whole, by the most optimistic estimate, the foodstuff commodity production does not exceed 30-40 per cent of the total foodstuff production.²⁶

For two, national capitalism is hindered by a vast army of paupers. For three, capitalism is held back by pre-capitalist relations, and, what's more, the Indian monopolistic bourgeoisie wants their preservation for they ensure its highest (and mostly non-productive) profits. At the basis of this phenomenon, concludes Das Gupta, lies the disproportion between industry and agriculture, city and village, traditional sector and modern.

On the whole, the process of primary accumulation in the countries of "secondary" and "tertiary" capitalism is distinguished by essential peculiarities from "primary" capitalism of the West European region. The specifics here is not simply in the sharp social contradictions and conflicts (in Europe, too, capitalism went through "fencing", work houses, expropriation of small producers, etc.), but in a substantially aggravated nature of social problems in the epoch of primary accumulation, as well as in far fewer possibilities of finding positive solutions to these problems. Classic capitalism, as it becomes clear now, took a much longer historical time to form (16th-19th centuries). The mollifying factor here was the very gradualness of the process, as well as its organic nature, i.e. the fact that bourgeois relations "sprouted" spontaneously from within, from the precapitalist structures, having accumulated from epoch

to epoch the necessary formative conditions—economic, social, political, intellectual, cultural. Whereas in the countries of “secondary” and “tertiary” capitalism it comes into being, so to speak, “overnight” under outside pressure and influence, here “the genesis and development of capitalism proceeded without a prior formation of corresponding prerequisites”.²⁷

Further, the process of primary accumulation in developing countries is complicated by the very fact that capitalism on a world scale has already achieved developed forms. Infiltrating backward countries, mature capitalism finds its actions checked because it can operate effectively only within the established framework of the capitalist system and in accordance with its laws. Developed capitalism can no longer “process” traditional structures the way early capitalism of the 16th-19th centuries did. A modern mechanized enterprise cannot “stoop down” to a manufactory, it needs a mass market, a high percentage of fixed capital, a corresponding level of social division of labour, etc. That is why developed capitalism only adjusts traditional structures to its interests and enters into an abnormal coexistence with them. Hence the disproportion between industry and agriculture; exploitation of the traditional economy by way of its one-sided raw-material-for-export specialization; chaotic penetration of commodity-money relations into the economy of a backward country without corresponding development of its productive forces; finally, permanent limitation of the development of capitalism on national soil.

Defective Character of the National Bourgeoisie. Thus, in a backward country it is destructive, not constructive, functions of capitalism that come to the fore. The “self-braking” of bourgeois evolution is caused in this case by the fact that “capitalism, affecting social forms that are not based on private property, leads to their quick dissolution, however this process by its very nature must slow down the development of capitalism”.²⁸ This circumstance puts an indelible mark on the character of the budding national bourgeoisie.

To a certain extent the inaptitude of the national bourgeoisie showed up already in Russia. The predominance of primitive, predatory forms of primary accumulation, a relatively thin stratum of entrepreneurs, a raw material specialization of export, parasitizing on lucrative government

orders, etc.—all of that contributed to a major economic backwardness and political reptileness of the Russian bourgeoisie, as it was graphically demonstrated in the bourgeois-democratic revolutions.

As for the bourgeoisie in the majority of present-day developing countries, it exists in two forms. Firstly, as a dependent bourgeoisie, dominated by the world capitalist market and working for it; secondly, as a “grassroots” bourgeoisie, engendered spontaneously by small-scale commodity production. In both cases the national bourgeoisie shows traits of certain defectiveness, of social and economic inaptitude, which gave reason to the well-known African revolutionary Amílcar Cabral to call it native pseudo-bourgeoisie.²⁹

In fact, some of its groups can hardly be bracketed with the national bourgeoisie for they are appendages of international corporations and the production of their enterprises, and even a solid part of their profits end up on foreign markets. Such centres of commodity production are based “not so much on the social division of labour in a country as on international division of labour created by imperialism”.³⁰

The development of the small and middle national bourgeoisie is even more affected by backwardness, by pre-capitalist vestiges, by the traditional structures that it tends to destroy, but most of all, by the blocking hotbeds of developed, “external” capitalism. Therefore the growing tendency of agriculture to produce for the market, as shown in recent works by Soviet economists, is not a direct indicator of the growth of the local bourgeoisie in the developing countries. “The bankruptcy of the peasantry here goes on faster than the creation of capitalist forms of economy... At the same time the growth of well-off farmers proceeds at a slower pace.”³¹

This results in a wide gap between the grassroots micro-bourgeoisie (small farmers, traders, owners of small workshops, etc.), only a small part of which can be labelled petty-bourgeois by European standards, and the big bourgeoisie, linked with international capital. The middle stratum of entrepreneurs is very scanty. The majority of the nouveaux riches avoid investing in industry and settle down in trade and services, which tendency is typical of present-day developing countries. For example, in Zambia in the last decade 78 per cent of African entrepreneurs have been concentrated in trade and services.³²

The feebleness of the entrepreneur stratum within the na-

tional bourgeoisie of backward countries is not fortuitous. Free competition here does not agree at all with industrial enterprise; the latter can only grow in the hothouse conditions created by government favours. But "the artificial removal of free competition and sundry favours ... result in an early, artificial appearance of monopolies with their tendency of stagnation".³³ Sometimes national monopolies can reach considerable size, as for example in India. But in this case even more manifest are the vices of late capitalism and the parasitic traits of the national bourgeoisie of the backward countries—the indifference of the monopolies for the acute needs and demands of national development, their oppressing influence on the other sectors of the economy, their avarice for superprofits.

Again, the root cause of this phenomenon is not that the local bourgeoisie is genetically unfit for free enterprise, but lies in the conditions of its "late" genesis, i.e. its co-existence with highly developed and domineering capitalism. If in Europe bourgeois evolution started in the age of the manufactory with its low capital investment norm per worker, then at present an entrepreneur in the East needs capital in amounts that, as a rule, exceed his capability. But even if there is enough capital for starting a technologically streamlined capitalist enterprise, the latter may find itself "out of business" because of the problems of marketing, of stimulating technological progress despite cheap labour, etc. Thus the high level of scientific and technical development of modern capitalism has its other side in the backward countries showing a slow pace of socio-class changes of capitalist type and limits set to the formation of the national bourgeoisie and its social capabilities. In the West, as noted by L. I. Reisner, the process of class formation and of the genesis of bourgeois society was facilitated by its passage through all the stages of capitalist production, starting from the lowest forms. For "the lower the organic and technical level of industrial capital, the lower the capital content of production and the higher the labour absorption of enterprise, the more intensive the process of class formation on both poles [the proletariat and the bourgeoisie]". Whereas in contemporary developing countries infiltrating capitalism is characterized by an "economy" tendency in regard to live labour which factor tends to slow down class formation (and the growth of capitalism on the whole).³⁴

A number of the above characteristics, typical of late, backward capitalism—one-sided raw-material-export ties with the world market, coexistence of bourgeois and pre-capitalist structures, mass pauperization of the traditional population, the “marking of time” by national capitalism, predatory methods of primary accumulation, premature monopolization—all of these were known already in 19th-century Russia. The Narodnik economists were able to point out some of these features. At that time their observations seemed strange, of course, especially if various extremes and recipes offered by the theorists of “economic romanticism” are taken into account. But, as Andrzej Walicki observes, “what was ‘bizarre’ from the point of view of the classical Western model of economic development, is seen today as a typical feature of the development of backward countries in conditions of a rapid but uneven growth of the economy of the world”.³⁵⁻³⁷

The Complicating Factors of the 20th Century. In comparison to Russia of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, late-stage capitalism of contemporary developing countries is fraught with a number of complicating factors. Some of them compound social processes of primary accumulation by degree, others are responsible for a new quality of dependent development.

The failure of local capitalism to ensure high rates of growth of production and employment is sharply seen against the background of the population explosion in the developing countries which were densely populated even before. The excessive population growth is felt above all in the village where “pressure on the ground” has risen many times over in the last decades. For example, in agriculture of North Africa “redundant” hands (and mouths) comprise, by most conservative estimates, from 30 to 50 per cent of the gainfully employed population. A distinctive factor, in comparison with Russia, is also lack of arable land in many of the developing countries, especially in Asia.

And as for industry, it can absorb the rapidly growing reserve army of labour only to a tiny degree. Thus, in two decades (from 1950 to 1970) in all the developing countries the share of the industrial sector in the GNP increased from 25 to 33 per cent, while its share in general employment of the gainfully employed population rose only from 12 to 14 per cent.

That is why the pauperization of small producers is rising "on a widespread scale hitherto unknown".³⁸ In India, as admitted by her political leaders, almost 68 per cent of the population live beyond the poverty line—28 per cent more than a quarter of a century ago.³⁹

In conditions of extreme overpopulation and mass poverty every effort to instil "cultured" capitalism in a developing country turns into a problem and even tragedy for a large part of the population. For example, the launching of big capitalist plantations of cotton and sugarcane in the Avash valley in Ethiopia at the beginning of the 1970s, as shown by Swedish economist Lars Bondestam, caused lack of land, economic and physical degradation of the mass of local herdsmen and land tillers.⁴⁰

Growing pauperization of the traditional population tends to create a huge army of migrants leaving their villages and seeking all sorts of temporary work and permanent residence in cities. In Zambia, back at the end of the 1960s, a third of the population did not live in the district they were born in.⁴¹ In Ghana, 60 per cent of migrants are unemployed.⁴² Even more striking figures are on record for the countries of South Asia. Such a scale of pauperism and chaotic, "premature" urbanization was unknown in pre-revolutionary Russia, even though the phenomenon of "vagabondism" was conspicuous there at the end of the 19th century and was viewed by Narodnik intellectuals as a national tragedy. But what would they say about many contemporary cities of Asia and Africa with their vast surrounding belts of "bidonvilles", ghettos and slums, ridden with crime, joblessness, poverty and lack of sanitation.

All these phenomena are of most serious economic and social consequence. In the economic aspect they mean a catastrophic rise in unemployment which, according to specialists, will go on rising in the developing countries at the rate of about 2-3.5 per cent a year.⁴³ Modern capitalist production cannot absorb this reserve labour army because, firstly, it is based on technology with a higher capital than labour content, and, secondly, for development it needs markets which are ever more curtailed by the growing pauperization and unemployment. "It is obvious already now that penetration of modern technology into the economy of young national states considerably complicates the problem of realization for capitalist enterprises ... and puts serious limitations on the development of capitalism."⁴⁴

Even more dangerous are consequences in the social aspect because social evolution acquires a chaotic, unmanageable character and leads to a violation of social balance in society. The discrepancy between labour and capital, between the destruction of traditional structures and the creation of modern ones results in a situation wherein "new structures have no time to take root and we have a destructured society, devoid of striving for development".⁴⁵

The described processes of "tertiary" development of 20th-century capitalism are different from "secondary" 19th-century capitalism mainly in degree—in connection with a widening gap between developed and backward capitalism. At the same time these phenomena show graphically the regularities of late capitalism on the whole, and in particular such a paradoxical regularity as bourgeois development in the world's periphery accompanied not by curtailment but expansion of traditional sectors,⁴⁶ that are becoming "sediment reservoirs" of capitalism, for late capitalism can no longer function without recreating, supporting and conserving traditional structures that grow into gigantic hotbeds of backwardness and destitution.

New Quality: "Peripheral Capitalism". The major difference of developing countries from the Russian situation is their total domination by the outside capitalist market which is a consequence of their colonial and dependent past. With all her socio-economic lagging behind the advanced powers, Russia was not a colony. Capitalism in such a country—thanks to her size, great natural, including land, resources, etc.,—possessed a much greater potential for development than do present-day backward states.⁴⁷ It is of significance also that at the end of the 19th century the world capitalist market and the imperialist system as a whole had not yet been molded as "rigid" as today, so that they could still be penetrated by "runner-up" countries. Incidentally, Lenin called Russian capitalism "semi-weak".⁴⁸ And the well-known African economist Samir Amin defines pre-revolutionary Russia as a "lagging country of central capitalism".⁴⁹

As for colonial and dependent countries, their development from the outset was meant to be "extravert", i.e. dominated by the external market of imperialist metropolises. This opened up a new phase of late, backward capitalism which faced a "drastic shift in the balance of external and internal factors of development".⁵⁰ External factors of eco-

conomic and non-economic coercion became in many respects determining and simultaneously oppressing for the socio-economic evolution of the developing countries. There appeared the phenomenon of "peripheral capitalism".

The latter subject has of late been scrutinized in the works of Soviet scholars (V. L. Tyagunenko, P. M. Avakov, K. L. Maidanik, V. V. Krylov, and others), as well as by foreign authors (Arghiri Emmanuel, Samir Amin, Selso Furtado, and others). Though a lot remains still unraveled and moot in these works, some aspects pertaining to our theme have been clarified well enough.

In the system of "peripheral capitalism" the problems and vices of late and backward capitalism are carried to the extreme. A well-defined raw-material-for-export specialization, foisted by international capital on the developing countries back in the colonial period, entailed serious negative consequences for the national economies, both direct and indirect, i.e. structural. Direct losses are connected, first of all, with unequivalent exchange between the "periphery" and the "centre" when there occurs "an exchange of a lesser quantity of labour of an economic system or country [developed capitalist one] for a greater quantity of labour of another economic system or country".⁵¹ Besides, the liberated states are wholly dependent on the price situation on the world capitalist market. For example, in 1975 the level of prices for copper fell 45 per cent against 1974,⁵² which dealt a serious blow at Zambia's economy. No less tangible are the losses of developing countries exporting natural products, caused by a growing tendency of advanced capitalist countries to develop and use manmade substances.

But even more substantial are structural shifts taking place in a developing society as a result of artificial reorganization in economic links and export orientation. Disorganization and dissolution of traditional structures, undermining of the economy of small producers, violation of ecological balance (soil depletion resulting from extensive exploitation, chaotic use of fertilizers, etc.) entail an agrarian crisis. The latter is also connected with the undoing of traditional handicrafts by imports of industrial products from developed countries.⁵³ According to some economists, the demise of farm-oriented crafts that was not followed by the creation of local industry is no less responsible for the present crisis in agriculture of the developing world than

the population explosion. On the other hand, the agrarian crisis is caused not only by the differentiation of small producers and dissolution of traditional structures but also by their conservation, a spread of intermediary economic forms under which the emergence of agrarian capitalism proceeds most slowly and excruciatingly for the mass of rural population and which constitute "the most graphic manifestation of the agrarian crisis as a structural crisis".⁵⁴

Among the other structural features of "peripheral capitalism" are a predominance of light industry in the sphere of industrial production; a hypertrophy of the non-productive, tertiary sector (transport, trade, services, etc.), which in poor countries employs 60 per cent of gainfully employed population as against 45 per cent in the U.S.⁵⁵ The non-productive sphere (situated mainly in cities) is sought by bankrupt handicraftsmen and peasants ousted from agricultural production. Yet the city has an increasingly diminishing capacity to integrate them. In distinction from Western Europe in the 18th-19th centuries, where urbanization was, as a rule, a natural consequence of growing employment in the cities, the situation in the contemporary developing countries is reversed. For example, in Egypt, urban employment fell down almost one and a half times from 1914 to 1960.⁵⁶ And this is a general tendency in developing countries (in Asia and Africa, in the first place), which means, as shown by T. S. Pokatayeva, that the process of urbanization is connected, as a rule, with the growth of non-productive sectors (political and administrative establishments, educational institutions, infrastructure, etc.).⁵⁷

If bankrupt handicraftsmen, paupers, etc., make up the lower part of non-productive sectors, then their upper quarters are filled with constantly growing bureaucracy. This swelling of non-productive branches is not an accidental but natural consequence of the "external orientation of development" and of those mechanisms that shut out a great part of work force from production.

In its social aspect, "peripheral capitalism" is characterized by a mounting property and status polarization of society, with an income gap much greater in backward countries than in developed ones. And this gigantic social inequality is nothing but a means of reproducing conditions of dependent development. "In fact it opens up a market for luxury goods" imported from the centres.⁵⁸

"Peripheral capitalism", presenting a qualitatively new

stage of evolution of late, backward capitalism in general, is yet not an absolutely specific product of modernity. A number of structural elements of such capitalism (although in a mild form) were present already in the 19th century, in particular in Russia. So now we have a development of this phenomenon, an unfolding of its inner regularities that become clearly defined. Summing up these regularities some Soviet scholars (Reisner, in particular) come to the conclusion of a "progressively narrowing framework for the emergence of this type of production [i.e. capitalism] in the contemporary developing states".⁵⁹

Opposition of External and Internal Impulses of Development. I do not at all claim to present here a comprehensive model of socio-economic processes in the countries of late capitalism. I am aware that certain conceptions and propositions of economists I rely on here (for example, the theory of "peripheral capitalism") can be considered to a certain degree one-sided.⁶⁰ However, in my opinion, there is no denying in the works of modern (and not only modern) economic thought the conclusion regarding the profoundly contradictory and crisis-ridden process of backward countries turning bourgeois, these features stemming from their coexistence with and domination by the countries of developed capitalism.

It is just this overfall in levels of development that entails, on the one hand, a rapid expansion of "external" capitalism (not only foreign, but also national capital connected with foreign or close to it in type) into the traditional structures of backward countries, an expansion that disorganizes and destroys these structures. On the other hand, this process, by its very nature, slows down the advance of capitalism. The latter is compelled to resort to "enclaves", separating itself from traditional sectors and social institutions and at the same time attempting to adjust the methods of capitalist exploitation to its objectives.

Thus a socio-economic multistructure comes into being and takes root in countries of late, backward capitalism. In relation to Russia it was noted by Lenin, and now it is intrinsic for a great majority of states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. A socio-economic multistructure here means not simply coexistence of different modes and structures but their disunity and disharmony. These aspects have been widely researched into in Soviet literature of late.⁶¹

Foreign studies include works by Dutch economist Julius Boeke who, taking Indonesia as an example, has shown a "functional dualism" of developing society, the disunity and antagonisms of modern and traditional economic sectors.⁶² There is also a prominent Hungarian economist, Tamás Szentes, who has shown the negative impact of the dualistic socio-economic structure in the developing countries on domestic market, capital formation and labour, for the foreign market orientation of the most developed sectors of production inevitably undermines the domestic market.⁶³

A socio-economic multistructure means not only the opposition of the above-mentioned sectors. It appears simultaneously as a consequence of the clash between "external" and "internal" capitalism, which represent two different phases of historical development, and this is fraught with a number of paradoxes when viewed from historical, economic and socio-political standpoints.

In a formal-economic sense, "external" capitalism comes out as a revolutionary force, which is supposed to transform traditional structures and in principle having the necessary means, organizing experience and technological know-how to accomplish this. But as has been shown above, developed capitalism is unable to fulfill its mission in this case inasmuch as it remains to be a mode of production for profit. So in a developing country it is constrained to defending what it has won, i.e. the dependent status of a given country. It means that in relation to the national interests of young states, the interests of local capital (not to speak of the interests of the toiling masses) "external" capitalism acts as a conservative handicap. It is just the developing world, as noted by V. V. Krylov, that exposes with special force "the crisis of an elemental social process based on private property".⁶⁴

"Internal" capitalism, spontaneously sprouting from small commodity production, is going through an early bourgeois phase of development and is objectively interested in the liquidation of pre-capitalist vestiges and in the "processing" of traditional structures. Viewed from this angle, any developing country faces general democratic tasks of doing away with pre-capitalist fetters of exploitation and vestiges of feudalism, of resolving the agrarian problem, etc. all of which is a natural prologue of bourgeois development. But the paradox is that these bourgeois-

democratic measures (similar to those in European countries in the 18th-19th centuries) cannot be carried out without opposing "external" capitalism and ending the crisis created by it. For the same reason, the liquidation of pre-capitalist vestiges and forms is not simply a bourgeois-democratic measure but to a large extent an act directed against capitalism (both foreign and domestic) because traditional structures are mainly reproduced and maintained by late capitalism, for they constitute its "anomalous forms".⁶⁵

It is just the social situation of late, "secondary" or "tertiary" capitalism, described above, that gives birth to ideologies of a populist type which combine bourgeois-democratic and anti-capitalist motifs. The latter may mean programmes of "improved" capitalism, as well as a real striving to go beyond it.

Additional Favourable Conditions. Late, peripheral capitalism provides general social ground for the growth of populist ideologies. But their forms, level of development and systematization, their place and influence in social thought and struggle depend on many conditions and concrete circumstances, favourable or otherwise for the functioning of this intellectual phenomenon. For backward society engenders not only populism but also such intellectual and political forces as conservative neotraditionalism and bourgeois reformism; ideologies that combine traditionalism with bourgeois modernization (of the Stolypin or Pakhlavi type); revolutionary democratism free, or mostly free, from populist elements, and, finally, Marxism, which all come out as ideological and political rivals of populism.

Therefore it is necessary to single out additional social factors that favour the birth and development of a populist ideology. They can be listed as follows: the gravity of the agrarian problem and presence of a peasant movement; the weakness of the local bourgeoisie compared with foreign; certain conditions under which more or less overt ideology of bourgeois industrialism is viewed as an alien one; authority of the state sector; sufficiently high development and social activity of the intelligentsia.

Let us briefly examine these factors. The first one seems rather important for without a peasant background, without a sufficiently emphasized peasant question an ideology cannot be rated within the populist tradition, no matter how

much it uses the word "people" in its slogans and programmes. In many cases the emergence of populist trends was connected with a peasant movement or rebellion—in Madagascar, Kenya, Indonesia, Mexico and others. But a peasant movement may not be clearly defined, it can be covert, potential, as was the case, for example, in Russia. Here Narodnik intellectuals bided their time for four decades of oppositional activity without any support from the peasantry, and it was an upsurge of the peasant movement at the beginning of the 20th century that caused, as Lenin put it, "a certain revival of senile Narodism".⁶⁶

The acuteness of the problem of landownership is also, as a rule, an important accompanying factor in the genesis of populist ideologies. General orientations of agrarian transformations may differ: they may be anti-feudal (as in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, and in a number of Asian and Latin-American countries) or anti-colonial, aimed at liquidating the consequences of a "trade economy" (as in many African countries). But in both cases of much significance is the preservation of pre-capitalist forms of landownership which provides real ground for populist "supplements" to the bourgeois-democratic agrarian transformations. Conversely, a far advanced dissolution of traditional forms of landownership is unfavourable for populist ideologies and tends to lead to bourgeois solutions for agrarian problems.

In general, the more viable and firm are traditional relations in a developing society (even on a socio-psychological level), the greater the probability of populist ideas emerging. This makes comprehensible another favourable factor—weakness of the local bourgeoisie, including particularly that in the village. Take, for example, Tanzania. Jannik Boesen, a Belgian Africanist, points out that even in the most advanced coffee-producing areas of Tanzania real agrarian capitalism did not take root because profit is not a stimulus for production here and hired labour, even in the well-off families, accounts for not more than 30 per cent of labour expenditure.⁶⁷ And if we take a no less "populist" country of Peru, the following evidence is provided by the authoritative scholar and political figure, founder of the Communist Party of Peru, Jose Carlos Mariategui: "Within one hundred years of the Republic of Peru we have not got a real bourgeois class... The old feudal class, camouflaged as a republican bourgeoisie, has retained its posi-

tions."⁶⁸ Characteristic are Modibo Keita's ironic words regarding the French administration: "True to the colonialist policy of quick and maximum profit..., the French prevented the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie, an indigenous capitalism. This spared us the trouble of making a needless revolution to mobilize the peasants for the building of socialism."⁶⁹

Of course, the concept "weakness of the local bourgeoisie" has a relative value in different regions. As regards African countries, it is relevant in a direct sense as reflecting the small number and economic weakness of the bourgeois elements. And in respect of, for example, India or Russia in the second half of the 19th century, it means other aspects: dependence on foreign capital and international capitalist market, a low level of integration with other sectors of national production, parasitism on government subsidies, political conservatism, etc. But in all cases populism necessarily includes criticism of the local bourgeoisie and its "non-effectiveness". Populist ideologists point out not only bourgeoisie's socio-economic weakness but also its intellectual flaws. They note, in particular, that pro-Western liberal-bourgeois trends in developing countries manifest an inability to creatively solve national problems, or, to use the expression of Syed Hussein Alatas from Singapore, they present the phenomenon of "imprisoned thought". When Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of Ivory Coast, explaining his strategy, says that "the phase of inequilibrium and inequality is the price each country striving for progress must pay",⁷⁰ he echoes almost word for word many Western economists and sociologists.⁷¹

But the main point is not, of course, in intellectual imitation but in the fact that the policy pursued by bourgeois reformists in the developing countries often tends to ignore vital problems of these countries, in the first place, an acute process of marginalization and pauperization of the mass of toilers, their socio-psychological moods, etc. As pointed out by American scholar Jon Woronoff, the "modernism" of the Ivory Coast leaders is only relevant to the upper layer of society and remains alien to the peasant.⁷²

An additional "irritant" to populism and an argument in favour of non-capitalist development is provided by the existence of foreign bourgeoisie. Specifically, Narodnik writers complained against the "dominance of Germans". Even more indicative is the nationalist and anti-capitalist

reaction to the foreign bourgeoisie in the contemporary developing countries—the Chinese in South-East Asia, Indians in West Africa, Syrians in East Africa, etc.—as a factor stimulating populist intellectual currents.⁷³

Further, a definite intellectual milieu is necessary for the appearance of a populist ideology. On the one hand, this demands a relatively high intellectual level of the environment so as to work out a complex ideology; on the other, this intellectual environment ought to be still sufficiently “underdeveloped”—in the sense of its weak integration into society, isolation from the ruling classes and opposition towards them, just incipient on a mass level of professionalism and culture. But given even these conditions, the inclination of the national intelligentsia to populist ideas depends on additional circumstances, such as the existing intellectual traditions and influences, and the ideological climate in general. Intellectual contacts of different circles of the intelligentsia with the outside environment can stimulate, besides populism, other democratic and revolutionary currents—non-populist or even anti-populist. Thus, in Russia in the second half of the 19th century there existed, along with Narodism, another—true, much less popular—current of democratic enlightenment (D. I. Pisarev, N. V. Shelgunov, G. E. Blagosvetlov and others), which was on the whole non-populist, though cooperating with the Narodniks. In the contemporary developing countries a number of public figures and groups also come out with ideas that do not correspond to or even oppose populism. Such is, for example, the position of Dahomey’s publicist Stanislas Adotevi with its strong criticism of Negritude and other African “native soil” conceptions and its struggle against traditionalism.⁷⁴ In the same way Amilcar Cabral and his followers rejected the assertions of the “national socialism” theorists alleging that the role of culture in young African countries boils down to coming back to the roots. A non-populist democrat can be told apart from a populist by his anti-traditionalism. This is well stated, for example, by Agostinho Neto, the outstanding political leader of Angola, who emphasized that MPLA was striving to liberate the people by a double revolution, aimed both against the colonial yoke and the outdated traditional structures.⁷⁵

This does not mean that populism and non-populist democratic movements are locked in confrontation. On the

contrary, populism (above all, in its revolutionary variant) by necessity includes democratism, an anti-feudal (and anti-archaic) tendency, just as non-populist democratism is rarely devoid of warm feelings towards socialism or of a socialist hue. Both these ideological types appear in the same socio-historical phase of inter-formational transition and constitute an answer to about the same set of historical problems—social, political, cultural. That is why a number of populist currents of the past and present form an integral part of the camp of revolutionary democracy. Yet these close ideological configurations lay different accents in a number of aspects. Non-populist democratism comes out more consistently for the liquidation of pre-capitalist vestiges, whereas the attitude of populism toward traditional structures is not that simple. It stands for a selective treatment of traditional structures, for the use of traditional collectivism in social reforms along socialist line. But being more “traditional”, populism also comes out for modernization, though objectively this can mean either bourgeois or socialist orientation.

Lastly, besides liberal-reformist groupings or “pure” revolutionary democrats, the national intelligentsia is much influenced by Marxism. All these currents can seriously affect the populist ideology, modifying it or limiting its sphere of activity. Pre-revolutionary Russia provides a classic example, since from the end of the 19th century Narodism in Russia conceded hegemony to Marxism in public thought and the liberation movement. In the same way in some present-day developing countries populist trends are being ousted by avant-garde parties whose programmes are based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism (and sometimes populist figures can evolve leftward, taking on some Marxist features).

As for bourgeois-nationalist and liberal-bourgeois trends in general, under certain conditions they can also take over the initiative from the petty-bourgeois democracy of a populist type. In general, ousting of populism by various rival ideologies confirms by a negative example the above-mentioned set of additional social conditions whose presence is favourable for, and conversely, whose lack is detrimental to the development of populist trends. In this connection, let us examine just one but very typical example of Kemalism.

The social situation in Turkey during the revolution of

1917-1923 could well engender populist trends or movements. And it also had some features which can in a large measure explain the national-bourgeois character of the Kemal ideology and policy. The peasant movement in Turkey was relatively weak and heterogeneous as compared with that in Russia and China—agrarian reforms from the second half of the 19th century had produced in Western and Southern Anatolia a considerable layer of developed small-commodity peasantry which formed the vanguard of the revolution. At the same time, the Anatolian bourgeoisie which formed the core of the Kemal political organization, was not compromised by links with imperialist capital, in contrast to big commercial, and mostly non-Turkish, bourgeoisie; the former's ideology was not viewed as alien and foreign.

Nevertheless, though in a relatively subdued form, populist tendencies did show up in the Turkish peasant movement. Taking part in the revolution were detachments of the "green army" that demanded land for the peasants, rejected the capitalist way, interpreted socialism as adherence to old traditions and principles of Islam, etc. And the Kemalists themselves, having done away with the "green army" movement, were obliged to heed the peasants' demands. In the first period of their activity the Kemalists "had the image of a revolutionary petty-bourgeois organization close to the Narodnik and socialist-revolutionary type".⁷⁶ Also indicative was the Kemalists' political demagoguery to the effect that "Turkey is owned by the peasant", that the country lacked social cleavage and class differences, that the revolution was going along a "special" path, etc. It was only in the late 1920s that the ideology of Kemalism showed a "gradual fading of populist motifs"⁷⁷ and switching over to the positions of "usual" bourgeois democratism.

To a considerable degree the success of the Kemalist bourgeois course can be attributed to subjective factors—Kemal Atatürk's charisma, the able domestic policy manoeuvring of his government that managed to carry out a number of democratic reforms, liquidate the sultanate, replace Panturkism with a realistic and nationalistic slogan of Turkism and, what's more, satisfy the peasantry for a time by abolishing the feudal natural tax (*ashar*).

However, since social contradictions of "late" capitalist development (above all, the agrarian question) were not resolved radically enough, even contemporary Turkey is

the scene of recurrent manifestations of populist ideology. Thus, in the 1960s a group of progressive-minded figures came out with pretty radical statements which contained strong criticism of the capitalist course of the government, demands for a radical land reform and strengthening of the cooperative sector, as well as calls for building a "Turkish socialism".⁷⁸

On the whole, the Turkish example, confirming the regularity of populist tendencies appearing in a corresponding social situation, at the same time shows in what conditions these tendencies are curbed (mainly with an insufficient scope of the peasant movement and a far advanced differentiation among the peasantry).

Finally, the existence of a considerable state sector is among social factors instrumental for the appearance of populist ideas. For example, in Russia of the 19th and the early 20th centuries there was a significant state economy and various state institutions to the "supra-class" functions of which Narodniks repeatedly appealed. In contemporary developing countries the state sector often springs up out of the colonial enterprises and state establishments. It is viewed by a populist ideology as the main lever of non-capitalist industrialization and planned socio-economic development; the greater the scope of a country's state sector, the more possibilities are there, with other conditions equal, for the emergence and growth of populist ideological tendencies.

3. SOCIO-CLASS MECHANISM OF POPULIST TREND FORMATION

Mass Socio-Psychological Level. The destructive impact of bourgeois relations on the pre-capitalist structures is felt very acutely on the socio-psychological level, even more so than on the institutional level. For not so many new institutions are created as old ones destroyed. The latter still exist but rendered to a large extent invalid; the customary way of life is violated; old links break down. Penetration of individualistic and proprietary attitudes into a formerly stable system of traditional collectivism; a mounting rivalry among members of a community, tribe or caste; a growing property inequality with its mass destitution; "awakened" material demands with minimum possibilities of their satisfaction; a swift breaking down of customary orientations in life, of socio-psychological views and norms

—such is the picture of backward countries “going bourgeois”.

A mass representative of traditional society cannot but react very painfully to this rapid and rough breaking down of the customary way of life. He finds himself in a state of constant change, in a situation of uncertainty; and this plunges him into a pathological condition.¹ According to psychiatrists, spread of education among semi-literate population, resulting in a considerable influx of information, tends to cause a strong psychological stress.² But something more serious is happening in the process of bourgeois modernization. The whole experience of a man of traditional society is put in question — all his values and the world he lives in (his family, community, village, etc.). Hence “the sense of dispossession” (aptly coined by American publicist Ferdinand Mount) which is commonplace among the masses of population in the developing countries.³ Hence “the angry beggary”, the growing danger of which was pointed out in his day by G. I. Uspensky who observed the post-reform Russian village degrading under “the power of money” and showing declining morals, spreading crime, theft, drunkenness, etc.⁴

The danger of mounting social tension resulting from a drastic expansion of bourgeois relations was clear even to reactionaries. For example, Jan Christian Smuts, a leading ideologist of British colonialism, emphasized that the fall of tribal society had to be prevented by all means. Otherwise, the indigenous society would crumble into human atoms and that was fraught with the possibility of general chaos.

These considerations are partly responsible for the policy of intentional conservation of traditional relations which, as has been noted above, is characteristic of ruling elites in many backward countries, a policy that was pursued by the colonizers not for a “harmonious” development of colonial and dependent countries, of course, but in order to strengthen the colonizers’ economic and political domination. But traditional relations are also supported from “below” by the population itself. The onslaught of bourgeois relations, making the material and spiritual existence of ordinary people problematic, is seen by the traditional population as a “disaster” and therefore, consciously and subconsciously, they resist the new.⁵ Hence the stability of traditional relations and pre-capitalist institutions,

whose dissolution, as was pointed out in recent works by Soviet authors, was often overestimated in literature.⁶

When the Narodnik publicists in Russia emphasized the unwillingness of the peasant "to abandon land" and join the factory hands, that was often interpreted as an example of idealization and conservatism. However modern research has confirmed that these observations were not idle. For example, Mossi migrants from Upper Volta and Mambwe migrants from Zambia who seek earnings in Ghana and at copper mines in Zambia, periodically come back and are reported to feel that "life cannot be tolerated without their kin membership, symbolized in land ownership, and the status they receive from being members of the traditional political structures of their people."⁷

Traditional relations not only persist but are constantly reproduced and woven into the fabric of contemporary institutions which may only appear modern. V. G. Rastyanikov has noticed a curious regularity in India to the effect that hired labour is more widely used in less developed, overpopulated and rather poor rural areas than in areas with a predominance of big farms.⁸ It turned out that hired labour was in reality a form of traditional cooperation and mutual assistance, a means of supporting poor relatives. In this respect, the modern structures themselves are not totally immune to a revival of traditional relations. Ethnographers have evidence, for example, that modern means of communication can strengthen communal ties since the railway runs through the "land of ancestors".⁹

Undoubtedly, this shows the conservatism and stagnant character of pre-capitalist relations and their agents who can reject any innovations and progressive changes. But it would be shortsighted not to go beyond this statement. The toilers of peripheral societies have subjective reasons to resist bourgeois progress for it brings them physical and mental degradation rather than any good, whereas the system of traditional ties provides at least for an acceptable existence. The classics of Marxism-Leninism pointed out that the peasant commune could act like a "shock absorber": under the most adverse conditions it not only "does not cause poverty but, on the contrary, it alone softens it up".¹⁰ N. K. Mikhailovsky in his day said the following regarding the negative attitude of the masses towards bourgeois way of life that helped restore traditional institutions: "The old bonds turned out to be in some respects

more tolerable than the new ones for they at least protected the person from storms and rainy weather."¹¹ Some such reaction is displayed today by an Indian handicraftsman, a Peruvian peasant, an African herdsman.

The tenacity of traditional relations and reliance on traditional cultural heritage considerably increased during the anti-colonial struggle. "The colonizers' offensive against the veil," noted Frantz Fanon, "is opposed by the colonized with the cult of the veil."¹² But even allowing for the nationalist impulse of contemporary developing countries, we cannot regard the rejection by the masses of traditional population of various aspects of bourgeois modernization as mere traditionalism. The situation is much more complex since modern values have already penetrated traditional mentality and are being assimilated by it, as noted by many students. For example, in the rural communities of eastern Madagascar the cult of property (*tromba*) is fixed in religious rites and ceremonies.¹³ Anti-urbanism, as a widespread tendency of mass psychology in contemporary Asian societies,¹⁴ is combined with a longing of the rural population for the city. For some strata of the population (peasants in suburbs, for instance) the threshold between the traditional and modern structures is psychologically overcome rather quickly, as revealed by an interesting survey conducted by Alex Inkeles and David Smith in a number of developing countries on three continents.¹⁵ But modern and traditional values, as well as practical relations, are not integrated into a comprehensive system and suffer incessant antagonisms. At the same time bourgeois modernization, in the opinion of the great mass of producers of a developing society, does not promise any tangible positive prospects and appears as a corroding and destructive factor while traditional values and ties constitute a restraining and stabilizing factor.

For a time an equilibrium can be maintained in society through the conservation and animation of traditional ties but social antagonisms are bound gradually to increase. "*The South Asian village*," writes Gunnar Myrdal, "*is thus like a complex molecule among whose parts extreme tensions have been built up. Although the tensions crisscross in a manner that maintains equilibrium, it is conceivable that they might reorganize in a way that would explode the molecule. This probably would not happen spontaneously, but as the result of a forceful onslaught from outside.*"¹⁶

The destructive influence of bourgeois relations from "outside" sooner or later outweighs the stabilizing and adaptive capacities of traditional ties, and a backward society begins "to explode".

Social protest in the countries of "peripheral capitalism" is engendered by two kinds of exploitation—pre-capitalist and capitalist, but bourgeois oppression—the pressure of commodity-money relations, loss of land, etc.—is felt as more painful. Dutch scholar R. Buijtenhuijs points out that the seeking of earnings "on the side" brought the dissatisfaction of African peasants to the point of a Mau-Mau revolt in Kenya.¹⁷ In reality such a reaction to the capitalist methods of exploitation is a reflection of more complicated objective factors, namely, the fact that the pressure of bourgeois relations is compounded by the heavy burden of pre-capitalist vestiges, so that the two forms of exploitation merge into one. "Pre-capitalist exploitation of peasants," writes R. A. Ulyanovsky, "has never mixed on such a scale with capitalist exploitation as is the case in our epoch. This objectively leads to a situation wherein the peasant, the poor toiler, the semi-proletarian, i. e. the main characters of the Asian and African village, are regularly turned into spontaneous adversaries of capitalism."¹⁸

Thus, equilibrium in a developing society is incessantly violated by the onslaught of capitalist and pre-capitalist antagonisms, and a social crisis can be provoked by one or another factor. According to Michael D. Baring-Gould, the cause of the 1910 Mexican Revolution was "the attempt to transform Mexican society into an urban capitalist system without destroying its feudal land and social structure", that is to say, the preservation and even strengthening of latifundism was especially oppressive against the background of growing capitalism.¹⁹ In other cases, dissatisfaction is mostly caused by factors of bourgeois development. But, as a rule, it is simultaneously directed against pre-capitalist exploitation, and, vice versa, anti-feudal protest develops into anti-capitalist action.

Under the crisis conditions of peripheral societies and dissolution of traditional structures, a new impulse (and meaning) is given to the ideas of mass egalitarian movements of the past—from the Mazdak movement to the Taiping Rebellion. These popular movements, periodically arising in pre-capitalist society at the time of social upheaval, had tendencies of egalitarianism, messiahship and re-

turn to the "Golden Age" of justice.²⁰ The utopian views of traditional masses were largely derived from religious beliefs, from the elements of egalitarianism contained in Islam, Buddhism and other religions. In their time Russian Narodniks intensively sought contact with the "rebellious" peasant masses and with sectarian groups in particular. In contemporary developing countries the scale of spontaneous mass protest is even more impressive. Thus, according to David Barret, in 1967 about 5,000 popular-sectarian groups (on a symbiotic religious basis), with a total strength of 7 million, were active in 34 African countries.²¹ That was the soil on which sprang the rebellion of Mau Mau in Kenya, the Simon Kimbangu movement in the Belgian Congo, as well as a number of mass peasant revolts and unrest in India, Indonesia, Philippines and Latin American countries. Recently, a number of works have appeared which are devoted to the utopian-egalitarian movements of the past and present, among which stand out the research by the German author Wilhelm Mühlmann and Brazilian author Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz. Regrettably, this is not the place to dwell on this interesting topic. Let us just note that marking the traditional orientation of mass egalitarian movements (especially in the past) the above authors also mention such traits of these movements that can lead beyond traditionalism. In particular, distinguishing the restoration strivings of messianic movements and the primitivism of demands by peasants that sought a "hierarchy in reverse" in regard to the power structure, Pereira de Queiroz also holds that these movements "were not condemned to complete immobility"²² and under certain social conditions could result in a change of existing structures.

Mühlmann views the indigenous mass movements as collective actions inspired by the desire to restore the wholeness of the group's consciousness violated by the infringement of a higher alien culture. And this, according to his observations, leads not only to tendencies of restoring traditional values but also of active borrowing of the "foreign", which is accepted in this nationalist context not as something alien but as a native entity.²³ The irreversible character of modernization in backward countries sometimes changes the nature of "restoration" impulses of mass egalitarian movements of the 19th-20th centuries.

Popular protest movements have certain features of spontaneous, primitive socialism. Kostas Vergopoulos even believes that socialism appeared as "contemporary to capital from the beginning of the New Time", and the bourgeois society was formed not as "an outgrowth of the feudal society" but as "a force of opposition to the liberating socialist alternative of the popular masses", above all the peasantry.²⁴ This opinion can hardly be underwritten in its entirety, for socialism as a scientific teaching and a mass movement made its appearance only in the epoch of industrial revolution and was connected with the formation of the working class. But we can fully agree that egalitarian ideas and currents, directly preceding this period (beginning from the 16th century in Europe), became one of the sources of utopian socialist thought and later one of the sources of the populist trend of utopian socialism.

If we try to determine the milieu that gives rise to populist moods and ideas, then it is the petty bourgeoisie that provides the main social background for different patterns of populist ideology—the petty bourgeoisie in the classic definition of Lenin: "A small producer, operating under a system of commodity economy..."²⁵ This definition is broad enough for it means not only a producer entirely or mostly working for the market, a true-bill agent of the commodity-money relations (though such, naturally, belong to the petty bourgeoisie, forming its upper crust). The definition also includes a peasant who buys and sells from time to time; and a handicraftsman who works for a stable system of intra-village or inter-village cooperation. It was not accidental that Lenin worked out the concept of petty bourgeoisie with due account of the Russian material, for in Russia the petty bourgeoisie had already a number of peculiarities as compared to the European region.

And as for the contemporary developing countries, the peculiarity of the petty bourgeoisie there is even greater. This has been repeatedly noted in Soviet literature. "In Eastern states," points out A. I. Levkovsky, "this class is characterized, among other things, by a much greater 'pollution', bonds with other, non-petty-bourgeois institutions (economic, social, political, cultural, etc.). Therefore in different countries or in different periods with separate groups of direct producers we can find different degrees of petty-bourgeois features which, however, do not make a distinctive quality of the petty-bourgeois

class.”²⁶ Of most significance in this connection are features of traditionalism, the merging of petty-bourgeois elements with traditional relations and institutions.

V. V. Krylov comes up with an interesting proposition that a small farmer in developing countries, a producer of monoproductions at fixed purchase prices for the state or the world market is not “a petty bourgeois ... but rather a worker of a dispersed capitalist or state manufactory”.²⁷ Some students also point out the socio-economic multistructure of petty-bourgeois strata in these countries, the predominance among them of economically unstable, not well-to-do elements, so that the Afro-Asian petty-bourgeois mass has more features of a toiler than of a proprietor.

Comparison with the petty bourgeoisie of the developed states shows that the majority of corresponding social strata in the developing countries are petty-bourgeois not so much in reality as potentially and in tendency. This explains, in particular, the fact that the main complex of petty-bourgeois traits (the wavering and contradictions of social behaviour, the combination of labour and proprietary features, etc.) reveals itself among small producers in the Afro-Asian world chiefly on a socio-psychological level. Such a dichotomy of petty-bourgeois psychology is expressed clearly enough by the populist ideological complex.

Nonetheless, populism can hardly be viewed as a mere synonym of the petty-bourgeois nature and defined as a purely petty-bourgeois ideology. These concepts are close but not identical. In a sense populism is broader than the expression of moods and ideas of the petty-bourgeois strata. It amalgamates social protest from all strata of the population in a developing society suffering from “late” and deficient bourgeois modernization. Of course, petty bourgeois (in a broad sense of the word) make up a significant part of this suffering population but do not at all form the whole of it.

Special mention should be made here of the patriarchal and semi-patriarchal peasantry, of the wide strata of the rural poor—it is with these groups, especially on a subjective-ideological level, that populism is closely connected. Claiming to express the interests of “all the peasantry”, populism is perceptive to a much greater degree to the sentiments of the exploited peasant majority than are bourgeois-democratic agrarian trends. This aspect was specially emphasized in Lenin’s analysis of Russian Narodism. In

the same vein, urban populism is to a large degree inspired by the sentiments of the urban lower strata made up, as a rule, of former villagers.

In this connection we can point up such an urban product of village degradation as lumpen-proletariat. In its time the theory of Bakuninism, aimed directly at this layer of population, constituted an anarchist trend of populism. Similar tendencies can be observed in contemporary populist currents in the Afro-Asian countries. V. B. Iordansky, for example, writes that "a very large part of the youth, especially students, were sort of mesmerized by ... the unusual growth of lumpen-proletariat, a layer of people that broke with the peasantry but found no place in the city. They began to believe that the main contradiction in African cities was the conflict of these destitute people with the rest of society. Along with the peasantry, these people were declared the 'true' proletarians of the continent."²⁸ And that is natural, for a pauper is viewed by the populist as a direct result of negative bourgeois modernization that "up-roots" the peasantry which makes up the mass of population. That is why the moods of the urban mass, their unrest and movements cannot but influence a populist ideology.

Thus, even though the focus of socio-psychological protest in a degrading society in the epoch of late bourgeois evolution is found in the village, the said protest involves certain strata of urban population as well. These are in the first place rural migrants that bring their traditional views and stereotypes into the city and who periodically migrate back into the village. These are also various representatives of middle urban strata (clerks, traders, etc.), as well as a part of workers who happen to be former peasants that keep some sort of bond with the village. Some authors ascribe, and with a reason, populist views to the latter category, objecting to the exaggeration of differences between workers and peasants in the developing countries that is common in recent years for many scholars in the West and the developing countries themselves.²⁹

Intelligentsia as Agent of Populist Ideas. Social fermentation that grows in the depth of a backward society quickly spreads to its educated strata. Under conditions of sharp contradictions of late capitalism and socio-psychological stress, a group of intellectuals comes forth from the mass of traditional population and starts generating populist ideas. An ideology of this type can be created not

only when social conflicts have gone a long way but even their first symptoms show up, so that the future is "played out" in the heads of ideologists conscious of the example of other countries.

In principle ideological constructions, always and everywhere, are created by intellectuals. But in populism ideological functions of the intelligentsia are especially striking—above all in the minds of populist theorists themselves. In any case, to explain the ideological activity of the populist cultural elite it is not enough to state its belonging to the stratum of "professionals", "workers of mental labour". It is necessary to provide additional characteristics of that layer of educated minority that comes out as the creator and agent of populist ideas.

It was not by chance that the concept of "intelligentsia" was conceived in Russia and largely due to Narodnik intellectuals. Members of the intelligentsia were recognized not so much by their university diplomas, education and professional status (many Narodniks were semi-educated or such professionals that devoted little time to their profession) as by their opposition to the existing order, condemnation of social injustice and striving to reform social institutions. The intelligentsia was regarded as a kind of moral focus of society, an avant-garde group of people that stood for the interests of all "humiliated and downtrodden" and of the people as a whole, not any particular groups of it. Such were and are the strivings and aspirations of populist figures irrespective of their social positions and professions. At the start of his political career P. L. Lavrov was an artillery officer, N. K. Mikhailovsky a journalist, Sukarno an engineer, Gandhi a lawyer, Mboya a sanitation inspector, but all of them had features of the "intelligentsia".

The Narodnik cult of "critically thinking personalities" was justly criticized in its time and was undoubtedly an exaggeration of the intelligentsia's social role and its "super-class" functions. But this peculiar narcissism had a reason of its own. What was the real meaning of such an exaggeration and what caused the enhanced social sensitivity of the populist activists?

It seems the answers are to be sought in the specific objective conditions of countries of late capitalism where the intelligentsia tends to play an enhanced social role. We can concur with Walicki that democratic intellectuals

"in backward countries, lacking a strong bourgeois class structure, enjoy as a rule greater social authority and play a more important part in national life than intellectuals in the economically more developed states".³⁰ And there are several reasons for this. Firstly, the weakness of the two main elites—traditional and bourgeois, the former economically and politically degrading while the latter are unable to gain strength for the reasons reviewed above. It is relevant in this connection that the incipient national intelligentsia has little access to bourgeois enterprise (and even technico-economic activity) and it seeks the humanitarian sphere, all sorts of social services and, finally, political activity.³¹

Secondly, the intelligentsia in the developing countries is often the most vulnerable social group because, being subject to all the hardships of social dissolution in a transitional society, it is endowed with self-awareness. The process of marginalization affects intellectuals in different forms, in particular, as "overproduction", especially of humanitarians unable to find a job and dependent on the expansion of state services. By 1955, in India alone the number of unemployed with diplomas was far over 500,000.³² A similar situation, if not so critical and on a lesser scale, obtained in pre-revolutionary Russia. A sense of frustration afflicting jobless educated youth turns easily into opposition.

What groups of the national intelligentsia are most prone to a populist ideology? It is primarily the most afflicted and poorest strata of the aristocracy, of the gentry, as shown by the experience of Russia and some contemporary developing countries. The spread of populist ideas is also connected with the process of democratization of developing society, when the lower and middle strata get access to education. Of considerable importance here are direct or indirect ties of the new generations of intellectuals with the traditional intelligentsia and traditional culture. Thus, in Russia the Narodnik milieu included, besides the gentry youth, many offsprings of the clergy. As regards Africa, which has produced a great many theories of "national socialism" of a populist kind, V. B. Iordansky notes a close connection between the modern and national intelligentsia: "There are thousands of covert links that connect the two seemingly antagonistic social forces."³³

The ties of populist intellectuals with traditional cul-

ture are of much importance for preserving their closeness to the rest of society from which they begin to be sharply separated by their education. However, this is not the only effect of education in this case. Being, on the one hand, a barrier that divides the intelligentsia from the mass of population, education, on the other hand, suddenly becomes—in the eyes of populists themselves—a unifying factor that highly dramatizes the intellectual's mentality and his critical mood.

The genesis of populist world outlook and orientation in the mind of an intellectual of "peripheral" society proceeds in the approximately following way. An educated representative of the East, Africa, Latin America (just as in his time his Russian predecessor) begins with a liking for the Western ways, the ideals of modernization, that are instilled in him at Oxford, Sorbonne, Berkeley or at home under the tutorship of foreign professors. However, encountering Western culture and its bearers, a national intellectual feels more and more alien in it and develops an "inferiority complex" described in detail by Fanon.³⁴ And it is not only a matter of deficiency but also of rejection of certain elements of bourgeois culture, individualistic motives, etc. that run counter to traditional views instilled in the intellectual of a backward country from his very childhood.

At the same time, continuing his studies, he feels a growing alienation from his compatriots. "We the educated classes," exclaimed Gandhi, "have received our education through a foreign tongue. We have therefore not reacted upon the masses."³⁵ Such an ambiguous existence in the realm of two cultures at a time can become a spiritual drama for an intellectual. The situation is aptly described by Soviet scholar I. V. Podberezsky in regard to the Philippine cultural elite. The latter "recognizes, on the one hand, traditional values..., on the other, the values of Western culture, above all, achievements of science and technology, and strongly desires to make them available to the people. However, the two systems of values are chiefly in disagreement, the attitudes ... clash, creating inward tension and conflict. Conceptions by which the elite tries to justify its existence crumble at first touch with reality. The elite does not feel much at home: in its own country its views are rejected, and they remain alien to representatives of American culture."³⁶

This gives rise to a populist solution of the problem—a fierce striving to “return” to the national cultural traditions, to one’s “soil”, to one’s people. Thus, Herzen in his day “returned” to the izba of the Russian peasant, thus a contemporary African teacher seeks the “wisdom and values of the forefathers” and a Peruvian writer seeks the Indian communities in the Sierra. This is what in regard to the Gandhi teaching was aptly defined as “identification with the poor” by the Indian scholar Sankar Ghose.³⁷

Why does the populist intelligentsia choose just the peasantry as its “referential group”? There are several reasons. The peasantry constitutes the most numerous and the most oppressed class in a developing society. Further, it is regarded by populism a guardian of traditional culture. In addition, there is certain likeness between the intelligentsia and the peasantry—not in the structure of their ideas or way of life but just on a socio-psychological plane. This likeness was noted, in particular, by American scholar Richard Wortman regarding the Russian situation. The intelligentsia and the peasantry in post-reform Russia, he writes, had a “similar feeling of confusion and disorientation—a common loss of the values of the past and doubt as to what the future would bring”.³⁸ It is on this ground that “identification” and “empathy” by the populist figures with the peasantry becomes possible.

It must be remarked, however, that “identification” is not tantamount to “identity”. The interaction of ideology and reality in this case (and in general) is rather complex. Despite his warm sentiments for the village a populist intellectual is, as a rule, a city-dweller—and so were three or four generations of his ancestors. He does not know the real village, or knows it superficially and often does not even want to know it. He often takes the peasantry, the commune, the people as mere ideological symbols, the “x” that has to be inserted into an intellectual formula so as to make it complete. It wouldn’t be amiss to say that a populist intellectual—especially in the beginning of his activity—is projecting his own philosophical problems, his sentiments of protest, his personal grudges, etc. onto a “poor man”.

Otherwise there is no accounting for the discrepancy between ideas and reality that has been repeatedly revealed in the history of various populist movements and ideologies whenever their agents came into contact with their

class base. This can well be illustrated by the famous "going to the people" by the Narodniks in Russia. The disunity between the popular mass and the "friends of the people" was keenly felt by many Narodniks, including G. I. Uspensky who expressed the peasants' attitude to intellectuals by the phrase "Keep off!". In the same vein a contemporary Peruvian "Indologist" can complain that the Guechua commune members "are not desirous of development", while an African political figure is vexed by the peasants that do not accept or understand his cooperative projects.

And for the very same reasons there is a tendency to idealize the peasants and their communes by the petty-bourgeois ideologists of the populist type, as has been repeatedly pointed out both in Marxist and non-Marxist literature. Under the pen of Gandhi and his followers (and many of them cannot be denied the knowledge of the psychology of peasants and love of them) the Indian commune tends to lose its real features, such as the existence of a considerable exploiting upper layer, of social inequality and caste barriers among the commune members, and looks like a kind of idyll. In a similar way are to be explained periodic failures of populist cooperative experiments and their unjustifiably forceful speeding which is undoubtedly connected with an initial maximalist project, the "imposition" on the peasantry of certain wishes absent in reality.

All of this is evidence that the "reflection of interests" in ideology should not be understood too literally; the formation and functioning of an ideology (as well as of its agents) have relative independence. But this does not validate the opposite extreme, namely, that populist conceptions are mere utopias. An ideology of this type has its own fertile ground and is engendered by real social problems. Neither is there doubt that in the course of development, of "entering the masses", moreover, in their practical realization, populist intellectual constructions begin to acquire certain political and socio-class orientation and play a role in social thought and social practice. And this is connected with, among other things, the activity of certain strata of national intelligentsia.

Formation of populist ideology coincides with the process of differentiation among the national intelligentsia. The populists diverge from the "Westerners" who, acquiring an education, "become alienated from tribal and village roots", for it is personal success, social position and profes-

sional status that become the objectives.³⁹ In Africa, writes Emile Ologoudou of Dahomey, first there appeared the "évolués", then the "élites", and after them and as their counterweight—the "intellectuals."⁴⁰

Then the moral-psychological impulse of going to the "roots" gets its corresponding populist ideological attire. And here a close connection between the internal and external factors becomes apparent, i. e. the fact that "pushing away" from a higher culture does not mean a full break with it. Actually, the "comeback" itself is stimulated by the contact with a different culture and as a result has its indelible imprint. "Paradoxally," wrote Léopold Senghor, "it was the French who forced us first to seek and then reveal ourselves to ourselves."⁴¹ But the found ideological solution is to a large extent the product of an "alien" heritage. We mean a strong influence of the socialist thought of developed countries on the intellectuals of developing societies.

Narodniks in Russia attempted, at least in part, to assimilate Western socialism, including Marxism. In the 20th century, thanks to the Great October Socialist Revolution and the formation of the socialist world system, the influence of socialist thought on the developing world has immeasurably increased. Hence turning to socialism as an alternative model of development against the background of crisis phenomena in developing societies that "go bourgeois", and turning to traditional collectivist values and their interpretation as a key nucleus of socialism, which is explained above all by the influence of socialist thought of developed countries. F. Olisa Awogu, an African scholar working in the U.S., notes that "African socialism", in spite of its traditional roots, to a significant degree owes its origin to European thought. It is just from European theories that Africans perceived that "socialism was a more progressive ideology than capitalism", and that it is "similar to traditional African communalism and humanism".⁴²

"National socialism" becomes for populism a means of modernization, of doing away with backwardness, and at the same time promises to make modernization more harmonious and less traumatic for the traditional population both in social and cultural aspects. Thus a conception of non-capitalist development is being formed, a combination of socialism with communal-collectivist values that pre-

sent a synthesis of "native" and "alien", of traditional and contemporary that is so necessary for a populist.

It means that populist conceptions are formed on the "crossroads" of two major intellectual and cultural currents: traditional cultural heritage and outside intellectual influences ensuing from the developed countries. This "clash" of two cultures (just as the situation of speedy socio-cultural dissolution of traditional society) can have two consequences. On the one hand, it stimulates the minds of primarily educated and talented persons to engage in rather productive and socially sensitive theoretical reflexion (Herzen, Gandhi, Nyerere, and others). On the other hand, chiefly on a mass-intellectual, "semi-educated" level, such a situation can contribute to the appearance of intellectual simplification and anti-intellectual tendencies. Even some major populist theorists are not insured against this.

In general, such phenomena are natural and inevitable in transitional societies in which social relations are being broken on such a vast scale and traumatic contacts are made with the developed countries. "With us everything has been turned over and is just settling down"—these words by Lev Tolstoy, often cited by Lenin, give in a nutshell the cultural and spiritual situation conducive to formation of a populist ideology. Therefore the latter can be perceived not only as an attempt at resolving the problems of developing society but also as a cultural drama, a drama of ideas. This is because the synthesis of traditional and contemporary cultures, with the help of which populism seeks to solve national problems, presents an extremely formidable task, compounded in addition by the shortness of historical time that is available to cope with it. Besides, this problem is being tackled of necessity by a rather young and inexperienced intelligentsia that has just joined world culture. Hence, along with profound theoretical insights, manifestations of intellectual primitivism, of "poor rationalism", which is typical of many populist conceptions, i. e. a striving for utilization of categories of modern science and progressive social teachings (including scientific socialism) without perceiving their complex theoreticomethodological and cultural-historical context, an inclination to simplistic conceptual schemes, to building systems that are immediately turned into a complex of loudly publicized recipes of "social salvation" and catchy clichés. These elements and features of populist ideologies are res-

possible for the latter's non-scientific character, though this does not mean in the least that these theories and ideologies are absolutely wrong or that their socio-historical productivity is nil.

4. THE LOGICAL-STRUCTURAL ASPECT OF POPULIST IDEOLOGY

The reader might have already noticed that populist doctrines are formed as ideological entities incorporating discrepant, at times opposed, trends. This peculiarity stems from complicated realities in developing societies rather than from the illogic of their ideologists. "The reasons for the non-scientific character of this or that kind of national socialism emerging at the culmination point of a national liberation revolution," writes V. P. Lukin, "lie not so much in the errors and illusions of its authors ... as in the peculiarities of social relationships and social psychology."¹ Therefore, populist ideology should be analyzed "from within", as it were, i. e. both from the point of view of the laws governing its social genesis and from the point of view of its immanent ideological and theoretical properties. This will provide the foundation for assessing a populist ideology "from without" by comparing it with the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory.

The above considerations have determined our method of theoretical reconstruction of the ideological trends of the populist type. As a rule, ideology is described through citing principles and tenets advocated and shared by its proponents. This approach, however, is defective in the sense that it depicts ideology as a static entity. It tends to leave out of consideration the inner dynamics and the pivotal problems of ideology and, consequently, the mechanisms of its evolution and functioning. A dynamic model of ideology elaborated with due regard for its inner contradictions, antinomies, will answer our purpose in a better way.


In principle, antinomies, as an essential element of subjective dialectics, are the fundamental property of human thought which reproduces the objective dialectics of reality. That this has been discovered and substantiated is one of the greatest achievements of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The dialectics of social thought is expressed in formulating and solving the problems of cognition. The latter are often formulated as antinomies, i. e. such princi-

ples which, although they seem to be mutually exclusive, are closely connected with each other as different aspects of the same problem. Contradictions of this type do not pertain to formal logic, being, rather, reflections of objective contradictions obtaining in reality, of social collisions, and opposing tendencies. Once resolved in theory or social practice, these contradictions do not disappear; they persist through taking on ever new forms and are, therefore, repeatedly registered in social thought. Through this mechanism, social thought is set in motion, developing in the struggle between various ideological oppositions both within one trend and in several different trends. It is important to understand that ideological oppositions of this kind do not merely negate one another but constitute a usual form of sustaining, comprehending and resolving a problem.

Antinomies, just as subjective dialectics, are inherent in any major, socially significant ideology. They are especially vivid in the ideologies of the populist type engendered by the social realities of a "transient" society with its typical multiform dialectical dualism. The contradictions of populist ideologies are rooted in the objective contradictions manifested in the conflict between traditional and bourgeois forms, in capitalism being characterized at the later stages of the bourgeois evolution by destructive, rather than constructive functions, in the clash between "foreign" and "national" capitalism, in the dual nature of the small producer, in the interaction of internal and external ideological and cultural impulses, etc. The contradictory nature and large variety of opposing principles in populist doctrines are determined by reality with the latter's opposing tendencies and alternative ways of development. This "fluctuating nature" of ideology is exemplified, as will be shown below, by Russian populism.


A Principle of Building a Model. Let us try to simulate a purely theoretical model of an ideology of the populist type with a minimal number of references to concrete facts, creating thereby a visual picture of the development of the populist ideas in the mind of an ideologist in a developing society. The set of populist ideas, as was shown above, is engendered in a "transient" social situation characterized by a variety of interacting and variously directed social and socio-psychological tendencies. Accordingly, populist-type doctrines emerge as a certain ideological field of tension generated between different ideological poles,

i. e. problems which constitute inner vectors and, at the same time, boundaries of populist ideology. They can be represented as antinomies, as pairs of theses and antitheses (i. e. problems resolved in different or, in the extreme case, opposed ways) which constitute the logical structure of ideology and, in one way or another, are reflected in concrete concepts². This can be represented in a graphic form. Let us assume that antinomy, or problem x tolerates interpretations a, a_1, a_2 , etc. arranged along the conceptual vector of tension $+\longrightarrow -$. The final possible interpretation is $-a$.



What connects a and $-a$? First, the problem itself. Second, the correlativity of solutions which have certain common basis (a). To cite a simple example, the bottom cannot be defined otherwise but through its relation to the top, as something that is below the top (and vice versa). However, in the above diagramme the connection is not merely of a conventional-verbal or an arbitrary nature. It is determined by the objective, dialectically contradictory situation in which, whatever the solution, actually opposed tendencies should be taken into consideration. Therefore, the opposition of a and $-a$ is not an absolute one: both interpretations have something in common, while the conceptual vectors connecting them are directed towards each other.

Solutions a and $-a$ correspond to the extreme ideological varieties of populism, in other words, to its left-hand and right-hand flanks, P_l and P_r . Let us plot solution a_n on axis x ; a_n is characteristic of the "normative", "ideal" populism (P_n). The latter is normative not so much in the sense of being "average", or compromise (although this might well be so), as in the sense of being best-suited to the spirit of populist ideology and the inner logic of its ideas. For the sake of brevity we shall use letters of the alphabet to denote our basic concepts. In the general form the diagram will look as follows



It goes without saying that this model is a purely theoretical one. First, because the above-mentioned basic ideological varieties of populism can change places: for instance, P_n can be placed either on the one or on the other flank, depending on the solution of certain problems, while P_l or P_r can take the intermediate position. Secondly, this division is based on the logical, rather than socio-political principle. It can certainly be assumed that P_r and P_l designate the reformist and the revolutionary (or the right and the left) wings of populism, and exhibit tendencies typical of its more moderate and more radical proponents. This kind of coincidence does not necessarily take place in all instances. Thus, P_r can be highly revolutionary (from the point of view of social change it instigates), while P_l may contain reactionary political trends, etc.

The Main Vectors of Populist Ideological Conscience. Let us now consider the ways in which the contradictory nature of the populist thought manifests itself in its ideological structure. As any major, well-developed ideology, populism incorporates philosophical doctrines, sociological teachings, a system of political views, economic doctrines and, lastly, a system of cultural views. Each of these subdivisions is based on certain pivotal problems or basic concepts which, constituting antinomies, allow various interpretations. While analyzing these antinomies (closely connected to one another in the overall ideological structure), it is important to establish what basic solutions to them are offered by P_r , P_l and P_n and what their common ingredients are.

The pivot of the philosophic foundation of populism is a system of values which contains several initial concepts and intentions, i. e. axioms, representing, just as in other non-scientific ideologies, a "totality of postulates which are not actually discussed as such",³ to quote the French Marxist Lucien Sebag. As a rule, they are present in concrete ideological structures implicitly. In case they are introduced or explained, they are presented in a modified and beautified form. Among the basic populist values are such intrinsic polarities as "traditionalism—modernism", "nationalism—universalism", "utopianism—realism", "democratism (bourgeois)—socialism", as well as such concepts as "the people", "the friends of the people", "the enemies of the people" and "the good of the people".

For a start, let us consider the antithesis "*traditionalism-modernism*" characteristic of populist conscience. Lenin compared populism to Janus whose one face is turned in the direction of the future and the other—in the direction of the past.⁴ As has been established, the traditionalist bias in a populist theorist has been brought about by a number of factors: the psychological urge to come back to the "soil", that is to the traditional socio-cultural heritage; "a justified concern", in B.S. Yerasov's words, "about the rapid transformation of social life leading to breaking-off of the habitual social ties"⁵; and, lastly, anti-bourgeois sentiments which emerge as a response to the inefficiency of belated capitalism and its disintegrating social role. The populist considers the apologetics of the national-cultural heritage as something to counterbalance the destructive effect of capitalism and as a kind of ideological and psychological compensation for it. The populist ideologist, especially at the early stages of his ideological and political activities, may act as an extremely active advocate of national "authenticity" and traditional social institutions and may even come to idealize the past. The French scholar Jacques Berque, commenting on modern nationalistic theories, said: "One more step and compensation will turn into reaction."⁶

The populist as a rule shuns this last step, and in case he dares to make it, the ideology he represents can no longer be described as populist. It stands to reason that the problem of correlation between traditionalism and modernism is typical of all ideological trends in the countries where capitalism developed belatedly; in populism, however, it is considered from a very specific point of view. The populist is not an academic antiques-lover, not a reactionary who would cling to the past at any price. He is rather a traditionalist against his own will, one who regards the "consolidation" of the national cultural foundations as a factor of successful development and a means of protecting oneself against outside influence. The latter thought belongs to J. P. Biondi⁷ who described the corresponding theories propounded in developing countries. The traditionalist declarations by the populists are closely tied up with their modernistic orientation; conversely, modernism is intertwined with traditionalist elements.

The Russian populists displayed a rather distinct aspiration for development. In a still clearer way this aspi-

ration is manifested in modern populist trends. While extolling the commune, the artel, the principles of moral solidarity, etc. the populist seeks to transform and adjust them to the purposes of modernization. One cannot but agree with the French scholars Jean Leca and Jean-Claude Vatin who studied the modern ideological trends in Algeria and concluded that populism constituted a search for a synthesis of the fundamental values of traditional culture and the need for modernization.⁸

In what way, from a populist viewpoint, can tradition promote development? First, as a spiritual and institutional factor consolidating society, since, as the populists see it, only social and national integration can provide for development, while disintegration, even if it results from the most up-to-date methods and institutions, rules it out. Second, as an ideological structure adequate to the actual state of affairs, i. e. to the social psychology of the vast masses of the population engaged in traditional sectors, such as small-scale agricultural production and craftsmanship, which are bound to persist in the course of further social evolution. Third, as a cultural potential of the past containing progressive elements, such as collectivism, spirituality, and high moral standards which can provide a basis for a new, socialist way of life.

In this context, the approach taken by those scholars (for instance, B. S. Yerasov) who consider populist slogans as "leading back to the past",⁹ does not seem to be quite accurate. From the view-point of the intrinsic logic of populist ideologies this is not so: Janus' two faces cannot be separated one from the other. Admittedly, when a concrete ideology is being translated into life, some of its aspects may come to dominate, by virtue of certain socio-historical circumstances over some others, for example, tendencies towards restoration and stagnation. We have thus come to another problem, that of the social "outlets" of populist ideology, which will be dealt with later.

The traditionalist motives are more typical of P_n , although this does not at all mean that it lacks a drive for development and a desire to take advantage of the scientific and technological achievements of the developed countries. Gandhism is indicative. The drive for modernization is much more vivid in ideology P_r which gives priority to development both in economic and institutional terms, while the traditional principles are expected to serve as

uniting social factors, predominantly at the spiritual, cultural and moral levels. As for P_1 , it presents a far more complicated picture. Resolute repudiation of bourgeois "individualist" modernization and setting it off with traditional communal solidarity may well be intertwined here with a strong drive for development, while the cultivation of traditional institutions and bolstering them ideologically and morally may be accompanied by their substantial restructuring in the course of development. Slogans of the type "Eastern ethics, Western technology" are more or less characteristic of all the main ideological varieties of populism.

The opposition *traditionalism—modernism* is closely tied up with the antithesis *nationalism—universalism* (internationalism). Populism as a whole undoubtedly intertwines with nationalism incorporating certain nationalist trends. In a sense, it constitutes a variety of numerous nationalist trends and movements, especially when a nation is equated to "a people" and "common man".¹⁰ Just as any type of nationalism, populism focuses on the topic of "originality", tending towards self-isolation in the course of general historic development. It lays special emphasis on studying national history and culture, reassessing and, at times, exaggerating the importance of traditional heritage within the system of world culture. However, the nationalist tendencies in populism, as has already been mentioned above, are not without limit, combining, as a rule, with a universalist tendency, with striving for ideological, political and other associations and contacts with the outer world, with the recognition of the cultural achievements of other nations and an aspiration for the symbiosis of national and international cultural elements. This aspiration is characteristic of all ideological varieties of populism, with P_n displaying a somewhat more vivid nationalist colouring.

There exists another pair of value intentions inherent in populism: *utopianism—realism*. N. K. Mikhailovsky's assertion that social science "should start with a certain Utopia",¹¹ i. e. with a social ideal, a project of a perfect society, is typical of populist thinking. In principle, such an approach is observed in all unscientific ideologies. It is especially characteristic, however, of populism where the utopian, romantic colouring of ideological constructions is extremely vivid, especially in the apology of antiquity and traditional collectivism, in the wholesale criticism of

stagnant bourgeois civilization, in the idea of introducing patriarchal peasant principles in modern technocratic structures, etc. Suffice it to mention the "economic romanticism" of the Russian populists. However, the populist acts not only as an ideologist but also as a politician in a backward country who may be privy, as it indeed occurs in a number of developing countries today, to the realm of power. This circumstance sets precise boundaries to his conceptual constructions. Hence the sobriety of ideological slogans and programmes, the desire to adjust them to a concrete social context, public opinion and the interests of certain groups of the population. His traits, temperament, etc. are also of importance. The totality of these factors determines, in each case, the variety of populist ideology which may be more or less radical in terms of the correlation of utopianism and realism.

While utopian and romantic tendencies are more typical of P_n , realistic tendencies are characteristic of P_r . The synthesis of romantic and realistic elements is typical of P_l , where the plans for "a bright future" may be organically combined with highly realistic organizational and political thinking. On the whole, however, the most utopian of all populist concepts usually tends to correspond or adapt itself, at least to a degree, to reality; conversely the most "realistic" and moderate programme usually contains, at least at the ideological level, romantic motifs.

Let us consider the antithesis *bourgeois democratism-socialism*, the starting points in the development of a populist concept which subsequently are reflected in all the aspects of the populist ideology. I have already mentioned that this antinomy stems from objective reality: on the one hand, it is necessary to eliminate various pre-capitalist forms of exploitation including the vestiges of slavery (in certain regions of Africa, for instance) and to carry out top-priority democratic transformations (agrarian reforms, the establishment of a new system of political rights, etc.) which are bound to result in the development of bourgeois relations. In the words of N.A. Simoniya, "objectively, at the time of their gestation and emergence, all the national-democratic revolutions in Eastern countries were, of a bourgeois-democratic nature".¹² On the other hand, in the majority of backward countries capitalism exacerbates social problems involved in development rather than solves them. Therefore, the attraction towards socialism be-

comes, for a populist ideologist, a natural, a priori starting point.

At the same time, a populist ideologist strives for a special kind of socialism—a national, “authentic” socialism based on traditions easily understood by the broad masses and, therefore, “democratic”. Similarly, democratism, in the populist interpretation, acquires specific features as the populist, unwilling to accept “formal” bourgeois democratism in its pure form, imparts socialist traits to it. These fluctuations between socialism and bourgeois democratism are characteristic of all the varieties of populist ideology.

The correlation and interaction of the elements of democratism (democratism as such, is, objectively, bourgeois democratism, i. e. repudiation of pre-capitalist structures) and socialism within populist ideology takes on most complicated forms. Socialist “additions” to democratism, the slogans of “communal socialism” and the like at times weaken the intrinsic democratic potential of the populist trends, leading their proponents to elaborate various kinds of dubious projects and social experiments. This was characteristic of the Russian populists in the late 19th century; this is, to various degrees, also characteristic of the populists in the developing countries today. However, the reverse is also true in cases when a populist, by virtue of his subjective fervent anti-capitalism, turns into a determined democrat. Lenin pointed out, referring not only to Russian thinkers but also to Sun Yatsen, that the anti-capitalist aspirations of populism led it to the maximum democratic solution of the agrarian problem.¹³ At the same time, the subjective emphasis on democratism or socialism is important in determining the socio-political orientation of a populist trend. For instance, reducing socialist slogans to democratic aspects, as a rule, leads a populist to opt for bourgeois orientation. Conversely, socialist orientation also implies the prevalence of “socialist” additions to democratism in a concrete populist system.

The socialist orientation manifests itself most vividly in P_l , and the bourgeois-democratic— in P_r . P_n occupies an intermediate, in a sense, position: in principle, it advocates socialism but expects socialism to be effected through gradual democratic change and therefore may in practice turn out to be close to P_r . In contrast to P_r and P_l , P_n relies, to a greater extent than the other trends,

on the implementation of the "communal" principle and on traditional collectivism.

Let us now consider the principal value category of populism, the concept of *the people*. It is present in other ideologies, too, but in each case it is interpreted differently. According to a historical tradition, the liberal bourgeois ideologists interpret the category of the people as *tiers état*, "a middle" or a more or less well-to-do class. In the understanding of the national socialists, "the people" is a racist category, the biologically "able" body of the nation, its most "healthy" elements. The populists interpret this concept in a specific and paradoxical way. By the people they imply a strata of the population which practically disappears, dissolves, in the course of social evolution. In their understanding, the people is a mass of small producers of traditional or semi-traditional type, who gradually become divided into classes and therefore cease to be the kind of "people" on which the populists rely.

For this reason, the ideological activity of the populists is directly connected with the disintegration of the traditional masses of the population at the stage of belated, backward capitalism. This phenomenon was described by T. B. Goncharova as applied to the concepts of "Indian national identity" in Latin American countries: "The more obvious the fact that nothing has been left, in the majority of cases, of the traditional commune but the form, the more persistently the adherents of 'national identity' idealize it."¹⁴

If we consider a more accurate, in terms of social structure, definition of "the people" we are bound to notice the differences between various populist factions. P_n interprets this category in more or less certain terms: the peasantry, Herzen's "*muzhik*", "Ivan Yermolayevich", the "middle owner" in G. I. Uspensky's essays, Gandhi's communal village. As to P_r , its understanding of "the people" is much more vague: "common people", including small owners, small tradesmen and the like. P_l tends to interpret the concept of "the people" as the poorest and semi-proletarian strata of the population, sometimes including the workers. The uncertainty of their interpretations stems from the radicalist and activist attitude of the left-wing populists to the masses: they do not fear, to quote P. V. Lavrov, "to criticize the popular spirit in the name of popular interests", to distinguish between the "true" representatives of the

people and those who have been "spoiled"; affected by cupidity, possessiveness, etc.

On the whole, the peasantry constitutes the main value and structure-forming element of "the people" for all the varieties of populism. Their different interpretations of the concept are arranged along the vector of the antinomy "the peasantry—the non-peasantry", i. e. they diverge in the directions in which the peasantry in backward society disintegrates—in the direction of petty-bourgeois and farmer groups (P_r) or semi-proletarian elements and workers (P_l).

Besides "the people" a society includes "the friends of the people" and "the enemies of the people". The former are usually associated with intelligentsia in the populist sense of the term: they are all advanced personalities performing supra-class functions, called upon to defend the interests of the whole of the people, to be selfless, moral, sensitive, etc. This self-description is typical of P_n . The interpretation of intelligentsia as the vanguard of the people is, to a certain extent, typical of the other ideological varieties of populism. At the same time, it is less definite, since the boundaries of the intelligentsia are exceeded. P_r accentuates not so much the social-class (or "inter-class") nature of the vanguard group, as the ideological, moral or political traits of its representatives, who, in principle, may belong to various social groups and classes, even the bourgeoisie.¹⁵ Similar vagueness is characteristic of P_l , too. However, the latter tends to lay a greater emphasis upon the radicalism and revolutionary traits of the leaders as the "politically conscious elements", "revolutionaries", "those who have a correct understanding of the people's interests", and so on. Note, by the way that the relative uncertainty and vagueness which are more typical, in a number of cases, of P_r and P_l than of P_n stem from the fact that the former are more often involved in political activity requiring a greater flexibility of concepts and a certain ideological pragmatism, while P_n tends to manifest itself at the level of social thought as a maximalist ideological doctrine.

"The enemies of the people" are defined in conjunction with "the people" and "the friends of the people". They include, above all, the big bourgeoisie (primarily foreign), the pre-capitalist exploiter bosses, and top bureaucracy. In principle, this opinion is shared by the representatives

of all populist trends. The difference among them lies, first, in the more (in P_l) or less (in P_r and P_n) rigorous attitude to the "enemies of the people" and, secondly, in the understanding of the correlation between "the enemies of the people" and "the people". In P_r , P_n they are, as a rule, clearly separated from each other and "the enemies of the people" are regarded as a relatively narrow group, whereas in P_l the boundary line between the two groups is less definite and "the enemies of the people" are seen as a broader group, including, at times, the petty bourgeoisie, the middle urban strata and even "the people" itself.

Finally, let us consider "the good of the people" as a value category in populist ideology. In principle, it is believed to imply the satisfaction of the material and spiritual requirements of a "working man". However, different varieties of populism tend to lay a greater emphasis on various aspects of the concept and, accordingly, to provide its different interpretations. P_l tends to emphasize the economic conditions of the masses. It is expected to be improved by way of a "just", "equitable" distribution of material boons which will provide a basis for the ideological and cultural progress of the people. P_n on the contrary, gives greater priority to the socio-cultural factors of development. Its position can be described as follows: first of all, it is necessary to preserve, consolidate, and develop social institutions, as well as spiritual and cultural foundations of the people's life, the principles of collectivism, mutual assistance, and moral solidarity. As for the living standards, it is of no particular importance and a modest living should be quite acceptable, especially at the initial stage. In the course of time, the living standard of the population will be improved through cultivating solidarity and humanist relations in society. In this respect, P_r takes an "intermediate" position, coming out in favour of satisfying both material and spiritual requirements of "the people". The two aspects of the task are regarded as being independent of each other, which should be solved at different levels, the level of technology and economics and the level of culture and propaganda.

Among the other philosophic and ideological vectors of populist thinking one should single out the following two closely tied antitheses of a gnosiological nature—*subjec-*

tivism—objectivism and *idealism—materialism*. The former is highly typical of populist thinking. On the whole, the populists tend to take a subjectivist approach to reality since reality is believed to develop in an "undesirable" direction. The difference between individual ideological factions lies in the degree of subjectivism and in the extent to which real facts and objective laws are taken into account in the plans to transform reality. In P_n the subjectivist tendencies are manifested in a most consistent way, since the hopes for changes in the surrounding world are tied, first of all, with the moral and spiritual factors. In P_r the subjectivist tendencies are less vivid. P_l often combines subjectivism, the radical revolutionary repudiation of the existing conditions with the attempts to substantiate its ideology by referring to the real or assumed laws and regularities observed in reality and by opposing the positive objective tendencies to the negative ones.

Another major element of populist philosophy is idealism (especially vivid in social sciences), which manifests itself in the belief that conscious, cultural and spiritual factors determine a person's life in society. This is especially characteristic of P_n . At the same time, populism may tolerate materialist constructions (in P_l this is observed more often than in the other trends) inspired by a different motive—the concern for the material requirements and needs of the overwhelming majority of the population in a backward society. P_r may elaborate intermediate concepts. For instance, some of the populist thinkers in Russia held positivist views.

Populist constructions fluctuate between *rationalism* and *irrationalism*. Many populist concepts are quite rationalist in form, operating with notions borrowed from rationalist social thought and the intellectual culture of developed countries. At the same time, these concepts are usually permeated with an irrationalist spirit reflected in permanent appeals to the "soil", the "sources", to intuitive, sensual world outlook typical of traditional societies. Elements of irrationalism and "agrarian mysticism" found in the writings by Russian populists (I. I. Kablits and others), are even more characteristic of current populist trends in developing countries. It is not easy to divide the antithesis "rationalism-irrationalism" into fractions, since the elements of both often coexist and are closely

interlaced in the views advocated by certain representatives of the populist ideological traditions. Irrationalist tendencies seem to be more vivid in P_n , the most consistent ideological variety of populism. Conversely rationalist elements are usually more developed in P_r and P_l .

In the area of ethics, populism is characterized by the existence of a wide gap between *ethical maximalism* (in P_n) and *ethical relativism* (in P_r and P_l). P_n is more consistent than the other varieties of populism in emphasizing the precedence of moral considerations over all others: scientific, political, and situational. While they recognize, by and large, the important role of ethics (this is especially true of P_r), other ideological varieties of populism display a greater tendency towards correlating it with the real conditions obtaining in society with the considerations of revolutionary expediency, political situation, etc.

Let us now consider populist sociological views. They are grounded on the general concept of historical development. In this, populism fluctuates between the *cyclical* (P_n) and *linear-progressist* (P_r and P_l) visualizations. The former emphasizes the discrete nature of historical progress: the "golden age", i. e. the period of harmonious development based on traditional collectivism, is superseded by a period marked by society's disintegration into antagonistic groups, the exploitation of man by man, the growth of the parasitical state, the suppression of village by town, etc. This stage should be overcome by restoring the original social integrity and eliminating the bourgeois, individualist spirit in man and society. In the second case, the ideologists recognize, with certain reservations, the linearity of historical progress: they point out that the line of progress bends under the impact of a number of aggravating factors, such as individualism, capitalism, colonialism, foreign domination. There is only a relative difference between the two positions: while the cyclical "recurrence" of the original social harmony presupposes reliance on the scientific and technological achievements of the "individualist" era, the linear pattern of development takes into account its intermittent nature, a possibility of an about-face from the bourgeois to a non-capitalist stage, and largely tends to associate progress with the future. In P_l this about-face is regarded as a decisive and abrupt

one, while in P_r it is pictured as something smoother and more balanced.

In connection with its concept of historical development the problem of the *motive forces of historical progress* acquires special importance for populism. Here, the ambivalent nature of populist thinking is extremely pronounced. Is it the individual or the people that acts as the subject of historical development? In principle, all populist factions advocate the idea of the people's guiding role in history. At the same time, P_n and P_r both emphasize the extremely important and at times decisive role of the historical activity of an individual as a ferment of social change. It is an individual, or to be more exact, a group of individuals ("the friends of the people", "the progressive elements", etc.) who are the first to realize that the social situation is fraught with crisis, to start to criticize social injustice and to be awakened to revolutionary action. P_l , on the contrary, is bent on giving priority to the fundamental role of "the people", who determines, albeit in the long run, the actions and thoughts of any individual. However, if the stand taken by an individual proves to be consonant with the aspirations and expectations of the people, his activity acquires a tremendous force. Moreover, in accordance with P_l 's assumption that there exist conflicting tendencies in the ranks of the people, it is the individual (certainly able to correctly interpret the "true interest" of the people) who can help the people to become aware of its own progressive role.

The *people-classes* antinomy underlies the populist interpretation of the social structure of society. On the whole, populism is notable for its tendency to deny (or, to be more exact, for its unwillingness to take note of and its desire to prevent) society's polarisation into classes and class struggle itself. This can be accounted for by the slow development of classes, the amorphous nature of the social structure and mass pauperization in backward countries. In the opinion of P. Worsley, populism is marked by an ideological vision which tends to disregard the class struggle unfolding in society and displace it beyond its limits¹⁶. This stand is typical of P_r , and especially of P_n , which both tend to interpret "the people" as the source and the paragon of social integration counterpoising disintegrated, antagonistic class society. Sharing, to a certain extent, this view, P_l in some instances has proved cap-

able of recognizing class struggle. This approach is rooted partly in P_i 's radicalist aspirations and partly in its sociological realism, in its taking note of the actually emerging, existing or exacerbating class contradictions, both those emerging among the developing bourgeois elements and the masses and those occurring in the process of the social differentiation of the people.

Individualism-collectivism is another fundamental antinomy underlying populist sociology. In terms of its significance for the system of populist ideology it should be regarded as one of the populist primary values. The assertion of the primacy of the people over its individual representatives, the primacy of the people over the individual, and the primacy of the group over the personality is one of the starting points of the populist thought. This principle underlies the apology of the archaic collectivism and the denial of the "atomisation" of man in bourgeois society. For instance, the main character in a story by the African writer William Conton, a young African turns against "the European's exaggerated individualism, his constant exalting of the single human being—at the polls, in the classroom, and in the sight of the God".¹⁷ Such sentiments are extremely typical of the populist thinker.

However, in populism the theme of collectivism is, as a rule, supplemented with the theme of the individual: Donald MacRae, for instance, even tends to believe that this is the main theme of all populist ideological writings. "It [the populist ideology] is about personality, and about personality in a moral sense. Populism claims that the individual should be a complete man." In his opinion, the populist concept of the personality can be well expressed in the words of Adam Ferguson, an 18th-century Scottish thinker: "The division of labour in society fragments the human character."¹⁸

It goes without saying that focusing on the problem of the personality is populism's reaction to the modernization of developing society. At the same time, it reflects the disintegration of traditional links obtaining in a backward society and constitutes, to a considerable extent, the intrinsic intention of the populist ideologist, an intellectual who places himself above the traditional ties and who has been brought up in the traditions of the humanist and socialist thought elaborated in his country. Psychologically, the emergence of populist outlook can be account-

ed for by the fact that in a developing society the intellectual thinks of himself as an individual suffering from the pressure exerted by the traditional and the bourgeois elite. Hence, the search for such a system of collectivism which would enable an individual to develop his personality; hence the tendency not only to extol traditional communal solidarity but also to criticize it for the reason that the commune, to put it in Herzen's words, "absorbs the personality". At the same time in populist concepts the individual is deprived of an autonomous, ontologic status and is of consequence largely a representative of a certain community (local, ethnic or national).

While P_r is concerned with the subject of individualism, P_n tends to harmoniously synthesize individual and collective elements. As for P_l , it concentrates primarily on collectivism, emphasizing the importance of identifying the individual with the society, the people, the state, etc. Since in both extreme variants, the opposite theme (of collectivism in P_r and individualism in P_l) is always present (although to various degrees), P_r and P_l both belong to the same ideology.

The sociological aspect of populist ideology is connected with its political aspect. However, the correlation between these two aspects is far from simple, being marked by the complicated dialectics of aims and means. It is one thing to proclaim the people the subject and the aim of historical development, and quite a different one to be faced with the immediate task of political organization and mobilization of the masses, usually impeded by various factors (such as the traditional socio-psychological principles and institutions, the opposition of the masses to the social innovations they are not accustomed to, their political passivity, ignorance, a lack of stable democratic traditions, etc.). The approach to be chosen depends on the given politician's moral principles, temperament and the values he cherishes.

This is manifested, in particular, in the antithesis *the leader—the masses*, one of the basic problems of the populist political thought. For instance, P_n which in principle recognizes the leading and guiding mission of "the friends of the people" largely reduces it to culture-mongering and propaganda thus taking a comparatively moderate approach to formulating political strategies. P_n insists that it is vital to concentrate on enhancing politi-

cal awareness of the masses and on gradually restructuring social institutions, without saddling the masses with populists' own projects but taking into account instead the wishes and the development level of the people, learning from the people, etc. While sharing this approach in general P_r gravitates towards political vanguardism, especially in terms of social and political modernization of society and introduction of technological and organisational innovations.

The vanguard tendencies are especially obvious in P_l , which emphasizes the need for the large-scale political mobilization of the masses and for the accelerated non-capitalist development of society primarily at the political level. As has already been mentioned, P_l is notable for its immanent critical attitude to "the people", which does not, however, rule out P_l 's attraction to the latter. In terms of politics, this attitude may boil down to "pushing" the masses towards progressive social reforms and promoting a leader who is capable of "imposing his salutary views on the society which is not conscious of its own good".¹⁹ This principle echoes almost word for word similar pronouncements by Tkachev. Admittedly, such views are extreme even for P_l . On the whole, the political strategy adopted by P_l is in one way or another associated with the conceptual arguments common for populist ideology in general (such as the necessity of coordinating one's programmes with the interests of the people, of not losing touch with the people, and the like).

Accordingly, the dialectics of the political means advocated by populism is reflected in the *violence—non-violence* antinomy. As ensues from the aforesaid, P_n advocates non-violent methods in political action (Gandhism is extremely representative in this respect). P_l in principle tolerates and even argues in favour of resorting to violence against those who directly exploit the people and against certain groups inside "the people" (in the most consistent and rigoristic concepts). P_r takes a less definite and a more pragmatic position somewhere in between these two ideological poles.

The *anarchism—etatism* antinomy is especially characteristic of populist political thought. In the opinion of Kenneth Minogue, both tendencies are equally typical of the populists: "There seems to be no general reason why either should be considered 'essential populism'."²⁰ The

anarchical tendencies obtaining in populism are rooted in the social psychology of the peasant, the small producer and his primordial mistrust of the state. It is no accident that M. A. Bakunin, one of the founders of anarchism, adhered to the populist tradition. Anarchical populism is based on the centrifugal tendencies of the closed and isolated peasant communes, on the separatist manifestations of tribalism, the sentiments of the pauperized urban migrants who have only recently been peasants, etc. Hence the demands to decentralize state power which are typical not only of P_n inclined to absorb the ideas of anarchic type more readily than the other trends, but also of P_r and P_l .

At the same time, populist ideology is another proof of the assertion that the extremes meet: its anarchical tendencies are intertwined with etatism. Bakunin's rebellious projects contained latent elements of political authoritarianism since they urged that the anarchic activity of the masses should be "invisibly" directed by the organized few. At the stage of political activity and especially at the stage of exercising power, populism may strongly gravitate towards etatist ideological constructions. This is true of P_r and especially of P_l .

The *anarchism-etatism* antinomy is closely tied up with the *democracy-dictatorship* polarity. All the populists proceed from the principle of democracy and the active involvement of the popular masses in political life. Unlike bourgeois constitutions, they regard democracy not so much from the formal legal point of view, but rather from that of actual and direct democracy which implies the involvement of the masses in political life according to the principle of the unity of the entire people, a democracy which does not rule out the indivisible power of the people, "the dictatorship of the people". Various populist factions differ in their approach to resolving this antinomy in the degree of democracy, in the degree of the political involvement of the masses and, accordingly, in the degree of dictatorship they strive after.

There is a tendency for the P_n to be more resolute in demanding democracy than P_l , although the representatives of the latter include fervent advocates of the people's power (such as Fanon). P_r takes an intermediate position: advocating democracy, it often interprets it from the point of view of formal law,²¹ showing a tendency towards political authoritarianism.

The populist theoretical principles and antinomies (traditionalism—modernism, utopianism—realism, democratism (bourgeois)—socialism, etc.) underlie the populist economic doctrine. Its economic strategy attempts to solve a dual task: to effect modernization and technical progress in a backward society and, at the same time, to take care that the changes involved take on such forms as are less painful for the broad masses of the population and do not aggravate but, rather, alleviate in every way the unfolding marginalization of the population. Similarly, the populists seek, in the long run, to organize the production on collective, socialist principles. However, they regard transition to such organization of production as an organic process, which implies gradually superseding private-ownership methods of developing economy through maintaining, cultivating, and perfecting the traditional forms of communal collectivism.

This approach to the non-capitalist path of development, shared by all the populist factions, generates specific antinomies in populist economic thought. P_r , P_n and P_l , which differ on the rate and forms of non-capitalist development, opt for more "bourgeois" or more "socialist" modifications of such development and give different assessments to the role of traditional institutions, etc. gravitate towards the different poles of these antinomies.

The *economic-social progress* polarity is one of such antinomies. Economic progress in the context of a developing society necessitates reliance on the most advanced sectors of production and the most progressive groups of the population, on making use of the commodity-monetary mechanism and the commercial methods of stimulating economy, and on retaining contacts with the international capitalist market to ensure the influx of currency. This, however, only aggravates disproportions in the national economy, and socio-economic differentiation in a backward country. Social progress calls for the involvement of the broad masses in the development process, for an appreciable rise in the living standard of the masses, for the repudiation of purely commercial principles in planning and organizing the economy, for a relatively egalitarian distribution, etc. This, however, may affect the rates of economic growth.

Theoretically, all the varieties of populism proceed from the priority of social progress over economic progress. P_l and P_n are more consistent in this respect than P_r , which,

on the contrary, largely tends to make use of economic leverages to stimulate development.

The antinomy *economic progress—social progress* is of decisive importance for the populist economic doctrine since other aspects of the populist development strategy, industrialization for instance, are closely tied up with it. A recent study devoted to the socialist trends in the present-day developing countries emphasized that many of these trends reflect "dualistic mood of transitional peoples and leaders, who both seek and fear industrialization".²² Such hesitation is especially characteristic of populist public figures. They realize that industrialization is a prerequisite for the attainment of economic independence; at the same time, they fear its consequences which may promote disintegration of society and ruin the peasantry, the core of "the people". Populist factions take various approaches to the solution of this problem. P_n stands for minimal industrialization, implying by this that modernization should largely affect rural structures. P_l , on the contrary, strongly insists on industrialization, expecting industrial methods to be introduced in agriculture and hoping that industrialization will lead to the establishment of large-scale labour associations, state farms and the like. P_r takes an intermediate position: on the one hand, it may both strongly gravitate towards industrialization, being in this similar to P_l , and on the other, concentrate on the modernization of agriculture, just as P_n . Similar correlation of positions is observed in the approach of various populist factions to the problem of interrelation between the industrial and rural sectors which is logically tied up with the problem of industrialization.

In its agrarian programme, populism is in principle drawn to the *nationalization of land*. As Lenin once pointed out, the nationalization of land advocated by the Russian Narodniks was the most consistent way of eliminating pre-capitalist survivals in land ownership. However, nationalization displays a dual tendency: it may offer a basis for a rapid, large-scale development of bourgeois relations and at the same time (under certain conditions and with certain political guidance) be conducive to restricting capitalist relations in the village. Hence various nuances in the populist agrarian projects: a bourgeois-democratic approach to nationalization which at times leads to passing land into private ownership (P_r) or supplementing

nationalization with freezing the mobilization of land, banning hired labour, introducing rigidly egalitarian principle of distributing land, encouraging various forms of collective land ownership, etc. (P_l). While favouring the second approach, P_n does not reject other solutions to the land problem (such as establishing communal ownership of land).

From the populist perspective, a *cooperative* is the basic unit of the economy. As populist theorists and economists see it, the cooperative answers the requirements of modern production, on the one hand, and carries on pre-bourgeois collectivist traditions, on the other. While P_l gives priority to production cooperatives, P_r favours purchasing, marketing or other such cooperatives as economic units based on the principles of market economy. It does not rule out the possibility of the coexistence of individual producers and cooperatives. The approach of P_n is less definite: in principle it agrees with P_l , but in its concrete political practice it is prepared to take a position similar to that of P_r .

Let us consider the antinomy *collective ownership-private ownership*. In principle, all the populist factions come out in favour of collective ownership. Nonetheless, each of them is prepared to tolerate various degrees of private ownership. P_r takes the least rigid position. For various reasons, for instance, out of its adherence to non-violence, P_n 's stand is similar to that of P_r ; of all the populist factions P_l is the most intolerant of the private-ownership forms of economy. This does not mean however that they are rejected altogether: for practical reasons they may sometimes be put up with.

Accordingly, one should distinguish between various populist concepts of the correlation *the state sector-the private sector*. In terms of polarity, this antinomy is similar to the described above. However, the gap between the different approaches is less striking here. This can be accounted for by a greater role the state has to play under the conditions of economic development in the less developed countries. Thus, although P_r is much more tolerant of the existence of the private sector than P_l is, their positions may be quite close in relying on the state as a factor of economic development. As for P_n , its position is less definite again: without being partial to the private sector, it treats the idea of the state management of the economy with reserve.

It now remains to consider the last section of populist ideology, the one concerned with culture.

The German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies opposed culture as an organic integrity of notions, modes of behaviour, aesthetic images, etc. which emerge in community (*Gemeinschaft*), or in the traditional peasant world of the pre-capitalist formations, to civilization which is generated by society (*Gesellschaft*), by bourgeois industrialism and urbanism with their inherent individualist, rationalist and mechanistic world outlook.²³ This way of thinking has much in common with the populist attitudes. The populist defends "the people" not only out of his sympathy for "the small man", "the younger brother", "the poor man", "the toiler", i. e. the partiality rooted in his moral outlook, in his ethical principles and his striving after justice. The populist views "the people" as the sustainer of integral social culture, the relationships based on the feeling of solidarity, on social harmony and moral traditions that hold society together. The collapse of these traditions under the impact of the bourgeois Moloch leads to the atomization of society, to its disintegration into a conglomeration of isolated individuals.

That the *organic* and *mechanistic* cultures are opposed to each other clearly follows, for instance, from Mikhailovsky's socio-cultural concept of the types and degrees of social development. According to Mikhailovsky, a typical Narodnik thinker, the progress of civilization is not at all bound to result in the cultural enrichment of an individual, to say nothing of the popular masses: social differentiation (that is the division of labour, the stratification of the population into the managers and the managed, the increasingly complicated social functions and roles of an individual) is tantamount to development only in terms of "quantity and degree". In its "quality", in its cultural merits, a pre-capitalist society, which may seem to be technologically and organizationally primitive in comparison with modern society, is superior to the latter for it is based on harmonious labour cooperation and moral solidarity among people and constitutes an integral cultural entity. Hence the opposition of "the people" and the "mob" one often comes across in Mikhailovsky's writings.

Similar ideas are to be found in the theories elaborated by modern populist ideologists. For instance, according to the concept of "Negritude" or the ideology of "Zam-

bian humanism", the peculiarity of the African Negro community lies in the primacy of cultural and spiritual factors, whereas in Western bourgeois societies it is the material and technical attributes of civilization that are brought into sharp focus. Similarly, Gandhi and his followers exposed the one-sidedness of Western preoccupation with technical aspects of civilization, and urged to preserve the ideological and ethical principles underlying Hindu culture.

These problems are closely linked to the populists' general tendency to oppose traditionalism to modernism, to their appeal to synthesize the "rationalism" of modern civilization (with its scientific and technological achievements) and the "spirituality" of traditional culture. Significantly, P_n regards the traditional heritage as the main element in the socio-cultural synthesis. It urges to preserve not only traditional art, customs, rites, linguistic independence, etc., but also the social milieu (above all, the peasantry) which sustains these cultural traditions. According to P_n , modernism should be tolerated only as a supplementary element of culture, an element which should be introduced in certain strictly controlled doses so as to "rationalize" the general style of life, ensure greater efficiency of the individual's and social institutions' activity, secure production growth, etc.

P_r and P_n take a more flexible position, being more inclined to permit the assimilation of the intellectual achievement of advanced countries. Senegalese politicians and theorists, seeking to secure cultural full-bloodedness for the African-Negro traditional society, recognise the importance of modern technological civilization and express readiness to take maximum advantage of its achievements. Here, P_l may differ from P_r in that the latter vigorously and openly expresses its desire to utilize the positive achievements of Western rationalist culture, while the former censures the anti-humanist bourgeois civilization and confines itself to borrowing from the West only its scientific and technological achievements. P_l shows consistency in pursuing this policy especially as regards the rationalization of management. At the same time, P_r and P_l may exhibit great vigour in the efforts to preserve and promote the people's creativity, folklore and aesthetic traditions as symbols of national culture.

Elitist culture-popular culture is a specific culturologi-

cal antinomy of populist thought. Populist approaches to this matter are many and varied. Populist thinkers are aware of the fact that "high" culture is created mainly by the elite, by the intelligentsia. This circumstance is brought into sharp focus by some of the populist theorists. Thus, according to what P. L. Lavrov says in his famous *Historical Letters*, cultural progress is ensured exclusively by the well-educated people. The working masses have only a supplementary role to play in it providing the material facilities for the leisure of those who create culture. However, populist theorists seek to overcome this cultural elitism. Lavrov achieves this by proclaiming the culture of the elite "guilty" and "unjust" and appealing to the intelligentsia to repay its "debt to the people" by making the latter the subject of historical-cultural development. The critique of elitist culture by some other populist thinkers culminates in opposing it to "popular" culture which is in every way elevated and ennobled. In this case, the intellectuals' rationalist interpretation of culture ("culture in various societies is a medium provided by history for thought's work"²⁴) is modified by or supplemented with picturing it as the sum total of society's cultural experience, as "wisdom" in accumulating which (or laying groundwork for which) "the people" with its feeling of solidarity, moral and spiritual traditions has a great role to play. Julius Nyerere emphasized: "Knowledge does not only come out of books, or lectures... We have wisdom in our own past, and in those who still carry the traditional knowledge accumulated in that tribal past ... although traditional Africa was backward technologically, it cannot be described as having been backward in the harmonization it had achieved between man and his society. We would be stupid indeed if we allowed the development of our economies to destroy the human and social values which African societies had built up over centuries."²⁵

A similar approach was characteristic of the Russian Narodnik I. I. Kablits (Yuzov) who regarded "reason" and "feeling" as factors of progress. While "reason" in his writings was used as a paraphrase of the rationalist sphere of the culture and activity of the intelligentsia, "feeling" was associated with society's spiritual values generated amidst the masses, the peasantry. This popular culture was proclaimed the leading and determining factor of society's life.²⁶ In culturology, this kind of counterposing the in-

lectuals and the people may come to belittling the role of the cultural elite. For instance Ahmed Sekou Touré maintains that while the people creates culture, poets, composers, and artists only interpret it.²⁷ In his time, Uspensky held an original view: while counterposing the intellectual and the popular "milieus" as two almost incompatible socio-cultural levels, he regarded the "people's intelligentsia" (village priests, teachers, etc.) as a group which had been of great importance for the developing of popular culture and morality.²⁸

The antinomy *elitist culture-popular culture* is hard to be distributed among the populist ideological factions. One can only state that P_n is marked by its striving for a relatively harmonious synthesis of both cultures, for recognizing the importance of both in promoting society's cultural progress. In P_r , and especially in P_l , fluctuations can be quite considerable—from stressing the culture-mongering mission of the intelligentsia to criticizing (self-criticizing) intelligentsia's cultural elite. This criticism may incorporate certain tendencies towards anti-intellectualism.

Among other juxtapositions in the populist culturological thought one should point out the *religiosity-atheism* antinomy. The Russian Narodniks were largely atheists who resorted in their argumentation to religion primarily for tactical reasons, as a means of influencing and mobilizing the masses. At the same time, as was pointed out by the Italian historian Franco Venturi, the Soviet scholar E. B. Rashkovsky and other researchers, the secularism of the Narodniks disguised a special type of religious sentiment which revealed itself in certain irrationalist tendencies in thinking and in the reverential, elated attitude to the "younger brother", the people. The ideological processes unfolding in developing countries today prove that populism may, to one degree or another, integrate religious motifs, since religion in the developing world (especially in oriental countries) constitutes a most important part of traditional culture. However, populism never turns into a purely religious trend and is bound to incorporate secular elements. Atheistic tendencies are most typical of P_l , while P_r , and especially P_n are more bent on or tolerant of reliance on religion.

While giving an overall assessment to the populist interpretation of cultural problems, it is interesting to note that the populist ideological tradition has never produced

(with the exception of the "Negritude theory") any major culturological concepts. One can hardly say that the problems of culture are not dealt with in populist writings. The thing is that these problems are outlined rather than tackled. Obviously, this is not without reason. Populism is "sociocentric" by nature, concentrating primarily on social and political problems, to which all other problems, including those of culture, are subordinated.

Such is the overall picture of the logical-structural cross-section of the populist ideology. It should be emphasized once more that this outline is in many respects conventional. First of all, because this is a purely logical model, which presupposes the existence of a *developed* ideological structure, i.e. a concrete set of fundamental elements, intrinsic problems and stereotypes of thinking (although the set of themes and problems treated by the populist ideologist and described above is far from being complete). Not every ideology can turn into an extremely developed ideological structure. For instance, A. Walicki, describing Russian populism as a highly developed and systematized ideology of the populist type, wrote: "It is hardly possible to find in an individual thinker all the aspects and all the constitutive elements of such a structure; in each individual case the proportions [of the constitutive elements] are different and in some cases the complete lack of an important element can even be established."²⁹ As a rule, populist ideology is concerned with a set of basic problems or aspects (political, economic, etc.), while all other problems or aspects are only mentioned in passing or implied. This is especially true of a number of the less significant ideological trends of the populist type in the present-day developing countries.

Moreover, the conventionality of our model is accounted for by the indistinct boundary line separating various trends of an ideology: while P_i may gravitate towards the "centre", P_n may be drawn closer either to the left or to the right. As for P_r , P_i , and P_n themselves, (and the prospective intermediate variants), they do not exist in a "pure" form; their features (which have been singled out above), in reality may constitute most unlikely combinations, coexisting within the framework of a concrete doctrine or theory. Lastly, the logical principle of division is not identical with the socio-political principle.

Nonetheless, an attempt to construct a logical-structural

model of populist ideology is heuristically useful. It may give one an idea of the overall conceptual structure of the ideology and its internal contradictions which, far from being subjective, reflect in one way or another the dialectics of objective reality per se. This kind of analysis makes it possible in principle to correlate any concrete ideology to an "ideal" logical structure. For instance, a paleontologist may reconstruct a skeleton typical of the given species from the odd bones of extinct animals. Subsequently, he can determine whether his other paleontological finds belong to this species or not by comparing them to his "model".

A logical model of populism, by taking into account the whole range of problems populism is concerned with and variety of possible approaches to them, which correspond to various populist trends, establishes its boundaries. While separating populism from other ideologies, they delineate the common ground populism shares with other ideologies. For the main social problems a society (in our case, developing society) is faced with are common to all ideologies that are generated in it. The difference lies in the solutions to problems offered by each of the ideologies. Thus, populism fluctuates between bourgeois reformism and revolutionary democratism of a non-populist type, or Marxism. In certain respects, populism's right wing (P_r) may be quite close to bourgeois nationalism and liberal reformism, at times even merging with them by virtue of advancing the slogan of "unity" of all classes and social groups, defending the rights of the small owner and the private entrepreneur, advocating the principle of "strict observance of democracy", etc. On the contrary, P_l may develop into non-populist revolutionary democratism and Marxism, identifying the people with the toiling non-propertied strata of the population or even with the working class or criticizing certain traditions to the extent that they are practically repudiated altogether (when it suggests to replace "national" socialism by "scientific" socialism, etc.). This illustrates the mechanism of potential ideological evolution that may occur in various types of populist theorists and public figures who in the course of their ideological "maturing" may switch over to different ideological positions. There are quite a number of examples of such ideological (both leftward and rightward) transformation in the representatives of the populist ideological tradition.

Thus, populism in developing societies is the outcome of a certain social situation, a certain stage of historical development. The latter can be described as a conflict between developed capitalism and pre-capitalist or similar societies, or as "secondary" or "tertiary" development of capitalism in the countries having predominantly peasant population and involved in primary accumulation in their capacity of the satellites of developed capitalist powers.

As compared with the preceding century, the belated, backward capitalism of the 20th century is marked by more acute social problems, more complicated forms of colonial exploitation, demographic, ecological, and food crises and a wider gap between "provincial" capitalism and the countries of monopoly capitalism, i.e. the former metropolies. The enormous gap between the socio-economic development levels resulted in "the price of progress" (or industrialization) becoming much higher than it was a century ago.³⁰

At this point, taking into account modern experience, one may describe the ideologies of the populist type as an attempt to formulate and solve a variety of global problems, namely: 1) "amortization" or mitigation of the consequences of primary accumulation in their effect upon the traditional population in backward countries; (2) the use of traditional social forms and, consequently, repudiation of their forcible elimination in the process of organizing the peasantry on cooperative lines; (3) non-capitalist, "state" industrialization stipulating a more balanced and gradual involvement of traditional sectors in the process of modernization. These problems, which used to attract the attention of the Russian Narodniks, are of concern to many ideologies obtaining in the developing world. It stands to reason that there is a long way to go from formulating problems to solving them, especially within the framework of unscientific social theories. As for the problems themselves, they are certainly vital, and this is recognized by many scholars. For instance, the West German author Hermann Hänsel, assessing the ideology and practices of the Ujamaa villages in Tanzania, stresses that this experience helps to realize "the importance of equal development participation and avoidance of extreme polarization,

in addition to judging the improvements of material production".³¹

As an ideology of the masses, populism reflects, to a degree, the socio-ideological expectations of a complex conglomeration of social groups in a developing society which involves the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, certain contingents of the proletariat, and a part of lumpen-proletariat all of whom are suffering from the social contradictions typical of belated, "peripheral" capitalism. In a word, populism may be described as an ideology of non-capitalist development through adaptation and modernization of traditional collectivist institutions and values, such as the commune, the artel, the family and the principles of moral solidarity. However, such a definition—and the shortcomings of concise definitions are all too familiar—calls for further elucidation. It describes populism primarily from the point of view of its subjective ideological manifestation, ignoring at the same time its practical social implications. The latter may vary from attempts "to better" capitalism to attempts to formulate a development strategy, sometimes going beyond the framework of bourgeois society.

Although the idea of non-capitalist development which was originally formulated by the Russian Narodniks is, in principle, immanent to the populist ideological tradition, it should not be regarded as the exclusive prerogative of populism. First, the problem of non-capitalist development is also considered—on a scientific basis—by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and contemporary Marxist scholars. Second, this problem is objectively inherent in belated, backward capitalism; for this reason in modern developing countries non-capitalist development, or socialist orientation, is advocated by revolutionary democrats (in Syria, Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere) whose views are devoid (or practically devoid) of populist colouring.

In the above section an attempt has been made to describe the logical structure of the populist ideology. It has been represented as one rich in antinomies, as a certain potential emerging between opposite poles, i.e. problems and basic concepts around which various interpretations, and corresponding ideological factions, are concentrated. The contradictory nature of ideology is not simply a result of subjective errors made by various ideologists. It is the objective contradictions of life (the conflict between the

traditional and the bourgeois forms, the destructive function of capitalism in the context of a "belatedly" developing society, the clash between "foreign" and "national" capitalism, the dual nature of a small producer, etc.) that account for the abundance of antinomies in populist ideological doctrines and the abundance of ideological and socio-political trends within populism.

Without attempting to speak in detail about the logical structure of populist ideology depicted above, I shall only mention, in addition to the definition of populism already provided, certain important antinomies of populist ideology, including:

- the combination of bourgeois democratism and anti-capitalism;

- the synthesis of traditionalism and modernism;

- the concept of "the people" (above all, the peasantry) as a socio-cultural stratum which is disintegrating with the onset of bourgeois relations and which should be preserved and consolidated so as to promote the national goals of comprehensive development;

- the idea of non-capitalist development through preserving, developing and perfecting traditional collectivism;

- the tendency to advocate the non-class type of social evolution; the negation of class differences among various contingents of "the people" and the refusal to recognize the class functions of its leaders, the critically-minded intelligentsia;

- priority given to agrarian reforms called upon not only to lay the groundwork for industrialization but also to secure social equilibrium in the process of modernization.

Presenting one's concept of populism is by no means a universal means of explaining the ideological and socio-political processes unfolding in the developing countries today. It is only one of the possible approaches to the ideologies engendered by the petty bourgeois—in the broader sense of the word—elements obtaining in the developing world. Its methodological importance lies in its providing an insight into the peculiarities of modern petty-bourgeois democracy in developing countries (its intrinsic contradictoriness and wide range of ideological and political trends and polarities) as immanent to the very nature of the phenomenon in question.

B. POPULISM IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: A VARIETY OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN BOURGEOIS SOCIETY

We have defined the main typological features of populist ideological trends emerging in the society of belated, underdeveloped capitalism. However, recent history has seen certain other phenomena which are reckoned in literature (predominantly Western) among the manifestations of populism. They include the populist political tradition obtaining in the United States, analogous political trends in Canada, Pierre Poujade's movement in France in the 1950s, "Vennamoism", i.e. the movement and the programme initiated by the Finnish Rural party, Peronism in Argentina, etc. Although (as has already been specified) the present work will mainly be concerned with populism in developing societies, we deem it also necessary to consider, albeit in general outline, populism in developed countries and to establish the correlation, that is the differences and the similarities (which are reflected in etymology), between them. This is also important for the reason that populism in developed countries and populism in developing societies are often confused or, at any rate, insufficiently differentiated one from the other.

The populist trends in developed countries can be defined, in the first approximation, as *movements to "democratize" capitalism*. The inverted commas are deliberately here, stressing that in its political forms populism in developed countries often displays vivid authoritarian tendencies (Poujadism, Peronism, etc.) and also because the radicalist rhetoric of certain populists, the rhetoric which has often confused scholars, is essentially well adjusted to capitalist society and to the principal values of bourgeois ideology.

This contradiction between the means and the goals, between what is claimed and what results from practical activity is characteristic of all past and present populist trends in developed countries.

Let us consider the populist trends in the United States. Their factual history will be dealt with in greater detail elsewhere in this book. However, since the North American variety of populism may be considered as the typological basis from which to proceed in assessing populist phenomena in developed bourgeois countries, I shall describe some of its basic features at this point.

In the United States populism emerged in the 1870s-1890s as a farmers' movement of Grangers and Greenbackers supported by certain groups of urban population. Representing the interests of the farmers, the participants in this movement urged to establish control over railroad companies, banks and monopolies and mapped out projects to effect a monetary reform and reduce taxes. The Populist Party set up in 1891 won more than 1.5 million votes at the Congressional and local elections. At the subsequent presidential election, however, the party's candidate suffered a defeat. After this populist movement disintegrated and was partially absorbed by other political movements which subsequently carried out many of the reforms originally advocated by the populists.

In some of its features American populism is similar to the movement of the Russian Narodniks (especially to its legal liberal wing active in the 1880s-1890s) in that it opposed capitalist urbanization, urged partial nationalization and advocated agrarian utopianism (manifested, for instance, in the projects to reform the monetary system which may allegedly entail essential social change or in appealing to the state to defend the farmers against encroachment on the part of monopolies and land speculators). However, unlike the Russian Narodnik movement, the views and programmes advocated by the American populists, despite their verbal radicalism, have never contained even a hint at socialist aspirations or advocacy of non-capitalist development. The American historian Lawrence Goodwyn, for instance, believes that the US populism of the last century should not be regarded as pertaining either to capitalist or to socialist ideology.¹ However, both the activity of the populist organisations and the whole range of measures they proposed testify to the opposite (this

is recognized by Goodwyn): they have never questioned the main capitalist social institutions such as private ownership, economic competition among individuals, the system of bourgeois democracy, and opposed only the monopoly forms of economic and political life.

Populist traditions in the United States have proved viable. They have been characteristic of the political history of the United States in the 20th century and especially in the 1970s, when people started to talk about the emergence of "new populism". Today's populism in the United States has retained, however, the main features of the populism of the past, among them a certain anti-monopoly orientation and a bent on forming a "third party". Moreover, modern populism has retained the amorphous nature of the populism of the past and displays a similar lack of any developed socio-political doctrine. The latter is made up for by vague references to "the power of the people", "the inalienable rights of the individual", etc. In this respect, populism today remains "a certain method or style of public political activity", rather than an ideologically and organizationally definite political trend.² Moreover, modern populism in the United States is certainly of a bourgeois nature. This is corroborated by declarations made by some populists. For instance, Fred R. Harris, one of the populist politicians, pointed out in his basic work that the leading force behind "the new populism" is not ethics (Christian, socialist or any other) but rather the egoistic interest of the individual. Harris contrasted the populists with the "classical socialists", indicating that the former regard the market as the best mechanism of planning and that the concentration of political power is as harmful as the concentration of economic power.³

Canadian populism is an offshoot of US populism. In the period when Canada was still a dominion, farmers' organisations in Canadian provinces were greatly influenced by the movement of American Grangers. These organisations were active in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They aimed at uniting the farmers, defending their interests against the encroachments of big capital, and promoting farmers purchasing and marketing cooperatives.

The populist movement in Canada was in full swing in the 1930s-1940s. In these years the Social Credit Association in Alberta and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan were set up. Both of them were soon to

win at the local elections. The CCF, which in the 1960s united with the trade unions to form the New Democratic Party, is now at the head of the Saskatchewan government. The populist movement has swept the other parts of the country, including Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba.

The goals and the programmatic slogans formulated by the Canadian populists sounded extremely radical. They called "to replace the present capitalist system, with its injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which exploitation of one group by another will be eliminated and in which economic planning for abundance will supersede unregulated private enterprise". It was emphasized that the populists were acting in the name of "common man". The Regina Manifesto, adopted by the Saskatchewan populists in 1933, emphasized that "a small irresponsible minority of financiers and industrialists" had usurped power and that this should be done away with by passing over to a "planned and socialized economy in which our natural resources and the principal means of production and distribution are owned, controlled, and operated by the people".⁴

However, certain reservations contained in these programmes were indicative of the fact that their anti-capitalist attacks should not be taken seriously. In many branches, as James Coldwell, a leader of the Canadian populists, has put it, "private enterprise could perform a useful function". According to Coldwell, "if private business does not exploit the public ... there is no reason why its ownership and operation should not continue in private hands". He also maintained that "[Canadian] agriculture ought to be carried on on the basis of the personal ownership of the family farm"⁵, etc. The practical activity of the Canadian populists disproves the opinion of some scholars who tend to regard them as advocates of "agrarian socialism".⁶ In its practical policies both in the prewar and in the postwar years, the CCF did not exceed the framework of such palliative measures as organizing farmers' credit, setting up marketing and consumer cooperatives, reducing taxes, introducing certain elements of planning, effecting partial nationalization of industrial enterprises, etc.

Moreover, there is a political similarity between the Canadian and the US populists: they both opposed the two leading bourgeois parties, the Liberal and the Conservative Parties, and urged the setting up of a "third" party. On

the whole, this is nothing else but "petty-bourgeois agrarian radicalism"⁷ which, although it contains certain democratic elements, does not affect the foundations of capitalism and bourgeois ideology.

Let us now turn to Peronism, one of the most remarkable trends in Latin American populism which determined political life in Argentina between 1940 and 1970. Robert J. Alexander, an American economist and politologist, an expert on Peron and the movement he founded, indicates that Peronism did not produce any clearly formulated ideological concept or "political philosophy". As for Peron's own views, they constituted an incongruous mixture of doctrines. Only "Argentine nationalism" and the idea of "syndicalist society", which substantiated the regime's efforts to rely on urban workers, were more or less clearly formulated.⁸

One of Peron's interviews throws some light on his position: bourgeois liberalism has already become obsolete, while the time for people's democracy will be ripe no sooner than in the next century. What is needed now is something intermediate, and that is "justicialism", i.e. "guided democracy". Peron maintained that this kind of democracy was established in the period of "propagation of the Argentine revolution".⁹ Peron's followers did not shun similarly resolute pronouncements either. In 1962 Andrés Framini, one of Peron's close followers and a trade union leader, said that the capitalist system was experiencing a crisis and nothing could save it. Since capitalism could not offer any solution it belonged to the past. "We ought to search for road leading to the future," he concluded.¹⁰

However, Peron's and his followers' activity testified to the reverse: far from attempting to encroach upon the capitalist system, they largely promoted its consolidation in Argentina. Peron's economic policy was aimed at developing the private sector, accelerating industrialization and promoting the growth of heavy industry at the price of undermining the agrarian sector, pumping out the resources from the agricultural sphere and channelling them to the industries. Peron's regime undertook a number of progressive measures, such as democratization of education, the establishment of minimum wages and a system of days-off and leaves for industrial and farm workers. All this was guaranteed by the constitution. However, these measures did no harm to the national bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they

helped to ease social tensions in the country and contributed thereby to its bourgeois development.

At the same time, Peron introduced authoritarianism into policy. Dictatorial methods were employed literally in all spheres of society's life. Despite the intensive propaganda of the "workers' ideals", all the trade unions, with the exception of those which reported directly to Peron and persons endowed with power to act for him, existed in name only. For this reason, as many researchers see it, Peronism caused considerable damage to the working-class movement and the workers' struggle for their rights and against the bourgeoisie.¹¹

One could have cited other materials on the populist trends in developed or relatively developed capitalist countries. But what has been said seems to be enough to enable us to make certain conclusions. Despite the fact that populism in developed countries may reflect aspirations to reform and democratize capitalism, on the whole, it is well adjusted to the capitalist social structure representing an essentially bourgeois phenomenon. This largely accounts for its amorphous character in terms of ideology: apart from purely verbal radicalism, there was nothing with which to counter bourgeois ideology. The populists' political efforts are more meaningful because in their bid to win over the electorate, they advance such slogans as "the people's interests", "the power of the people", etc., and thus reflect the desire of certain political groups to partially redistribute power within the framework of bourgeois society. Populist political movements are usually marked by spontaneity, poor organization, reliance on charisma and the personality of the leader. All this enables us to describe populism as an authentic political culture in which Edward Shils distinguished two salient features: the priority given to the "will of the people" over any other political slogan, and the desire of the leaders to establish "direct" contact with the masses without the mediation of any political institutions (which is typical of any charismatic tendency).

The Petty-Bourgeois Social Basis. The definition given by Shils obviously interprets the reality it describes as a phenomenon of political culture. However, this definition is of a somewhat abstract politological nature, it lacks a socio-class aspect because it fails to pinpoint the social strata on which populism relies or seeks to rely. In a number of

cases, these strata are easy to define. They are, as was shown by the American populism of the last century and the Canadian populism of the 20th century, the petty-bourgeois peasantry, small owners and farmers. Richard Hofstadter, a well-known American historian, was justified in stressing the dual nature of the American farmer, who, on the one hand, seeks to do an honest piece of work tilling his own plot of land in accordance with the American "agrarian myth", and, on the other, displays a taste for extracting maximum profit from selling his farm produce.¹² This is the basis of the anti-monopoly rhetoric of American populism and of its overall bourgeois colouring. Significantly, the farmers proved to be the main social group supporting populism in the United States: in the 1892 elections, as little as 0.5—2 per cent of the workers voted for the populists in its major industrial areas.¹³

There are some other instances which prove that there is a certain link between populism and bourgeois agrarianism (the interests of the farmers). Indicative are various trends of peasantism widespread in certain East-European countries in the 1920s and 1930s (Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria). One of the theorists of peasantism urged to consolidate "true, healthy, strong peasant democracy", to institute peasant's private ownership of land. The peasantists did not call to rely on the collectivist communal principles; on the contrary, in their cooperation projects they proceeded from the principles of the Danish-type bourgeois cooperation. These tendencies were displayed in the activity of the short-lived agrarian ("Green") International which was set up by the peasantists in the 1920s.¹⁴

In this connection mention should be made of Vennamoism (after Vennamo Veikko), a populist-type political party in Finland. As has been shown by the Finnish scholar Risto Sänkiahö, this party represents the interests of the petty-bourgeois urban and rural strata (significantly, until 1966 the party had been called Smallholder's Party), especially sensitive to social change, processes of alienation and the pressure exerted by big capital.¹⁵

The Finnish example bears out that populism in developed countries does not rely solely on the farmers. Populism, at least subjectively tends to expand its social basis through winning over to its side all the marginal strata and groups. One cannot but agree with the American author Richard L. Worsnop in that the "silent majority from Middle Amer-

ica that sings the blue-collar blues" constitute another social group bolstering modern populism in the United States.¹⁶ Similarly, the British researcher Peter Worsley maintains it is not to the working man and not even to the middle classes that populism in developed countries appeals, but rather, more emotionally and less definitely, to "the small man" with all the vague connotations and associations the term is fraught with.¹⁷ However, what is actually implied by "the small man" is, again, the same "independent" small owner whose interests are being encroached upon by big capital.

Coming back to Peronism, one may conclude that populism may also rely on certain groups in the working class. As has been shown by the American scholar Alistair Hennessy, Latin American "urban" populism was engendered by a mass society which emerged too early in the process of a chaotic migration of the rural population into urban areas.¹⁸ Populism of this type appeals not so much to proletarian consciousness as to traditionalist prejudices (for instance, admiration for the authority of the leader, "caudillo", typical of the Latin American history of the 19th and 20th centuries). At the same time, "urban" populism in Latin America has never been able to offer anything but bourgeois ideals disguised by the promises of "universal justice and equality". Therefore, the Latin American varieties of populism do not disprove the fact that populism in developed or sufficiently developed capitalist countries objectively (and at times subjectively and quite consciously) reflects the aspirations of the petty-bourgeois strata of the population who are suffering from the oppression of big capital and are prepared to turn for protection to the state or those political forces which aspire to state power.

On Two Populisms. Populism in developed societies differs from that in developing ones. The former is ideologically less pronounced, confines itself to pragmatic political tasks, and constitutes an original variety of political culture. It can be referred to as "political" populism to distinguish it from "ideological", conceptual, doctrinal populism of a type reminiscent of the Russian Narodnik movement or the modern African theories of "national socialism". Unlike populism in the developing world, populism in developed countries is by and large influenced by the bourgeois attitudes, and, despite certain, usually purely verbal, differences, they spring from the same sources.

These and other dissimilarities between the two kinds of populism are natural since they are determined by the specific conditions obtaining at each historical stage in the development of the phenomena in question. Populism as an ideological tradition arises in societies experiencing belated development of capitalism fraught with all the above-described social conflicts. In this connection, one may recall the Russian Narodnik movement and similar ideological trends in Europe today and in the 19th century. "Ideological" populism is engendered in a society whose majority is made up of peasants, at early stage of bourgeois development (though this stage is "belated" as compared to the countries of developed capitalism). It seeks to resolve social problems by embarking on the road of "special", non-capitalist development. Faced with a certain historical alternative, this kind of populism concentrates on searching for an approach to it.

"Political" populism emerges at a different historical stage. It comes into being and functions on the basis of well-established bourgeois relations (even in the conditions of a highly developed bourgeois society). Hence the "normal", bourgeois-democratic approach to the solution of agrarian and other social problems and the absence of any distinct signs of a socialist outlook. For this reason, it doesn't need any special ideology, different from the bourgeois ideology. In point of fact, at a stage of a sufficiently high (to say nothing of an extremely high) level of bourgeois development, nothing is practically left of "the people" to which a "peasant" populist may appeal. Therefore, populism as a political culture uses the term "people" out of ideological inertia to denote something different, some entity which has little to do with traditional structures and traditional pre-capitalist culture.

This should not be taken to mean that populist trends in developed and developing countries have nothing in common. On the contrary there is a definite link between them. There could be no smoke without fire, and etymological identity in this case is no coincidence. As the first ideological trend to emerge in transient societies populism establishes a stable ideological-cultural tradition which lays a foundation for subsequent ideological formations. Political populism, emerging later than ideological populism, borrows from the latter various ideas and thought patterns such as the call to go back to "the soil", to maintain the

cult of "the people", to cherish "the high moral standards" and peasant virtues, etc.). This is only natural because in any bourgeois society, even a highly developed one, there always exist backward and marginal groups which preserve something of the traditional relations and traditional culture.

All the rest is different. A developed bourgeois society is different from a developing society in that it is past its transient stage, when traditional structures prevail over bourgeois ones, and capitalism has gained a firm footing in it economically, politically, culturally and ideologically. This means that bourgeois forms of relations and bourgeois ideals have spread throughout the society, penetrating even into those spheres where pre-capitalist survivals still persist and into the strata which still cherish traditional values. *Insofar as* these elements of the traditional or early capitalist past still persist in the society, the populist slogans and appeals meet with a positive response among certain groups of the population. This is usually a result of a conflict between small producers (farmers, craftsmen and the like) and big capital. At the same time in a fully developed (or sufficiently developed) bourgeois society populism finds itself in an inadequate social environment. As an ideology offering an alternative to capitalist development, populism is a *latecomer*: it appeared when the direction of social evolution had already been determined. Therefore, the groups to which populism appeals cannot take it "in serious", since they have already been largely affected by bourgeois attitudes. Thus, in the postwar discussion on the problems of populism in American historiography, a number of authors, among them John Hicks and Norman Pollak emphasized that the farmers' populism of the 19th century in the United States cannot be regarded as a response of the pre-industrialization producer, cherishing traditional values, to industrialization because the American farmer had become firmly integrated in the bourgeois system.¹⁹

Moreover, those ideologists and politicians who now uphold populist ideas and slogans function within a well-established political system and are caught in the fly-wheel of the bourgeois political machine. As a result, populism is transformed, cleared of any meaningful opposition to capitalism, all "anti-capitalist" declarations being reduced to mere demagoguery. Populism is neutralized, "domesti-

cated", integrated in the political mechanism of bourgeois society. Hence the amorphous character of populism in developed countries, its political pragmatism, its turning into a means of manipulating the masses, the electoral and public opinion.

Nevertheless, in capitalist countries populist trends and populist sentiments continue to recur. In the last decades they have become even more noticeable. Admittedly, they are sporadic manifestations or tendencies rather than something explicit and ideologically well-defined. However, they contain some new meanings which cannot be reduced to a mere nostalgia for the "good old times" or to the small farmer's indignation at the "mercenary town".

For the reader to have a better idea of what it is all about, let us refer to the ideas contained in the latest works by Karl Jaspers. Jaspers, of course, is not a populist but one of the classics of existentialism. However, just as many other German thinkers, he paid tribute to the romantic (or conservative-romantic) tradition typical of German social thought and rather similar to populism in such aspects as cultural substantiation of nationalism, the idea of the "soil", the propagation of the commune and the communal spirit, etc. From this point of view, Jaspers's last work, *The Sources and Aim of History*, is of special interest.

While developing the romantic and populist traditions in exposing the anti-cultural tendencies of bourgeois civilization, Jaspers, a thinker active in the era of imperialism, is more sweeping and radical in his criticism. He aims at the very foundation and main attribute of bourgeois civilization, technology. For Jaspers, technology is not merely an end product of material culture, but rather the fruit of spiritual culture (to be more exact, anti-culture), a universal phenomenon in developed bourgeois society. The spirit of technology is ubiquitous, its effect ranging "from subjugating nature to subjugating man's entire life, to *bureaucratic control* over everything, to presiding over politics and even games and recreation which take on customary forms of life but are no longer an expression of an inner impulse".²⁰

According to Jaspers, technological expansion causes more harm than good: while reducing the amount of labour expended, technology increases its intensity. While satisfying certain requirements, technology immediately generates new ones (recall Rousseau's "Unnecessary Desires").

And what is more important, technology, in effect, eliminates the creative potential in man because in the "technological world" the efforts of inventors and scientists are countered by "the non-creative application of the results of creative search" and because "machine production eliminates the joy of individual creation, it cancels one's ownership of the means of his labour and the production of goods to individual order."²¹ Technology, creating an inanimate world, "pertains to the sphere of the lifeless".²² Man is no longer related to nature as a living being to life, he is separated from it by a barrier of machines and things, and for that reason is increasingly lacking creative impulse which can be generated only by life. Technology as a sphere of purely rational activity is "an ability to make and to possess, rather than to create and to let grow".²³

Although Jaspers himself does not base any agrarian utopias on this reasoning his concepts undoubtedly contain certain elements of the populist vision of culture. This becomes especially obvious when Jaspers tries to reveal the historical and cultural incentives of bourgeois industrial civilization and, at the same time, to bring to light the consequences of the growing mechanization and technization of human life. He shows that "the world of the machines" emerged as a result of man's alienation from traditional culture and its spiritual values associated with man's ability to perceive "the absolute dimensions" of his existence, to understand the meaning of life, the goals of his own activity, and the imperatives underlying man's moral code and relations to other people. "Man forfeits his roots, the ground under his feet and his native land so as to find his place by the machine. The house and the plot of land allotted to him become like machines: they are temporary and exchangeable... The horizon of human life becomes unusually narrow with respect both to the past and to the future; man loses touch with the tradition and stops searching for the ultimate goal, living only in the present. However, the present becomes increasingly inane as it ceases to be sustained by the substance of reminiscences and be charged with the potentials of the future..."²⁴

The consequences of severing the roots and breaking off with the tradition are negative and varied. "The tradition, inasmuch as it is fraught with absolute imperatives, is eliminated, while people in their majority become like

grains of sand. It is owing to their having lost their roots that they can be made use of to advantage."²⁵

This brings us to another aspect of Jaspers's criticism of bourgeois civilization which depersonalizes people and turns them into the mass. In his attitude to the mass Jaspers proceeds from considerations similar to those advanced by the populists rather than from aristocratic or elitist principles. "The mass," he stresses, "should be distinguished from the people.

"The people are internally well-ordered, their self-awareness is reflected in their life styles, thought patterns and traditions. The people are something substantial and qualitative, there is certain atmosphere to their community. The personal qualities a man of the people possesses are determined by the strength of the people which bolsters him up.

"The mass, on the contrary, is not structuralized, it does not possess self-consciousness, it is homogeneous and quantitative, deprived of any distinctive features, traditions, any ground under feet; it is inane. The mass is the object of propaganda and persuasion and exists at the lowest level of consciousness."²⁶ The transformation of the people into the mass has been fostered by the advance of the era of preoccupation with technical aspects of things, the era of urbanization and partial disintegration of the historical and cultural bonds which used to unite the people. For this reason, each individual has something of the people and something of the mass about him.

The most serious consequences of turning society into the mass lie in the area of politics. Having emerged under democratic slogans, the mass gradually turns into the object of manipulation. It becomes an obedient tool in the hands of political adventurers and dictators. The reasons for this are cultural, rather than political. They are associated with the dissolution of the popular tradition and the people per se, with the domination of industrialism, technology, and gigantic towns—all that depersonalizes human beings and deadens their spiritual potentials, their personal and civic self-consciousness.

Where should one look for a way out? Jaspers does not suggest returning to the past. He is judicious enough in his precepts. He is not dogmatic in renouncing Western civilization obsessed with technology. "The burden of labour in itself becomes increasingly heavy with the intro-

duction of modern technology; however, it may well be that the latter will increase the chances of achieving the allotted tasks."²⁷ What is bad is not technology per se but preoccupation with it, senseless quantitative growth and acquisitiveness—the universal principles which should be reassessed, restricted and regulated. Technology is only a means of reaching an aim, therefore it is important to be mindful of the aims of applying technology.

Similarly, the turning of society into a mass interlaces with the inevitable and necessary processes of democratizing social life; to abandon them and to return to the aristocratic mode of government would be unwise and inconceivable. Jaspers stands up for restructuring contemporaneous society primarily in terms of values and culture. As a result, technology would adopt a subordinate role, the mass would acquire the qualities of the people and man would become a personality.

In Jaspers's above-cited discourse on historical and cultural themes one may find, in a condensed form, what is set forth in the writings of many populist ideologists. For instance, Mikhailovsky, too, distinguished between "the people" and "the crowd"; Gandhi denounced preoccupation with technology; Léopold Senghor counterposed the vitality and sensuality of African Negro culture to the rationality of Western civilization, etc. Naturally, Jaspers's ideas emerged against a different socio-cultural background, as a response to the excessive, rather than insufficient, development of capitalism. Therefore, they have a different meaning and different social message.

Objectively, judgements of this kind are stimulated by the crisis plaguing modern bourgeois civilization. Indicative are disappointment with the parliamentary forms of bourgeois democracy, a drive for direct political action at the grassroots level, the opposition to the growing bureaucratization and technocratization of society, and the resultant tendency towards anarchical activity, which can be exemplified by "the New Left". Excessive urbanization and the ecological crisis foster the revival of "rural" values which acquire special significance in the context of the worsening position of the peasantry. Similarly, the growing alienation of man, his feeling of being lost in gigantic organizations and associations lash into a drive for decentralization, for modifying the forms of labour and

life styles, for coming back to "simple" systems of social communication.

In their totality, these symptoms have not yet been crystallized in any finished ideological forms. For this reason one can hardly speak about populism in the West as a socially definite and coherent world outlook, although the possibility of such a system of views appearing in the future is not ruled out. But even then, this kind of an ideological phenomenon should not be typologically identified with the Narodnik movement or any other trend of "national socialism" in developing countries: the latter emerged under different conditions, have different goals and provoke different social response.

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I believe that this analysis, albeit a brief one, of populism in developed capitalist countries has shown once more that the problem of populism should be approached from the socio-class positions and examined by means of a concrete historical method. Otherwise any political movement or politician making frequent use of the word "people" could be named populism or populist.

It would be relevant to say a few words about a larger model of populism, based on similarity between certain ideological issues found in the doctrine of the past (beginning with the Gracchus brothers) and the present. Although in its present form this model tends to confuse rather than elucidate the problem, it would hardly be expedient to discard it as a hypothesis.

One may assume that a certain similarity between various "peasantophilic" ideologies, doctrines and social ideas of various historical periods; the fact that, in a sense, the peasantry constitutes an extra- or inter-formational category; the passage of certain common socio-psychological features from generation to generation—in principle, may lead the scholar to a sufficiently fruitful generalization about "the populist complex". One may assume, hypothetically, that "communalism", i.e. fellowship achieved through living in a commune, is an ancient form of socialization which, as such, is rooted in mass psychology and in man's inner self, in the innermost depth of his psyche and in the system of his basic values. The ideological syndrome

of populism—a stronger reliance of an individual or groups of individuals on certain values—occur whenever, for various reasons, a system of social bonds embodied in communal institutions or some other forms of collectivism, is collapsing.

Yet, the forms and the outcome of this ideological response to the impending breakdown of social bonds are, naturally, different in different historical periods and in different socio-class contexts. In the pre-capitalist formations this response was predominantly conservative, based on the idea of “returning to the past”. As for the Narodnik-minded intellectuals or peasants, they cling to the surviving communal institutions and advocate a synthesis of traditionalism and modernism. At the stage of sufficiently developed capitalism, in the petty-bourgeoisie’s response to the danger the ideological rudiments of populism conceal the purely bourgeois content and purpose of political action. Lastly, in a highly developed bourgeois society, this response may take on the form of nostalgia for “the people” and “communalism” which reflects the common man’s protest against the excessive preoccupation with technology and the extremely formal social structure, against those substitutes of the collective effort (associations, societies, parties, etc.) which the capitalist world offers him.

Without ruling out the possibility of taking such a global approach, we should like to note that this approach, too, presupposes a combination of sociological and concrete historical methods, strict differentiation between the phenomena under consideration, a science-based definition of their socio-historical, historico-cultural, and, conceivably, anthropological foundation. An analysis of this kind is a matter of the future.

Part II

HISTORICAL FORMS AND NATIONAL VARIANTS OF POPULISM

1. EARLY POPULIST TRENDS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES (THE 17TH-19TH CENTURIES)

Populism as a well-developed ideological tradition pertains to the 19th-20th centuries. However, certain ideas, which were subsequently to acquire great importance in the populist system of views, are of more remote origin. In this sense one can speak about *pre-populism*. Its representatives included, for instance, Gerrard Winstanley, a prominent figure in the British bourgeois revolution, who advocated the institution of public ownership of land in its communal form. Similar views were expressed by the British utopian socialist of the late 18th century, Thomas Spence, the first to advance the idea of land nationalization. As he saw it, the land was to be passed over to communes rather than individuals. According to Karl Marx, Thomas Spence with his socialist approach to agrarian problems, was "the deadly enemy of Private Property in Land".¹

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who set forth the principle of "people's sovereignty" and a romantic approach to the criticism of progress, may be ranked among the representatives of pre-populism, too. Let us consider in brief some of his views to which the origin of populist ideas can be traced. In a treatise entitled "Has the Revival of Sciences and Arts Contributed to the Purification of Morals?" Rousseau wrote: "A vile and insidious uniformity reigns in our morals, and all minds seem to have been cast in the same mould... We follow customs without end and we never follow our own reason."²

According to Rousseau, this happens because material progress promotes "useless desires" (and is stimulated by them), and conduces to an extensive growth of requirements.

Progress brings a diversity of outward forms of life, and a greater knowledge of the world, but this is not accompanied by any progress in what Rousseau believes to be "most useful and most advanced of all human knowledge", "the knowledge of man".³

In search of such knowledge Rousseau turns to "the golden age", the antiquity, when the tilling of land was man's main preoccupation. For Rousseau, agriculture is not merely a form of productive activity, but a certain socio-cultural milieu which possessed, in his opinion, three basic merits. Firstly, it constituted a natural foundation for equality and political consciousness of independent producers. "Commerce," Rousseau wrote, "produces riches, while agriculture ensures liberty."⁴ Departing from "the natural state" and embarking on an unsteady path of progress causes and continuously enhances inequality and fosters private property.

Secondly, rural life ensures man's harmonious relations with nature. Rousseau noted sadly that "Switzerland used to be covered with forest..., but in order to multiply pastures and to establish manufactures, they have been felled without measure and order."⁵

Thirdly, rustic life is conducive to the shaping of man's cultural, spiritual and moral world. "The peasants are more attached to their land than the townsmen to their towns. The equality and simplicity of rustic life are so attractive for those who do not know any other life that they have no desire to change it. Hence the contentment with the sort of existence that renders man peaceful."⁶

In Rousseau's writings the ideas, which were later to be advocated by populists, are expressed in an abstract, vague fashion and are mixed with thoughts characteristic of the early bourgeois Enlightenment. This was not yet an exposure but rather an anticipation of the impending crisis of bourgeois civilization.

Among other representatives of pre-populism mention should be made of Thomas Paine, an American democrat of the 18th century, who formulated the idea of agrarian justice and the "labour foundation" of property. Of certain importance for the further development of populist views were the concepts set forth by the physiocrats (François Quesnay and others) who regarded farming and agriculture as primary factors determining public wealth and economic life. On the whole, pre-populism incorporated certain ru-

diments of "peasant socialism" and early bourgeois democratism. Objectively, it added to the general liberation movement of the era of bourgeois revolutions.

It follows from the above that populism proper emerged in the context of a developing society as a response to the disproportions characteristic of the second and the subsequent stages of bourgeois development. In principle, such social context is to various degrees characteristic of all the countries which were late, as compared with Britain, in developing capitalism. It is no accident that the first fifty years of the 19th century saw the activity of the Swiss economist Jean Sismondi, who, as a theorist of "economic romanticism", was ranked by Lenin among the precursors of the Russian Narodniks.⁷

The ideas of non-capitalist development, of the "balance" of the traditional and the modern elements were contained, in their rudimentary form, in the doctrine of the "true socialists", a trend which emerged in Germany in the period preceding the revolution of 1848. Among the representatives of this trend were Otto Lünning, Moses Hess, Karl Grün and others. Their views were founded on a quintessential populist idea of the advantages of backwardness owing to which whole stages of development can be passed over. Lünning wrote: "Spiritually, we are ... in pace with France. What in France yields practically unripe fruit [i. e. a socialist movement] by virtue of being theoretically incomplete, now, owing to our participation, has been finally theoretically completed. This has spared us a long practical way."⁸

Criticism of capitalism and the bourgeois ways was typical of German "true socialists", as is obvious from a special series of articles edited by Moses Hess. The authors cited telltale figures and facts illustrative of the conditions of the factory workers in England and other European countries and warned against Germany being turned into a second England.⁹ Heinrich Buhl, a Young Hegelian, believed that the proletarianization of the population could be averted only by socialism.

Moreover, "true socialists" contended that in Germany capitalism had no prospects. In a book entitled *The Proletarian* Heinrich Bensen maintained that Germany would be able to avoid capitalism and impoverishment of the urban proletariat provided it did not "imitate" Britain. He called to support the small producer and recommended

to "take care of small handicraftsmen".^{9a} Moses Hess, anticipating the Russian Narodniks, wrote: "The German bourgeoisie, too, helpless to sustain the competition from foreign industries at the world market..., helpless in its own country to defend its own interests in the struggle against the nobility, too cowardly to unite in order to attain revolutionary goals, is clearly doomed to manoeuvre between fear and hope in the still ocean of German vileness."¹⁰ Similarly, Heinrich Buhl maintained that capitalism in Germany had no prospects whatsoever, since the external market was shrinking rather than growing and Germany was not able to compete there with Great Britain and France; large-scale industries survived only due to the help from the state. The "true socialists" were not lured by bourgeois democratic liberties either, because, as Otto Lünning put it, "political freedom advocated by liberals incapable of eliminating the spiritual and material sufferings of humanity, could only lead to the monetary domination of the selfish bourgeoisie."¹¹ Hence the repudiation of "politics" and constitutionalism and a drive for an immediate socialist revolution which would pave the way to "humanism".

The movement of "true socialists", which displayed unmistakably populist tendencies, was a short-lived one. Several years later many of its representatives switched over to the positions of "realism", urging to develop national industry, carry out bourgeois-democratic reforms, etc. This was only natural as Germany was in the process of accelerated transition to a bourgeois society.

In the period between the 1830s and the 1870s the ideas propagated by the Polish utopian socialists also displayed a noticeable populist colouring. Popular with the progressive Polish thinkers was the idea of supplementing the democratic principles borrowed from the West with the national traditions of "communal power" to be revived through restoring the institute of "gmin", i. e. communal self-government.¹²

Similar views were sporadically emerging in non-European countries, including the United States, up to the late 19th century. Their advocates included the Belgian economist Emile de Laveleye and the British natural scientist and publicist Alfred Wallace, whose world outlook was grounded on the belief that the provision of each member of society with land, the organization of free self-governed communities would lead, under the conditions of capital-

ist production, trade exchange, etc. to the elimination of exploitation.¹³ An interesting example of a populist outlook is offered by the views of the Italian economist Achille Loria, who, as Engels put it, "saw the world's salvation in small-scale peasant's property in land",¹⁴ and called to the initial forms of communal life, communes and isolated associations. Populist tendencies were also incorporated in the theories of "co-operative socialism".¹⁵

However, all these concepts emerged in the context of developed bourgeois relations and therefore either remained a voice in the wilderness or acquired a bourgeois orientation and called only for partial restructuring of capitalism. On the whole, the populist tendencies in the developed countries of the 19th century were nothing more than sporadic manifestations which did not develop into an integral ideology of the populist type. Developed European countries and the United States were already lacking the social prerequisites for this, first and foremost, the peasantry united in communes and displaying anti-feudal and, at the same time, egalitarian aspirations. The first major (and therefore classical) ideology of this type was offered by the Russian Narodnik movement.

2. THE NARODNIK MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA (THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH AND THE EARLY 20TH CENTURIES)

According to Lenin, the Narodnik ideology is "a whole world outlook" and "a vast stretch of social thinking".¹ This is a most complicated, ramified ideology, a complex of philosophical, sociological, economic, and political theories, a set of thought patterns and ideological "cliches". At the same time, it is a broad public movement whose history saw upsurges and recesses, and the emergence of revolutionary and reformist trends, a movement which covered a long way from sporadic circles to mass political parties. It is also a cross-section of national culture described in numerous works of literature, art, and science.

Constituting, in terms of its historic goals and socio-political substance, an anti-feudal movement paving the way for national capitalism, the Narodniks adhered to ideological principles which incorporated certain elements of

utopian socialism. The latter implied that they put forth both bourgeois-democratic demands ("land and freedom"), and programmatic slogans which sometimes went beyond bourgeois democratism by urging non-capitalist development, socialization of land, banning hired labour, etc. These "additions", "as distinct from democracy, as a supplement to democracy"², accompany the Narodnik movement at all stages of its development.

Narodism originated in the country which displayed distinctive features of belated, peripheral bourgeois development described in the preceding part (among them contradictions between the developed forms of capitalism borrowed from the outer world and the non-capitalist structures; rapacious methods of exploiting the population; the growing process of "depeasantization" and pauperization of the small producers, etc). In many respects, Narodnik thinkers were the first to become aware of the situation taking shape in the country. They proceeded from this awareness in developing their theories. Therefore, it should be noted that some of the Narodnik thinkers regarded their doctrines as relevant not only to their national context but to countries similar to Russia, too.

This is obvious in the works by the founders of Narodism, Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Chernyshevsky. Herzen proceeded from his belief in the universality of the historical process. "The historical forms of Western life," he wrote, "*incomparably higher* in their development level than the political system in Russia, are no longer consonant with the requirements of modern mentality. This mentality evolved in the West; yet, since the moment it was recognized and expressed it has turned into a universal human asset belonging to all those who contribute to it."³ But since socialism is a natural vector of the further development of the advanced countries in the West, "would not it be strange for us to repeat all the long metamorphosis of Western history, *knowing in advance le secret de la comédie?*..."⁴ Thus, the prospects for bypassing capitalism are grounded on the possibility for the backward countries to learn from the advanced ones, to imitate their achievements and thus avoid errors. "Good pupils are often moved up to the next class but one,"⁵ Herzen concludes, therefore a backward country is in a position to consciously control its historical development in order to pass through the stages preceding socialism over a shorter period, "in a way similar

to that of an embryo passing through the lowest stages of its zoological existence".⁶

Herzen thinks it extremely important that by the time of impending and radical change Russia had managed to preserve its "inconspicuous, modest commune, i.e. communal ownership of land, the equality of all members of the commune without any exception, brotherly distribution according to the number of workers and its own communal management of the affairs".⁷ According to Herzen, these principles, namely "communal" production, egalitarianism in distribution, genuine democratism, form the basis of socialism which has emerged and is consolidating in Europe. Thus, for a backward country, he believes, emulating the example set by advanced countries is a goal, while its own communal institutions are the means of attaining it. Herzen was by no means embarrassed by the fact that socialism is to be built on the foundation of traditional, archaic collectivism, as "development in general is ensured by various combinations of the two interacting forces, the *tradition* and the *ideal*".⁸

Herzen's approach to history as a universal phenomenon was reflected not only in his perception of history as an integral process but also in his approach to socialism as a global, worldwide problem. This means that a backward country should not merely catch up with the advanced countries and learn from them but also seek to contribute to the common cause of achieving socialism both *independently* and in alliance with the advanced countries. In the West, Herzen maintains, the freedom of the personality has been achieved and democratic norms have been established, but only the minority can enjoy them. As for Russia, it has its commune, but the latter tends to "absorb the personality". "...What is the way to remove this contradiction: what is the way to retain the Briton's independence without letting him be a cannibal [i. e. without promoting the bourgeois principle of universal rivalry], what is the way to develop the peasant's personality without letting him forfeit the communal spirit? This constitutes the painful problem of our century, this is what socialism is all about."⁹

Hence the necessity for various, parallel roads leading to the same goal. "It would be sheer madness to initiate a change by abolishing free institutions [in developed countries] because practically only a few people have access to them; it would be a still greater madness to eliminate the

communal principle after which man strives today because it has failed, so far, to develop a free personality in Russia."¹⁰ Forcible eradication of traditional collectivist institutions, albeit for educational, civilizing reasons, can only cause harm to a backward country. This is exactly the way the British acted towards the Indians: having found in India "rudiments of patriarchal-communal government, they replaced it with the British mode of government". Commenting on the Sepoy uprising, Herzen wrote that this method "made imbeciles of the people, at places killed them and at places developed ... hatred for Britain".¹¹

As Herzen saw it, Russia's chances to establish socialism were no smaller than those of other European countries. Russia even had certain advantages over them. They consisted, in Herzen's opinion, in Russia's being able to utilize the experience of developed countries, and, at the same time, in its being less conservative, less dependent on well-established, fully-developed social forms, and, consequently, in its being "quicker off the mark". "We are a young nation," stresses Herzen, "we can only win, we have nothing to lose."¹²

It might seem that it is more difficult to embark upon socialist restructuring of society without well-developed legal norms guaranteeing individual rights, without a high level of social and economic organization and culture. At the same time, "by virtue of the natural spontaneity of our rustic life, the shaky and unstable economic and legal concepts, the vague proprietary right, the absence of philistinism and the unusual ease in assimilating other people's experience we are superior to the fully-developed and tired nations".¹³ Russia's main advantage, however, was the existence of the commune, because, as Herzen saw it, the spirit of collectivism is more important for securing socialism than the freedom of the individual. Therefore, Herzen concludes, our untilled land, our black soil *are better suited* for being sown with the grain gathered from Western fields".¹⁴

Herzen assessed European bourgeois civilization from the point of view of its ability to pass over to socialism. According to Herzen, the West's main evil is that it lapses into philistinism, excessive acquisitiveness and possessiveness resulting from the alienation of the worker from the means of production, land, and "detaching people from the land and passing it over to the few, to the elite".¹⁵

For this reason, "the German peasant is a *philistine* of farming, the worker in all countries is a prospective *philistine*".¹⁶ Hence the danger that the industrialized West would never be able to reach socialism and "the landless, urban world, the world of the authoritative proprietary right will be engulfed by philistinism."¹⁷

In criticizing bourgeois civilization, Herzen captured some of the tendencies which subsequently were to develop into distinctive features of the present-day Western capitalist countries. He was worried about the spread of mass culture, standardization of life, depersonalization of the individual and dissolution of his spiritual world, the lack of authenticity in human activity and creativity, etc. He wrote: "Everything is *en masse*, wholesale, exchangeable, available to almost everybody, devoid of either aesthetic finishing or individual taste ... an autocratic crowd of united mediocrities..."¹⁸ The impending ecological problems are as grim. Here is Herzen's gloomy picture of London: "Look at the dark damp lanes. Look at its inhabitants grown two meters deep into the ground... Look at the river flowing with pus and infection, at this cap of smoke and stench covering both the city and its environs ... don't you think that all this will persist, that all this is the necessary prerequisite of civilization?"¹⁹

There was a time when Herzen believed that European development had reached a deadlock and placed all the hopes for socialism and progress on Russia only. This is not to say that messiahnic sentiment dominated Herzen's outlook. He recognized (especially at the end of his life, when he, as Lenin put it, "turned his gaze ... to the International"²⁰) that the West would choose its own way to socialism, "workmen's socialism". At the same time, he stood up for Russia's non-capitalist development via the peasant commune. He expressed his position in a concise formula: both the West and Russia would advance towards the same goal along different roads—"you—with the help of the proletariat—towards socialism, we—with the help of socialism—towards freedom".²¹

Some of Herzen's basic principles were corroborated and some others, further developed by Nikolai Chernyshevsky. In his writings, the idea of bypassing capitalism acquires a distinct international character. According to Chernyshevsky, communal ownership "should be regarded ... as a feature common to the life of each nation".²² Consequent-

ly, not only Russia but also countries of a similar type, could embark upon the road of non-capitalist development. Chernyshevsky interprets the latter as a universal law, proceeding in this from the Hegelian principle of negating the negation ("in its form, the higher stage of development is similar to the initial one, from which it has departed"²³) and substantiating his thought by original examples from natural and social sciences. Chernyshevsky's "algebraic" (as Plekhanov put it) formula of non-capitalist development is worded as follows: "A high level of development of a certain social phenomenon [namely, socialism which emerges at the stage of the "overdevelopment" and crisis of capitalism] in advanced nations may promote accelerated development of this phenomenon in other countries, stimulating it to move up from the lowest stage right to the highest stage, bypassing intermediate logical phases"²⁴ [i. e. the bourgeois phase].

Chernyshevsky's (and Herzen's) position offered an alternative to the liberal approach to the agrarian problem in Russia. In the period of preparing for the peasant reform of 1861 the liberals thought it expedient to eliminate the commune as a primitive, archaic social unit and to replace it with "higher" forms of private economy. At the same time, Chernyshevsky indicated in a more definite form than Herzen did that Russia's non-capitalist development could be ensured only by a peasant revolution. Chernyshevsky held a more sober view of the possible roads to socialism in the developed and underdeveloped countries. He criticized the messianic sentiment in Herzen's writings and never questioned the socialist prospects for the more enlightened countries of the West. Lastly, he was less categorical in his assessment of the socialist potential of the peasant commune.

Up to the 1870's, the views held by the founders of Narodism had remained a "pure" theory, a sociological hypothesis, an abstract and general outlook. Then, there emerged and gradually grew the stratum of democratic *raznochinets** intelligentsia, a social group which upheld and developed the ideas of "peasant socialism". Thus, Narodism was developed from a theory into an ideology.

This process evolved in two directions. First, the general

* *Raznochinets* (hist.) — in 19th century, Russian intellectual not of gentle birth.

theory was systematized, supplemented and embodied in a number of concrete guidelines for practical political action. Herzen's and Chernyshevsky's theory of non-capitalist development was supplemented by subjective sociology, "economic romanticism", and a precise programme and tactics of revolutionary struggle. Second, the ideas elaborated by a handful of theorists turned into a common asset of a comparatively wide circle of their followers (although not yet an asset of the masses). This period can be described as the "group" or "circle", stage in the development of Narodism as an ideology.²⁵

The main ideas of subjective sociology were elaborated by P. L. Lavrov and N. K. Mikhailovsky. The pivot of their teaching is the so-called subjective method, the primacy of values, of ethical criteria in social science. This formed the foundation of the Narodnik "theory of progress". Unlike the theorists who elaborated evolutionist, linear patterns of historical development, the Narodnik thinkers believed that progress should be consciously introduced in history since the latter in its "natural" development is reduced to regress rather than progress. According to Lavrov, all achievements in technology and culture were the outcome of exploitation of the people who, by their labour, ensure leisure for the intellectual activity of the well-educated ruling elite. The price of progress proves to be exorbitant. For this reason, some of the most progressive intellectuals, "the critically-minded personalities" who realize the unjust nature of such division of labour ought to pay back their "debt to the people" and secure for the worker all the necessary conditions for the all-round development of his personality.

The theoretical subjectivism of the Narodnik thinkers should be seen in the context of specific social conditions obtaining in post-reform Russia. The experience of the first post-reform decade frustrated the hopes of the democratic circles for the spontaneous revolutionary upsurge of the peasant masses whom they expected to protest against the "fraudulent" reform of 1861. As the peasants' activity ebbed, the intelligentsia's and students' opposition surged. In this context, a social doctrine was expected to provide a theoretical basis to the growing democratic movement despite such "objective factors" as reprisals, the passivity of the peasants, the growth of capitalism, etc. and to inspire "individuals" and "groups of individuals" to

participate in social struggle. Theoretical subjectivism echoed the revolutionary sentiment of the Narodnik intelligentsia.²⁶

The sociological principles of Narodism underlay the works by the Narodnik economists, (V. P. Vorontsov, N. F. Danielson, V. V. Bervi-Flerovsky, P. P. Chervinsky and others), who sought to substantiate the Narodnik principles with an analysis of the economic processes unfolding in post-reform Russia. For all its subjectivism this analysis signalled a significant step forward. It is no accident that in the works by Narodnik economists Narodism, to quote Lenin, "ceased to be merely the dreamy contemplation of the future and made its rich contribution to Russian social thought by its researches into the economic life of Russia".²⁷ Lenin appreciated the Narodniks' analysis of capitalism.²⁸ The Narodnik economists described the bourgeois process in Russia, with all its contradictions fraught with crisis, and stressed, accordingly, the need for radical social change.

What were the peculiar features of the process highlighted by the Narodnik economists? First, capitalism in Russia developed at the cost of a host of small producers who were brought to ruin. The crude, primitive forms of primary accumulation (the exploiter leeches of all kinds were fleecing the people), combined with mechanized capitalist production, ruined the craftsmen, drove the peasants away from their land, created a huge army of the unemployed, the "down-and-outs" who vainly tried to hire themselves out at the labour market. Small producers were rendered landless, i.e. turned into factory hands, and impoverished.²⁹

Second, the development of bourgeois relations in Russia, as Danielson saw it, vividly manifested itself in the fact that the sphere of circulation grew faster than that of production and that the gap was constantly growing. This was an outcome of "the trade economy" (relying on the intensive exports of low-priced grain and raw materials to European markets) and the pro-bourgeois financial strategy of the government which had imposed the burden of taxes and the land-redemption fee upon the peasantry. In order to be able to pay the taxes, peasants had to sell their grain in winter only to buy it again in spring. All this brought the small producer to ruin, restricted his consumption, and, consequently, weakened the productive

forces of the country. But if the growth of exchange is not backed by growth in production, if "the producers and the land ... continue to be neglected, the entire mechanism of exchange will at first lose some of its momentum, then the slowdown will become more and more pronounced and finally, the mechanism will come to a complete halt."³⁰

Therefore, as Narodnik economists saw it, the development of capitalism in Russia was hampered by objective obstacles. It was in no position to compete with developed countries at foreign markets; at the same time, the domestic market remained narrow by virtue of the low (and constantly lowering) purchasing power of the masses. The capitalist system got into a kind of a "vicious circle: for capitalism to flourish the population must be rich; however, each step in capitalist development is accompanied by the impoverishment of the population".³¹

It should be stressed that the Narodnik thinkers believed that the "skidding" of capitalism in Russia was not an accidental but rather a natural phenomenon typical of all countries experiencing "belated", "peripheral" development of capitalism. As Vorontsov put it: "The later a country embarks on industrial development, the more difficult it is to accomplish such development in a capitalist way."³² In such a case, capitalism fails to fulfil its historical mission, to guarantee jobs for all those who are chased away from their land and to teach them capitalist labour skills. It can only form "islets" of modern production designed to satisfy the needs of the higher classes, bringing to ruin, at the same time, the overwhelming majority of the productive population. Young countries should seek alternative ways of economic development as not only their economic growth but their very existence as nations are jeopardized.

What kind of development should they strive after? In Vorontsov's opinion, it is vital that "the process of socialization of labour [i.e. the creation of large-scale productive public economy] could unfold ... in a different, non-capitalist way".³³ In this respect, belated development offers "enormous advantages". First of all, the young countries may utilize the organizational and economic achievements of advanced countries so as "to jump over the steps" in their technological advancement. Second, they should put an end to the chaotic economic development fraught with the pauperization of the great majority of the people. This

necessitates "the transformation of [our] capitalist production into public or artel production".³⁴ Only the state is in a position to ensure balanced development, free from acute social conflicts.

Essentially, the Narodnik project of "state-regulated" industrialization consisted in combining industrial progress with the development of "small-scale popular production" and in promoting the economic interests of the peasantry and craftsmen. Responding to the remarks to the effect that such a policy would slow down the rate of growth, Vorontsov said that in principle the goal of "popular production" consisted in satisfying the requirements of the population and not in increasing the surplus value".³⁵ He added that in the course of time a high rate of growth would be ensured, too: having preserved "the small-scale popular production", he said, we should be able to combine the communal element incorporated in the latter with modern technology and organization, which, would in the long run, promote economic and social progress. Vorontsov suggested that the "artel principle" should be gradually introduced throughout the national economy, from factories to rural communes, so as to create, eventually, "socialized popular production", i.e. socialism. Echoing the above cited Herzen's formula about the advancement "through socialism to freedom", Vorontsov wrote: "Once Russia has not been destined to fight for freedom, let us hope that its mission consists in achieving equality and fraternity."³⁶

The plan elaborated by Narodnik economists was neither another agrarian utopia nor an attempt to perpetuate small-scale production. Its authors were conscious of the importance of industrialization and developing the country's productive forces. The drive for modernization was shared by many other Narodniks. For instance, P. P. Chervinsky argued that it was impossible to retain the "antediluvian methods" of small-scale production without running the risk of being strangled economically and suggested introducing the achievements of science and technology into the communal-artel "economic units".³⁷

Analyzing the peculiarities of the development of capitalism in Russia, Narodnik economists proceeded from a number of general theoretical assumptions. Andrzej Walicki justly commented that the works by Vorontsov, Danielson and others constituted early ideological reflections on the specific features of the economic and social development

in backward agrarian countries who were "late" in joining the process of modernization in the context of their coexistence with highly industrialized nations.³⁸ Narodnik economists sought to show that backward countries should not and cannot imitate the classical models of Western development, that in the conditions obtaining in these countries non-capitalist development was most expedient since the state restricted the interests of private capital and coordinated the interests of various economic sectors and groups of the population.

At the same time, the writings by Narodnik economists contained what Lenin aptly called petty-bourgeois "economic romanticism" and "philistine socialism". These defects of Narodnik economic literature were exposed and analyzed by Marxist thinkers. At the same time, Lenin stressed the sincere desire of Narodnik ideologists to defend the interests of the working population, first of all the peasant masses. In one of his works, Vorontsov, for instance, urged to see to it that "the land released from the tired hands of its former owners [landlords] escape the embrace of the kulak and get into the hands of the muzhik who yearns for it".³⁹ This democratic attitude generated the demand to eliminate the vestiges of serfdom.

All these ideas and principles of Narodism were in one way or another reflected in the political programmes formulated by the revolutionary-minded Narodniks. The different programmes put forth by various Narodnik circles and factions had much in common. First, they shared the slogan "Land and Freedom!" which implied a series of radical democratic reforms; second, they all advocated the idea of setting up a centralized political organization or a party; third, they all planned to develop the political revolution into a "social" (in other words, "socialist") one. As for the means of attaining these goals, opinions differed. Some urged persistent propaganda among the masses (P. L. Lavrov), others called for organizing mass peasant uprisings (M. A. Bakunin), still others placed their hopes on a handful of professional revolutionaries (P. N. Tkachev). Indeed, in the 1870s the illegal Narodnik organizations tried all these methods. The wider movement, however, often acted independently and it was the sentiment prevailing at the grassroots level that would often inspire theoretical concepts.

Without dwelling upon the practical activity of the rev-

olutionary Narodniks, I shall confine myself to highlighting its stages (the circles of the 1860s and the early 1870s, the period of going to the people, *Zemlya i volya* [Land and Freedom], *Narodnaya volya* [The People's Freedom]⁴⁰) and making some general remarks. The 1860s-1870s showed that the theory of narodism in terms of both the goals it set and the methods of action it suggested had failed to stand the test of practice. The two decades of the struggle waged by "effective" Narodism can be divided into two similar cycles: the efforts to come into contact with the masses and stir them up to struggle were followed by a switchover to independent, primarily, terrorist actions of limited groups of revolutionaries.

At the same time, in the 1870s the revolutionary struggle acquired a new dimension. Whereas in the 1860s the liberation movements involved hundreds of participants, in the 1870s it involved thousands and even tens of thousands of them.⁴¹ Although the revolutionary Narodniks failed to achieve the goals they had set themselves, their movement, nonetheless, fulfilled certain important historical tasks. Revolutionary Narodism discredited autocracy in the eyes of the educated people both politically and ideologically. Moreover, its having moulded the personality of the professional revolutionary was an important step in preparing for the revolutionary assault against absolutism in the early 20th century. As Lenin repeatedly pointed out, the Narodniks' organizational and clandestine experience proved to be extremely valuable.

Narodism was a secular movement pursuing primarily social goals. The overwhelming majority of the Narodniks were atheists. However, one cannot declare that Narodism was a temporal movement without making certain reservations. In the 1870s, attempts were made to elaborate a kind of a "social religion" (A. K. Malikov). Furthermore, in their "going to the people" Narodniks made repeated attempts to appeal to the religious aspect of mass consciousness. The idea of "attracting the dissenters" belonged to Herzen, who regarded them as the most dynamic section among the peasant believers. The revolutionaries of the 1870s (A. D. Mikhailov and others) made efforts to establish contacts with various sectarian groups in order to involve them in revolutionary struggle. The Narodniks' attitude to religion was deep-rooted. The Narodnik ideological and socio-psychological aspirations were inspired by

profound, passionate, at times mystical, belief in "the people" and "the soil". Having lost touch with them, the intellectuals now sought to atone for it. The realization of intelligentsia's "sin", the need to seek redemption, the compassion for the "younger brother" and the desire to take upon themselves his sufferings dominated Narodniks' consciousness. Hence the readiness to sacrifice themselves typical of the Narodnik-minded *raznochinets* circles and especially the revolutionaries. Leo Tolstoy captured this peculiarity of Narodnik psychology in his story "Divine and Human". It should also be remembered that many of the Narodniks came from the lower and middle circles of the clergy.

The Narodnik movement was not confined solely to revolutionary organizations. Besides those Narodniks who worked underground, the movement involved a large number of sympathizers. Certain groups among the latter had close ties with the revolutionary underground organizations although they did not participate in them directly. For example, the editorial board of the journal *Otechestvenniye zapiski*, headed by G. Z. Yeliseev, N. K. Mikhailovsky and others, propagated the ideas of revolutionary Narodism through the press.

However, the majority of Narodniks belonged to the type which is usually described as liberal Narodniks. Sharing the main principles of the Narodnik outlook, the liberal Narodniks tended to confine themselves to the educational and culture-mongering activities among the working people, primarily the peasants. This can be accounted for not only by their temperament or the fear of reprisals but primarily by their adherence to gradualism.

The public activity of the Narodnik intelligentsia was predominantly associated with their work in the Zemstvo system (local administration) set up during the period of state reforms of the 1860s. The various Zemstvo bodies attracted large groups of Narodnik-minded professionals who formed the "third element" in the Zemstvo. "The Zemstvo institutions are increasingly staffed with politically-minded people who came there not to 'serve' but to work. The idea of coming into a close contact with the people, and doing practical work for the people through being employed in various Zemstvo bodies, acquired practical importance and became popular with the *raznochinets* intelligentsia."⁴²

The crackdown upon the revolutionary underground organizations in the early 1880s and the onslaught of the reaction resulted in a profound organizational and ideological crisis in the Narodnik movement. The Narodniks' hopes for a mass peasant revolt were crushed; the terrorist actions failed to provoke the expected public response. The uplift of revolutionary spirit among the Narodniks gave way to apathy, passivity, and opportunism. The liberal posturing became more pronounced. In the 1880s-1890s the unsequential liberalism of the 1860s-1870s turned into a dominant feature of the Narodnik movement.

The ideological foundation of the liberal tendency was the theory of "small accomplishments" elaborated by Ya. V. Abramov who claimed that the Narodniks at that time were not in a position to tackle major problems and called for a large-scale educational campaign in the countryside disseminating agronomic knowledge, organizing museums of farm machinery, setting up cooperative creameries, etc. This liberal tendency was a result of a decline in the political activity in the Narodnik movement and some more universal and deep-going social processes. The traditional Russian rural commune was gradually becoming stratified, and the more pragmatic Narodniks turned to represent the interests of the petty-bourgeois rural stratum.

Subjectively, the utopian philistine opportunism of the "friends of the people" as the liberal Narodniks called themselves, paradoxically sprang from their anti-bourgeois sentiments and a desire to retain their socialist-oriented world outlook. This compelled them to bank on absolutist bureaucratic machinery in a bid to put Russia on a non-capitalist road of development. Narodniks were even prepared to support various regulatory and prohibitory governmental measures, such as the despotic decree on "inalienability of land" designed to prevent peasants from leaving their communes. They believed that such measures impeded the development of bourgeois relations, helped to preserve the commune, etc. Some of the Narodnik publicists, among them S. N. Yuzhakov, included various legal constraints for the students in the notorious "educational utopia", a universal education project envisaging students' compulsory work as payment for education. Lenin aptly referred to Yuzhakov's project as "*a feudal-bureaucratic-bourgeois-socialist*" experiment".⁴³ This kind of socialism could only

detract from the anti-feudal substance of the Narodnik programmes.

It was in this context that Narodism was to face the growing influence of Marxism which, since the early 1890s, had been spreading in Russia and taking hold in the circles of revolutionary-minded young people.

The Narodniks differed in their attitude to Marxism. Taking heed of the socialist thought in Europe, the Narodniks were familiar with works by Marx and Engels: some of them knew Marx and Engels in person. They displayed great interest in Marxism. Scientific socialism exerted noticeable influence upon some of the Narodniks. Thus, in Tkachev's writings one comes across repeated references to the role of "the economic factor" in history. Even those Narodniks who did not accept Marxism recognized its important role in the European socialist movement and felt it necessary to coordinate their own positions with Marxism. All this was curiously reflected in the Narodnik literature where rejection of Marxism as a whole is accompanied with the attempt to utilize some of its principles and to bolster populist concepts with Marxism.⁴⁴

The Narodnik theorists, to put it in Lenin's words, "made sophistry of Marxism and falsified it (sometimes unconsciously): they appeared to be Marxists and, by referring to Marx, tried to deny the application of Marx's theory to Russia!"⁴⁵ It stands to reason, that such an approach to Marxism involved the repudiation (and, in many instances, misconception) of its true essence. This misconception warranted attempts to interpret Marxism in such a way as to reveal its "true" meaning (as applied to various concrete historical circumstances). In this, Narodism was similar to revisionism. It is no accident that in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries Narodnik theorists hailed Bernsteinian socialism as "creative attitude" to Marxism.⁴⁶

In their theoretical polemics with the Marxists consequent to the publication of the works by Lenin, Plekhanov and other revolutionary Marxists the Narodniks suffered a setback. Nonetheless, the criticism of Narodism by the Marxists, as well as the general democratic upsurge in the country in the late 1890s and early 1900s stirred up the Narodniks' efforts to consolidate their ranks and develop a new, neo-Narodnik ideological platform.

Neo-Narodism emerged as a response to Marxism and the growing working-class movement in Russia. The represen-

tatives of the new trend sought to make use of certain tenets of Marxism, and, at the same time, to update the principal postulates of the Lavrov-Mikhailovsky classical Narodism, streamlining them with various bourgeois theories, such as neo-Kantianism and empirio-criticism. In the period of the revolution of 1905-1907 the Narodniks founded a number of political parties, the most important of which united the socialist-revolutionaries and the people's socialists.

The setting up of the Narodnik parties was of great political importance. These parties, as Lenin put it, "in some way or another [reflected] the interests and views of a vast mass of the Russian people".⁴⁷ The Narodnik parties sought to organize the peasantry politically. Their programmes gave concrete expression to the longstanding slogan "Land and Freedom", which was accepted as the motto of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.

At the same time, the activity of the Narodnik organizations from the very outset displayed political instability and a lack of ideological and organizational unity. Narodniks' and, especially, socialist-revolutionaries' ties with the peasantry, i.e. the class they claimed to rely upon, were extremely weak. They functioned mainly in the towns and cities, among workers and students, neglecting the work in the countryside, among the peasants. The socialist-revolutionaries were bent on extreme, terrorist means of struggle. The people's socialists constituted the liberal wing of populism. They were highly inconsistent, opportunist in their attempt to effect general democratic reforms.

The agrarian programme advanced by the Narodnik political parties was certainly their forte. Lenin stressed on many occasions that both the socialist-revolutionaries' project of land "socialization" and the people's socialists' land nationalization project mirrored the anti-feudal sentiment of the peasantry. However, in 1917, at the crucial moment of the revolutionary struggle in Russia, the Narodniks turned out to be unable to cope with the socio-historical problems put forth by the situation.

After the events of February 1917, when the war, economic dislocation and the powerful movement of the popular masses made it urgent to switch from bourgeois democratic to socialist measures, there was no other choice than to align either with the proletariat or with the bourgeoisie. In this context, the Narodnik leaders, together with the Menshe-

viks, played into the hands of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, gradually losing ground to it through clinging to the policy of compromise formulated in the slogan "Wait until the Constituent Assembly". At the crucial moment it became obvious that "the friends of the people" had misinterpreted the sentiment and mentality of the working masses, whose powerful movement caught the Narodnik leaders unawares. As a result, the ideologists of the populist parties "betrayed the peasants"⁴⁸ and showed inconsistency even in fulfilling their own programmatic tasks. The adherence to the logic of "excluded third" brought them to the counter-revolutionary camp, to the struggle against Soviet power which had given land to the peasants and effectuated all that the Narodnik parties only talked about. A few years later some of the Narodniks (for instance, A. V. Peshekhonov) were to acknowledge this fact. Only the Russian proletariat, equipped with Lenin's revolutionary theory, could lead the radically-minded peasant masses in the struggle against the landlords and the big bourgeoisie.

The conclusions to be drawn from this outline of the history of Russian Narodism are as follows. The component parts that made up the ideology of Narodism included: (1) a critique of bourgeois civilization concentrating on the repudiation of the bourgeois way of life, capitalist progress accompanied by the degradation of the individual, urbanization, etc. and bringing into sharp focus the "horrors of primary accumulation" and the protests against the expropriation of small producers; (2) the idea of Russia's bypassing the capitalist stage of development; (3) the socialist ideal of collective production with an emphasis on the agrarian aspect; (4) transition to socialism through utilizing traditional economic units, such as the commune and the *artel*; (5) assigning the role of the leading social group and the structure-forming stratum of "the people" to the peasantry; (6) regarding the intelligentsia as the ferment of social advancement and the leader of the popular masses.

At the same time, Narodism was an extremely complex and ramified ideological system. What made Narodism so peculiar was not so much its multiplicity, as its ambivalence and the abundance of antinomies. Narodism as an ideology offers a set of theses counterposed by a corresponding set of anti-theses: the worship of "the people" is coun-

terposed by reliance on the intelligentsia as the only active force; the cult of the commune is juxtaposed with the criticism of its conservative nature; associating the basic values with the commune, collective is combined with proclaiming the individual the lever and the goal of progress; negating the existence of capitalism in Russia while recognizing its existence; opposing the peasant to the worker and combining them into the category of "the working people", etc. The ideological opposites, although they sometimes coexisted within the system of views of individual thinker or trend, were usually separated and distributed among different populist trends or thinkers with the complementary extreme not vanishing altogether, but rather implied or manifested in a comparatively weaker form. Contradictions can be found in Bakunin's anarchism and Tkachev's etatism, the repudiation and the recognition of political struggles by the members of *Zemlya i volya* and the members of *Narodnaya volya*, respectively; in Mikhailovsky's controversy with Chervinsky and Kablits-Yuzov on the role of the people and the intelligentsia; in the antagonism between Lavrov's and Mikhailovsky's subjective sociology, on the one hand, and Tkachev's mechanistic determinism, on the other; in the differences between land nationalization and "socialization", etc. Walicky is justified therefore in saying that Russian Narodism "was a supra-individual ideological structure within which many positions were possible, sometimes complementary".⁴⁹ In other words, Narodism cannot be judged by its individual representatives, in whose views some important elements of the populist doctrine may be missing or manifested indistinctly: Narodism should be judged by the totality of its ideological trends and varieties.

The ideological and theoretical complexity of Narodism was reflected in the continuous efforts of its various trends—the legal liberals, revolutionary populists, people's socialists, socialist revolutionaries, reformists, and extremists—to isolate themselves from one another socially and politically. Populism struggled to isolate itself, as Lenin put it, from anarchism on the left and liberalism on the right.⁵⁰ Populism's attitude to Marxism was also ambivalent, the rejection and misunderstanding of Marxism being combined with the attempts to make use of some of its principles.

This ideological and political inconsistency of Narodism can be accounted for its being rooted in the consciousness

of the petty-bourgeois peasant masses, amorphous, heterogeneous, and dual in their nature. However, as the peasantry remained *a single class*, Narodism, too, for all its heterogeneity and differentiation, constituted a social-ideological entity facing definite historical tasks.

In assessing the ideological, cultural, social and political role of Narodism one should be mindful of the historic tasks fulfilled by the Narodniks; first and foremost, advancing a democratic, anti-feudal programme and maintaining, throughout the pre-Marxist stage of the liberation movement in Russia, the socialist ideological tradition. For all the utopianism of some Narodnik ideological constructions, Narodism constituted a significant force in the Russian liberation movement, a force which promoted, in the long run, the bourgeois democratic and, subsequently, the socialist revolution in the country.

In the relevant literature, both Soviet and foreign, the utopian element in Narodism is often overemphasized. An example of such an approach is provided by *The Crisis of Russian Narodism*, an interesting book by the American historian Richard Wortman. He maintains that Narodism was an outcome of the 1860s, an era when the younger generation (the *raznochintsy* intelligentsia), fascinated by the atmosphere of reforms, broke off with the traditional principles, with their "fathers" and their class as a whole. However, this brought them to an emotional crisis, to the feeling of futility which they sought to overcome. Hence the passionate belief in the peasantry, a new "reference group", whom the intelligentsia credited, in a libertarian manner, "with their own thoughts".⁵¹ However, the further development of the Narodnik movement and ideology led to permanent dissatisfaction and constant confrontation with reality which proved to be different from its visualization by the Narodniks.

In our opinion, Wortman, while seeking to reproduce, in a very subtle and original manner, indeed, the basic values and the general psychological atmosphere prevailing in the Narodnik intelligentsia circles, devoted too little attention to the substance of Narodism both as a movement and ideology. Every social movement is bound to perceive the surrounding world in the light of its own concepts, values, and goals. Everything depends on the objective results of a social movement's activity, no matter how wide is the gap between the results and the goals formulated by

its representatives. Taking this approach, one will not fail to see that Narodism was not intellectuals' "literary reveries", but an extremely influential and socially meaningful movement which promoted major ideological, social, political and cultural changes in post-reform Russia.

Although Narodism expressed the interests of the peasantry, organizationally it was largely a movement of the intelligentsia. This was partly accounted for by the low level of the peasants' political consciousness, and partly by the fact that Narodniks' democratism was affected by certain anarchist and avant-garde tendencies.

This also explains the striking disparity between the considerable ideological influence exerted by Narodism and its comparatively insignificant political effect. The fact is that Narodism in Russia lived to be a contemporary of a developed working-class movement and young revolutionary Social-Democracy whom the populists could not match either ideologically or organizationally.

At the same time, throughout its long history, Narodism developed peculiar features and potentials as a social movement typical of a country where capitalism developed belatedly. Lenin emphasized that the experience of the proletarian revolution in Russia, a country standing "on the border-line between the civilised countries and the countries ... for the first time definitely brought into the orbit of civilisation—all the Oriental, non-European countries" is of "the international validity".⁵² In a sense, this can be applied to Russia's populist-peasant democracy which exhibited its inherent interlacing of bourgeois-democratic and anti-capitalist tendencies. Although populism failed to fulfil all its historical tasks, it revealed the existence of the above-mentioned tendencies and exposed their socio-historical roots.

Narodism could not but exert noticeable ideological influence upon thought and public movements in various districts and provinces of Russia. Populism swept the Ukraine and Georgia and involved, to a lesser degree, Byelorussia, Armenia, Finland, etc. A movement incorporating tendencies related to Narodism and the ideas of "renovated", modernized Buddhism emerged in the early 20th century in far-away Buryatia. The representatives of this movement, among them A. Dorzhiev, called themselves "democratic-socialist Buryatian traditionalists" and urged to work towards a socialism based on the ancient traditions

of nomads and hunters.⁵³ Noticeable was the influence of Narodnik ideas in some of Russia's neighbouring countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania.

The spread of Narodnik ideas was fostered not so much by the emergence of similar movements as by the similar social conditions obtaining elsewhere. The involvement of Asian, African and Latin American countries in the world historical process in the 20th century ushered in a new stage of the vigorous development of the populist ideological tradition. The similarity of socio-political situations arising at definite historical stages in the development of various countries is an important factor promoting populism. The overwhelming majority of the populist trends in the developing countries emerged spontaneously (at least in the first half of the 20th century), although the influence of Russian Narodnik ideas or that of other populist movements can sometimes be observed in certain Asiatic countries. This issue will be dealt with in the following section.

3. POPULISM IN ASIA (THE LATE 19TH-THE 20TH CENTURIES)

When analyzing the ideological petty-bourgeois democratic trends in Asia, one is bound to recall Lenin's forecast on the possibility of the emergence of a populist-type ideology "in a number of Asiatic countries going through bourgeois revolutions in the 20th century".¹ In the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, the vast, densely populated, predominantly peasant countries of Asia which preserved a host of traditions dating back to ancient oriental civilizations and which, at the same time, suffered (with the exception of Japan) from colonial oppression and the impact of imported capitalist relations on their traditional structure, presented a curious conglomeration of social contradiction. In the majority of cases the social problems they faced were more aggravated and complicated than those in Russia. There was a greater gap between the socio-economic development levels of the enterprises owned by foreign capital and the national bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the pre-capitalist institutions and economic units, on the other. Moreover, the tasks of socio-economic development were supplemented and complicated by the drive for political liberation and national self-determination.

It is only natural that the complex social situation gave rise to major ideological concepts of the populist type in which traditionalist and modernist tendencies, bourgeois democratism and anti-capitalism were intertwined. Their emergence was fostered, among other things, by the fact that some of the Asian countries had quite considerable groups of national intelligentsia. Brought up to respect ancient national traditions, the intellectuals also assimilated the ideas of Western science and culture imported into their countries in the period of colonial domination.

The emergence of populist trends in Asia is closely tied up with the development of the national liberation movement in the continent. The revolutionary developments in Russia, and especially the October Revolution, had a tremendous impact on the development of non-Marxist socialism. The ideas of populism penetrated into some Asiatic countries (although, on the whole, one cannot say that it was imported ideology that fostered the emergence of populist ideological trends in Asia). This was accompanied by a still swifter spread of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism which were to one degree or another assimilated by the populist ideologists.

At the same time, populist trends in Asia have a very distinct national colouring imparted to them by the oriental traditional heritage. The populist thinkers in Asia often speak about "Indian", "Buddhist", or "Islamic" socialism. Despite their being based on different national and regional cultural foundations, the populist concepts exert noticeable influence upon one another.

The first half of the 19th century saw the emergence of the most remarkable and well-elaborated populist concepts in Asia. Under the specific conditions obtaining in Asiatic countries, the development of populist ideological tendencies is impeded by a number of objective difficulties. On the one hand, the comparatively high level of capitalist development in certain Asiatic countries raises serious barriers in the path of their non-capitalist development; on the other, the special objective difficulties, hampering the solution of the most acute social problems limit, to a certain degree, the organizational potential of revolutionary petty-bourgeois democracy. Nonetheless, the populist ideological tendencies persist in a number of Asiatic countries.

China. As compared with Japan, the main populist trend

in China, Sun-Yatsenism was only to an insignificant degree influenced by Russian Narodism, despite certain ideological contacts between Sun Yatsen and Russian Narodniks.² Sun Yatsen's doctrine was based primarily on national ideological and cultural traditions. Among his precursors were Zheng Guanying and Wang Dao,³ the ideologists of a reformatory movement in the 19th century. That the main principles of Narodism were echoed in the doctrine of the outstanding Chinese democrat can be accounted for by the similarities in the social situation in China in the late 19th and early 20th century and that in post-reform Russia: the anti-feudal goals of the liberation struggle waged by the working people, the development of a peasant movement (suffice it to mention the Taiping Rebellion), the development of bourgeois social relations, etc.

That Sun-Yatsenism displays an unmistakable Narodnik colouring is obvious. The ideas of egalitarianism, land nationalization (and the attendant illusion that as a result of appropriate measures "social revolution ... will be from 70 to 80 per cent effected"⁴), historical idealism and overestimating the role of the subjective factor, the criticism of the bourgeois system, the idea of "preventing" capitalism in China, the expectations that the capitalist stage will be easily bypassed owing to the "advantages of being backward", the reliance on the peasantry, militant democracy, etc.—all this reveals that there is a direct link between Sun Yatsen's views and Russian populism. As was pointed out by Lenin, the identity can be observed in basic ideas and a number of declarations.

At the same time, Sun Yatsen's substantiation of the "three principles" of his doctrine (nationalism, the power of the people, and the well-being of the people) brings to light certain peculiarities of Chinese populism: the emphasis on bourgeois democratism and culture-mongering as expressed in the slogans of equality, fraternity, and liberty, and the propaganda of the ideas of industrialism and scientific and technological modernization. In practice this is embodied in the ideas of "mixed economy" and a certain reliance on foreign capital. Sun Yatsen never pinned his hopes on returning to the past, he was an ardent champion of progress inspired by the examples set by Japan and the United States. "Socialists often say that civilization is of no use for the poor and that it would be better to return to the ancient times. That means carrying things too far

in another direction. The progress of civilization is natural progress and it cannot be avoided."⁵ Sun Yatsen advanced an extensive plan of China's industrialization with the help of foreign capital. He wrote: "My idea boils down to the following: to make capitalism build socialism in China so as these two economic forces of human evolution could work side by side for the good of future civilization."⁶

Admittedly, such optimistic attitude to capitalism was more typical of Sun Yatsen in his young days. Later he was to pass over to the main idea of populism, that of non-capitalist development. This idea underlies his doctrine of "natural" and "artificial" progress. According to Sun Yatsen, while Europe had been developing in "natural sequence" both economically and politically, China, cognizant of Western experience, should by no means imitate the Western pattern by passing from absolutism to constitutional monarchy and subsequently to a republic, etc. China could well go over to socialism, bypassing capitalism ("jumping over a rank").⁷

Therefore, in contrast to Western "natural" progress, "slow and leading to acute social conflict", China's progress should be "artificial" (rapid, purposeful, etc.). "Socialism," Sun Yatsen wrote, "implies that man's maximum effort delivers the world from shortcomings of natural evolution".⁸

In Sun Yatsen's concept of progress the notions of "natural" and "artificial" may change places, in keeping with the controversial nature of populist thinking. Sun Yatsen believed, for instance, that "the main principle of mankind's evolution is mutual assistance (*hu zhy*)". So long as mankind adheres to this principle "it thrives. When it does not adhere to it, ... it perishes."⁹ From this perspective, non-capitalist development is quite natural whereas capitalist development, on the contrary, is artificial. Sun Yatsen compared the proponents of capitalist development with the people who buy fancy clothes at the market without fearing that "they might not fit them at all".¹⁰

Sun Yatsen maintained that socialism should secure a level of material and technological development higher than that attained by capitalism. He believed that socialism could be built at such a rate that "a thousand lees are covered in a day".¹¹ Sun Yatsen's ultimate goal was turning China into a powerful and rich country capable of competing with the world's major powers. It is no accident that in his

writings one often comes across the appeal to "catch up with America" and other similar calls.¹²

This reveals a strong nationalist orientation of the founder of the Kuomintang. The national liberation goals of the Chinese revolution and the necessity of uniting the nation in the anti-imperialist struggle imparted a more pronounced national colouring to Sun Yatsen's doctrines than the one observed in the doctrines elaborated by the Russian petty-bourgeois socialists. Sun Yatsen's unmistakable nationalism is also explained by his strong adherence to the ideological and cultural traditions of Chinese civilization on which his teaching was founded. As has been shown by Soviet scholars, Sun Yatsen's approach to the subject of Chinese prosperity was close to that of the proponents of Confucianism.

Sun Yatsen's third principle, the well-being of the people, stems from such ancient Chinese concepts as "*min sheng*" (the prosperity of the people) and "*jing ji*" (the science of managing society and of people's welfare).¹³ In substantiating the need for China to opt for special, non-capitalist development Sun Yatsen turned to such traditions and institutions as the system of examinations as a factor in organizing executive power, Confucian moral standards, and the "natural collectivist feeling"¹⁴ inherent in the Chinese peasant. At the same time, Sun Yatsen did not lay any special emphasis on the institute of the commune. There is no doubt, however, that he associated the transition to socialism with utilizing the collectivist, communal traditions, surviving in the sphere of social consciousness, and taking advantage of territorial and demographic factors—China's huge population, vast territory and formidable natural resources.

There are quite up-to-date reasons, apart from the drive to maintain the traditions engendered by Chinese civilization, behind Sun Yatsen's emphasizing the role of the state, especially in economic management. Criticizing the system of capitalist rivalry as "ruinous" and "pernicious", he stresses that "modern economy tends to develop in the opposite direction, in the direction of economic concentration, instead of free competition".¹⁵

Although Sun Yatsen did not understand that the October Revolution was proletarian in nature and tended to interpret social change in the Soviet Union in the spirit of the "three principles" for he advocated and believed

that under the conditions obtaining in China Marxism was not workable, he was, on the whole, strongly influenced by the October Revolution.

Sun Yatsen's ideological system was a multifacetous one. It incorporated the tendencies typical of P_n with its traditionalism, nationalism, a populist approach to the problems of non-capitalist development, etc., P_l (the revolutionary elements in Sun Yatsen's teaching were pointed out by Lenin) and P_r marked by the drive for modernization and bourgeois progress. Sun-Yatsenism displayed both progressive and negative features. The latter lay not only in the illusions of the petty-bourgeois-utopian type, but also in the attempts to restore the old Chinese etatism, bureaucratic regulation of the economic and social life of the country. When Sun Yatsen died, the ideologists of the Chiang-Kaishek Kuomintang interpreted his heritage in a bourgeois and anti-communist spirit, overemphasizing the ideas of etatist libertarianism.¹⁶ At the same time, the progressive traditions inherent in the doctrine elaborated by the great Chinese democrat had a great impact upon the activity of the Communist Party of China (in the period up to 1957).

India. Gandhism is another major populist ideological trend in Asia. The groundwork for Gandhism was provided by the ideological legacy of the previous period, starting from the late 19th century. These years were marked by an upsurge in the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movement which counterbalanced the bourgeois culture-mongering, reformist trend. Its ideological arsenal incorporated a set of populist-type tendencies: renunciation of the technicism of Western civilization, criticism of private ownership (Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyaya), warning against the "plague of proletarianism" (Bal Gangadhar Tilak), reliance on the peasantry and a programme of radical agrarian reforms (Omeo Kumar Das), the concept of India's special path and "Indian spirituality" (Swami Vivekananda). Characteristic of this tendency was the position taken by Ananda Kumaraswami, whose views, in the opinion of Soviet scholars, "are reminiscent of the Narodnik idealization of 'communal production', 'the artel principles', 'cottage industry' and the socialist reveries of the Narodniks".¹⁷ It is along these lines that Rabindranath Tagore's socio-political views evolved. The Indian scholar Puran Chandra Joshi stresses that in the Indian society of the

colonial period and in the years preceeding the attainment of independence, when it lacked a distinct social structure, populist theories similar to those of Gandhism were more popular than class doctrines.¹⁸ Gandhi accumulated the ideas of his predecessors, modified and expressed them in a well-defined ideological form.

Some Soviet researchers (E. N. Komarov, A. D. Litman, A. I. Reghinin), emphasize the "comprehensive nature" of ideological subject-matter of Gandhism.¹⁹ Indeed, Gandhi's outlook displayed the ambivalence characteristic of populism in general. In his doctrine, the ideas of "utmost" social utopianism are combined with a tendency towards moderation and compromise, principles of non-violence and pacifist non-resistance are intertwined with a project to set up a national army, the federalist-anarchic tendencies coexist with the theory of state "trusteeship". These contradictions unfolded, so to speak, both in space and in time, since Gandhi's outlook evolved since the time his first booklet *Hind Swaraj* was published. The students of Gandhism tend to concentrate either on individual components of Gandhism or on various stages in its development. This accounts for different approaches to Gandhism and explains why Gandhi was proclaimed an ideologist of the national bourgeoisie. Indeed, some elements of Gandhism suited the Indian bourgeoisie and were actually utilized by it: Gandhism was the ideology of the period in the national liberation movement which aimed at uniting the people in the anti-imperialist struggle. The assessment of Gandhism as "predominantly petty-bourgeois ideology" seems to be more correct.²⁰ This is warranted because Gandhi's views display an unmistakable petty-bourgeois colouring and fluctuate between bourgeois and anti-bourgeois tendencies.

Gandhi's ideological constructions are obviously based on a populist foundation. In his doctrine, the renunciation of bourgeois civilization is linked to the awareness of the "horrors of primary accumulation". The ideal of national development (*sarvodaya*) is rooted in the communal traditions of the Indian village. The commune is expected to be modernized through uniting the peasantry in cooperatives. The peasantry is regarded as the main class both in the present and in the future ("if the village disappears, India will disappear, too").²¹ He cites the classical argument of the "peasant democrats" who maintained that

land should belong to the state since all land is God's.²² Gandhi emphasizes the moral factor as the most important and determinative in the life of man and society maintaining that *dharma* (moral duty) should determine human activity and that moral perfection is one of man's most important tasks.

Taking all this into account, the Indian Marxist scholar Baren Ray stresses that the Gandhi movement "was analogous to the Narodnik movement of Russia earlier in the century and was the confluence of the yearning of the urban intelligentsia with the peasantry's resistance to intensified exploitation as a result of the vastly increased monetisation of the economy".²³

At the same time, in certain respects Gandhism was different from Russian Narodism. It displayed more pronounced and theoretically better-developed peasantophilism, anti-urbanism and anti-industrialism. Gandhi wrote: "Our ancestors dissuaded us from luxuries and pleasures... We have had no system of life-corroding competition... It was not that we did not know how to invent machineries, but our forefathers knew that, if we set our hearts after such things, we would become slaves and lose our moral fibre. They, therefore, after due deliberation decided that we should only do what we could with our hands... They further reasoned that large cities were a snare and a useless encumbrance and that people would not be happy in them, that there would be gangs of thieves and robbers, prostitution and vice flourishing in them and that poor men would be robbed by rich men. They were, therefore, satisfied with small villages."²⁴ Just as Leo Tolstoy, Gandhi believed that farming was not only vital, but also the most moral of all kinds of work done by man.²⁵

Proceeding from these principles, Gandhi formulated his strategy of social development. As far as economic life is concerned, he advocated restricting industrialization and concentrating on agriculture and handicrafts, such as weaving. He advocated large-scale decentralization in political life, with each village becoming a republic a *panchayat* enjoying full power in solving its own internal problems and defending itself against the encroachment from the outside. "Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the village."²⁶ Accordingly, Gandhi insisted on "restricting the

functions of the state to the narrowest possible limit".²⁷

The principle of non-violence (*ahimsa*),²⁸ the pivot of the Gandhian theoretical system and at the same time a peculiar form of social struggle (*satyagraha*), was another distinctive feature of Gandhism. Gandhi urged non-violent methods of social action arguing that "violence done to the rulers should be violence to ourselves."²⁹ *Satyagraha*, as political tactics, often brought Indian national liberation movement to an impasse. Gandhi's and his followers' adherence to non-violence led to repeated compromise with the colonial authorities and the national bourgeoisie. Nonetheless, by and large, the methods of non-violent resistance proved to be a comparatively effective means of involving the masses in political struggle.

In assessing the historical importance of Gandhism, one should bear in mind that its maximalist principles were perceived, even by the founder of the doctrine, as guidelines rather than imperatives understood literally. For instance, Gandhi's attitude to the practical tasks of industrial development was less rigorous than his theory: he recognized certain types of industrial production related to farming and facilitating the peasants' work. Gandhi's views evolved in such a way as to lose some of their original anti-industrialist and anti-urbanist edge, admit the importance of state sector, etc. In general, Gandhi was politically flexible and realistic in his approaches. Hence the idea of stage-wise social change in India expounded, and it seems for good reason, in his speeches.

Among Gandhi's merits was his involving the multimillion working masses, first of all the peasantry, in the national liberation struggle in India. His services to the vast masses of the Indian population, for whom he became a true national leader, were recognized by Lenin. In his memoirs Manabendra Nath Roy says that the assessment of Gandhi's activity "was the crucial point of difference. Lenin believed that as the inspirer and leader of a mass movement, he was a revolutionary. I maintained that, a religious and cultural revivalist, he was bound to be a reactionary..."³⁰

The context of the talk between Lenin and Roy is rather interesting. Roy was referring to Plekhanov's assessment of the activity of the Russian Narodniks, which, in his opinion, "was applicable to Indian nationalism, particularly to the extremist and Gandhian schools. The Russian

Populists and Socialist Revolutionaries believed in terrorism and in the special genius of the Slav race. They also denounced capitalism as a Western vice, which had no place in Russia. They appealed to the younger generation to return to the village with the object of reviving the "Mirs" [the Russian village commune] of the olden days.³¹ In his memoirs Roy says nothing about Lenin's response to his comparing Gandhism to Narodism. Significantly, Lenin did not agree with Roy's one-sided assessment of Gandhism. This is understandable, if we take into account that Lenin, unlike Plekhanov, attached great importance to the democratic "core" of Narodism and its reliance on the peasant masses; this determined his attitude to the trends of the Narodnik type (in particular, to Sun-Yatsenism) in Eastern countries.

Gandhi's bond with the masses has been noted by many Indian authors who pointed out that he "was the first important leader who realised that the true revolutionary power in India lay in the hands of the Indian masses who lived in the rural areas".³²

The apology of the ancient Indian civilization, reliance on the primordial traditions of moral tolerance and spiritual tenacity, advocacy of egalitarianism, idealization of the commune, advocacy of India's "special road"—all these ideas were brought home to the masses. They proved to be "workable" from the point of view of cultivating national pride and stirring the people to resolute struggle against British colonialism and providing an impetus for further social change. Similarly, religion which was given an important place in the ideological system of Gandhism, was turned into a ferment of the social activity of the working people. This, just as some other aspects of Gandhi's doctrine which are seemingly far removed from reality, proves that "the social aim dominated Gandhi's mind".³³

There is no need to discuss in greater detail the outlook of Gandhi, the prominent thinker and leader of the Indian national liberation movement, since it has been given wide coverage in Soviet and foreign literature. For the purpose of this book it is sufficient to bring into focus the populist nature of Gandhism and its impact on the ideological and social life of India in the period subsequent to the country's gaining of independence.

This impact has indeed been remarkable, especially in the domain of social thought. Works by many Indian philos-

ophers, sociologists and economists bear the imprint of Gandhi's doctrine. For instance, Amlan Datta, the author of the theory of "cooperative socialism", believes that agrarian relations can be restructured on the basis of "individual peasant holding supported by service-cooperatives and working within a rejuvenated rural community".³⁴ The ideas advocated in the writings by the well-known Indian economist Dhananjaya Ramchandra Gadgil also reveal the influence of Gandhism.

Gandhism has been proclaimed the basic ideology of the Indian National Congress. As has been emphasized in the relevant literature, the ideology and policy of the INC incorporate certain elements of Gandhian populism. Gandhi's influence upon Jawaharlal Nehru has also been repeatedly emphasized.³⁵ The concept propounded by Shri-man Narayan, a prominent figure in the INC, is grounded on Gandhian ideas. According to Narayan, "a socialist-type society" should be grounded on seven principles: full employment, production growth, social and economic justice and equality, priority given to the poorest groups of the population and most backward regions, decentralization of economic and political power by way of developing the *panchayats* and production cooperatives, national economic self-sufficiency and peaceful, non-violent means of building socialism.³⁶

The INC spokesmen have repeatedly stressed the importance of moral principles in politics, adherence to non-violence and "trusteeship" over the poorest strata of the population. However, the party's preoccupation with industrialization during its period in power is by no means indicative of its adherence to Gandhism in practical activity.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Indian social picture was dominated by growing economic difficulties, social conflicts and disproportions in economic development. It is against this background that the revival of Gandhian-type trends and ideas in India in the 1970s should be considered. The impetus to the revival was given by Gandhi's centenary marked in 1969. Extensive literature on Gandhi and Gandhism was published both before and after the jubilee. Many Indian authors stress the viability of Gandhi's doctrine and its being applicable and workable in modern conditions. Special emphasis is laid on the approach to the solution of social problems which, "in contrast to materialist-utilitarian explanation of social phenomena", con-

centrates on awakening "moral-collective consciousness"³⁷ and appeals to the feeling of solidarity and collectivism as an effective means of social and political mobilization of the masses.

Indian researchers and analysts focus on those aspects of the Gandhian doctrine which have either influenced Indian politics or can be successfully applied in the future. For instance, Gandhi's appeal to revive the popular trade of weaving promoted the understanding that small-scale production may become an important supplement to large-scale industries. Similarly, the Gandhian theory of "trusteeship" provoked public concern about the destiny of the millions of the poor in India.³⁸ Furthermore, many authors indicate that Gandhi's idea of state control over industrialization and introduction of machinery has proved viable. The Indian economist Das Amritananda suggests replacing the existing purely economic planning by "comprehensive" planning which will take into account the problems of distribution and defend the traditional population against the negative consequences of rapid modernization.³⁹

The campaign in the Indian press of the period is indicative of the same tendency. Newspapers and magazines published readers' letters which described Gandhi as "practical idealist" and stressed that the interpretation of his ideas could lower the level of poverty of the Indian masses, while a greater number of small-scale weaving enterprises could improve the situation of at least 30 per cent of the poor and be the only meaningful response to the growing social polarization and soaring unemployment in Indian society. This makes Gandhian ideas even "more relevant today".⁴⁰

In the 1970s, two of Gandhi's closest and most prominent followers, Acharya Vinolha Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan, acquired great authority and weight in Indian politics. Bhave had been Gandhi's close friend and comrade-in-arms since 1916. In 1957, he founded the Bhoodan-Gramdan movement. "Bhoodan" stands for a campaign to urge landowners to give away at least one-sixth of their lands. At the higher stage (Gramdan) all the landowners in the village are expected to pool their plots and carry on collectively. The aim of the movement is to establish "a society of universal well-being" on a large-family basis where work is the criterion of wealth and relations are based on mutual love and respect. "Private ownership of

land should be done away with," Bhave writes, "land just as any other property, should belong to all." To attain this, it is necessary to "effect a three-stage revolution: first, to change people's hearts; second, to change their life-styles; and, third, to change the structure of society".⁴¹

Bhave's teaching largely rests on a religious foundation; however, religious elements in his doctrine, just as in Gandhism, are a means of attaining social goals. As opposed to traditional Hinduism, they call for obligatory and active participation in social life. According to Bhave, the working people are the "incarnation of God" and the "pillar of the world". Serving people is the "dharma of today".⁴² It is only natural that Bhave's works contain criticism of many Hinduist religious dogmas, such as the caste system, the pessimistic view of historical development which is to eventuate in the victory of the evil forces, etc.

In keeping with the Gandhian principles, Bhave's supra-class movement stands up for non-violent methods. However, objectively, the neo-Gandhian movement is not devoid of social radicalism. O. V. Mezentseva points out that Bhave's principle of property donation implicitly involves redistribution of riches on the basis of equality.⁴³

Bhave's ideas, as well as the Bhoodan movement, continue to enjoy the support of the Indian authorities, although their practical effect is quite modest. Indian Communists, who regard Bhave's doctrine as a variety of utopian socialism, stress its considerable social importance in terms of promoting the process of democratization and heightening the level of the ideological and political consciousness of the working people.

Significantly, Bhave repeatedly expressed his positive attitude to Marxism, stressing that while he agrees with the Communists as far as the aims are concerned, he disagrees with them on the issue of means of attaining these aims. "I consider communism by itself is a very good and great thing," he wrote. "But what is the means to realize it? ... The communists oppose us by saying that we are only wandering in an utopia. They say: 'For the present we have to be prepared to make use of violence. But ultimately non-violence will come to prevail.'"⁴⁴ Bhave maintained that from the point of view of the proponents of *sarvodaya*, any problem in the world could and must be resolved by peaceful means, through persuasion and love. The differences between neo-Gandhism and Marxism lie

not only in their attitude to the methods of social activity but also in some of the basic principles underlying it. This does not prevent Marxism from recognizing certain positive aspects in the theoretical and practical activity of the given variety of Indian populism.

Jayaprakash Narayan embarked upon his political career as a socialist whose activity was influenced, to an extent, by Marxism (1930s). Over the 1940s he gradually turned into a proponent of Gandhism. Proceeding from Marxist doctrine, Narayan once regarded man as a product of social environment, but then he began to stress the role of the individual, his inner self and his spiritual perfection "as a constituent unit of any social system".⁴⁵ Subscribing to the idea of non-violence, he maintains, echoing Gandhi, that "social revolution must be preceded by human revolution", by "spiritual revolution".⁴⁶

Admittedly, up to the late 1950s Narayan had tried to combine Marxism and Gandhism. In 1952, explaining to the members of the Socialist Party he headed at the time the reasons for his turning to Gandhism, he emphasized that Marxism had sprung from three sources, "three streams of ideas". "Why should we not combine the Marxian thought with the thought and practice of Mahatma Gandhi and achieve a synthesis of our own?" he asked.⁴⁷

In point of fact, at that time Narayan was already retreating from Marxism. Only a year later he urged ideological synthesis on the basis of Gandhism for the reason that a "true revolution [was] a revolution in the values of life". According to Narayan, Gandhism provides a good basis for this synthesis because it does not confine itself to purely political activity but "goes direct to the people and helps them to effect the revolution in their lives, and, consequently, the revolution in the life of the community."⁴⁸

In the late 1950s, Narayan left the Socialist Party and joined Bhave's movement, campaigning for "people's socialism" as opposed to the state socialism advocated by the ruling INC party. Criticizing the Indian government for its breaking off with the masses he stressed that "it was necessary to go to the people to arouse them to action",⁴⁹ without which it would be impossible to secure the material and spiritual progress of the country.

This, he argued, called for radically new action because the "usual game of party politics [had] failed to interest the people".⁵⁰ What is to be done? "Go back to Mahatma",

answers Narayan, go back to Gandhi's methods of "direct democracy". Political leaders, he adds, "must go to the people—to live and work with them, to serve, guide and help them. They must do all this not to strengthen their parties and gather votes for themselves, but in order that the people should rise and put their heads and hearts and hands to the tasks of national development."⁵¹

In keeping with such principles and in search for new forms of political activity, Narayan himself relinquished any participation in the work of the then active political parties. It was in that period that his writings sounded certain anti-communist notes.

Since the late 1950s, Narayan has been propagating the idea that the Indian village was the pivot of social and cultural life in the country. Modern political and administrative institutions in India, he contends, are nothing more than imitation of foreign experience. Neither the British rulers, nor those leaders who compiled the country's constitution after the attainment of independence "took any note of the Indian traditions" which are concentrated in the countryside. Narayan is also sarcastic about those who regard the village as an obsolete social entity, an anachronism, and those who give priority to the development of industry and the town and are only "generous enough to advocate the 'development' of the village".⁵²

According to Narayan, the village is "the natural habitat of man and the primary unit of social organization. Man is a social animal and it is necessary for the full development of human nature that the primary community in which he lives is such that he is able to establish personal relationships." Conversely, towns and cities "are human jungles where impersonal relationships govern the life of the individual who is compelled to quench his thirst for 'society' by forming such artificial things as clubs and other associations. In the city neighbour does not know neighbour and there is no living together. Life is divided into compartments, and like passengers on a railway train, men are thrown together with different men into different compartments of activity one after another: now into the factory, now into the big department house, now into the theatre and so on. This is not living together. This is not human society."⁵³ However, man needs a community of "his own", in which he would be able to abide by the main values of human relationship.

Narayan advocates the primacy of the village in social life also for the reason that "the true foundation of democratic life can be established only in the small primary community".⁵⁴ Only this can provide a basis for nationwide democratism. Narayan criticizes bourgeois parliamentary methods and contrasts them with communal democracy "from below". He regards the village as the basic unit of political construction.

However, communes in their present form do not suit the purpose and should, consequently, be radically changed. Therefore, "the ultimate object ... is to establish *gramraj*. A *gramraj* is a self-governing village, a village republic, not merely a Panchayat. This *gramraj* is to be built up by the villagers themselves, by their own initiative and not by the governmental agencies."⁵⁵ Narayan exposes the anarchy and the domination of "the rich and the egoists" in the present-day Panchayat and urges to introduce scientific methods in the countryside and in agricultural production, organize "agrarian-industrial complexes", and raise the cultural level of the rural population. All this should be carried on the basis of imperishable traditional values of collectivism and democracy.⁵⁶

Citing what Gandhi said about the danger involved in the disappearance of the Indian village, Narayan warns that if the present social structure persists, "not only will the village wither away and become even more shadowy, but our democracy too would remain suspended in the air without roots in the soil and the life of the people".⁵⁷

Narayan campaigned for "social revolution", that is for "fundamental change in the socio-economic-political structure of power". Such a revolution, he maintained, cannot be effected by legal, reformist means, as had been testified to by the experience of European social democracy which proved to be unable to go beyond the framework of capitalism. But he also renounced revolution effected by violent means. He maintained that violence had a negative logic of its own. First "non-organized revolutionary violence" emerges and expands destroying all institutions; then, violence acquires dangerous momentum and in order to stop it "organized means of violence" become needed. These means are applied by the new power group which now suppresses those in whose name the revolution has been achieved. Therefore, Narayan maintains, the only humanist form of revolution is the non-violent revolution propagated by

Mahatma Gandhi. This revolution is aimed at radically transforming society and eliminating exploitation of man by man; the means of effecting such revolution correspond to its goals and prevent the social revolution from merely substituting one ruling elite for another.⁵⁸

In the late 1960s, Jayaprakash Narayan became even more active politically. As a participant in the Bhoodan movement in the state of Bihar, he travelled all about the state visiting the villages and campaigning for the donation of land to the *sarvodaya* fund and propagating non-violence as the best means of coping with social problems. Narayan made every effort to contribute to the expansion of the movement and turn it into a force capable of radically changing the existing political and social institutions through exclusive reliance on the mass movement "from below".

In the early 1970s he wrote: "It seems now that if democracy is to survive, the electoral system must be completely revamped... Advancing beyond the practices associated with a parliamentary democracy, in particular, party politics, we want to establish a people's government based on a system that functions without parties—such a state of affairs will be called 'communitarian democracy'."⁵⁹

Narayan's resumption of political activity coincides with a serious aggravation of the national socio-economic situation in the mid-1970s. As a result of a drop in agricultural production the prices of basic foodstuffs and consumer goods trebled as against the 1960s. The unemployment rate raised by more than 200 per cent and social contrasts became more pronounced.

This provoked massive protest. In 1970 alone, the state of Bihar saw 649 peasant disturbances many of which developed into sharp clashes between the peasants and big landowners. Massive discontent swept urban areas, too. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, more than 50 per cent of all protest actions involved white-collar workers, teachers and students. Authorities, both local and national, responded with large-scale reprisals. Finally, in December 1973-January 1974 the activity of the opposition forces in Ahmedabad, Vadodara and some other towns of the state of Gujarat led to mass strikes, incendiarism, clashes between students and the police. In a word, things were nearing a real riot. The protesters demanded resignation of the state government. Although the authorities called in the

troops and established a curfew in many towns, the unrest did not wane. The opposition was supported by many members of the state Congress. As a result the Cabinet resigned, Congress was dissolved and presidential government was introduced.

Similar developments swept the state of Bihar. In the course of a demonstration staged by blue- and white-collar workers' trade unions in front of the Congress building, and during the subsequent strike various opposition groups formed a bloc. Its principal demands included reduction of consumer prices and tuition fees, organization of cheap book sales, etc. During the growing unrest, public buildings were set on fire, hotels and warehouses looted, especially in Putna. When some time had passed, the protest campaign was joined by the "Sarvodaya" groups headed by Jayaprakash Narayan. During the "silent demonstration" staged by the "Sarvodaya" members the protesters, who had pledged themselves not to use violence, thronged by the Congress building, gags in their mouths, tied with saffron-coloured scarves. Since that time Narayan took upon himself the leadership of the struggle and proclaimed a "total revolution".

Throughout the campaign Narayan urged "changing the entire social frame from within and also from the outside, individuals as well as institutions".⁶⁰ He preached that "total revolution" should involve seven revolutions—economic, social, political, cultural, ideological (or intellectual), educational and spiritual. The socio-economic strategy of neo-Gandhism envisaged checking the growth of modern large-scale industry based on capital-intensive technology and heavier reliance on the "middle-scale industry", and especially on "small-scale and cottage industries" serving the interests of the toiling masses. Accordingly, Narayan favoured small-scale individual, family or cooperative property. Private ownership was to be tolerated on a restricted scale or under state control, with the state sector dominating the economic picture. Narayan's idea boiled down to accepting "the Yugoslav pattern minus dictatorship".⁶¹

The socio-political goal of the "total revolution" consisted in establishing a "classless and casteless society". Politically, this was to be achieved by abolishing the existing forms of power exercised through political parties, and creating a structure of "people's power" (*Jan shakti*), and "direct", "popular" democracy, i.e. spontaneously organ-

ized "popular committees", which, having emerged at the grass-roots level, were to gradually transform the political system in India. Narayan believed that this was the only way to "serve democracy" in a country wallowing in political phrase-mongering and corruption.

Political action was to be accompanied (or rather determined) by intellectual and moral change effected through holding such events as "weeks of honest behaviour" organized by "Sarvodaya" followers. During such events members of the younger generation, mostly students, were to persuade members of the older generation to renounce corruption, donate some of their land to the poor, etc. Narayan stressed that the "total revolution" was to be achieved only by non-violent means, by *satyagraha*, i.e. profound, spiritual and moral change.

At the same time, Narayan distinguished between the "immediate" and "long-term" goals of the revolution. He held that the "total revolution" would be effected only after a prolonged struggle, while at the moment the task was to "disorganize" the existing power structures and to satisfy the basic economic demands of the working people. According to Narayan, this was to be achieved by establishing a kind of parallel government bodies, "popular committees" in each panchayat, region and district. These committees were to combat corruption, establish control over the shops and distribution stations in order to secure a just distribution of goods among the population, and to organize demonstrations.

The Bihar opposition failed to emulate the Gujarat achievements, i.e. to urge the dissolution of the state congress. The efforts to organize "popular committees" or "popular governments" (*Janata sarkar*) were largely in vain. As of March 1975, for instance, only 18 out of 587 prospective new government bodies were active, and these proved to be short-lived ones, at that. "Weeks of honest behaviour" and campaigns to urge landowners to donate land to landless peasants or owners of small land plots also proved a failure. Narayan's non-violent methods were not universally adhered to and the campaigners often went beyond the limits of *satyagraha*.

To a certain extent, the failure of the Bihar protest movement can be accounted for by the central government's, crackdown during which the leaders of the "total revolution" were arrested. However, there were more profound social,

political and ideological reasons behind the lack of energy displayed by the movement led by Narayan.

First of all, the Gujarat and Bihar movements had a narrow social basis. In part, they were supported by the well-to-do and wealthy peasantry and part of the urban middle class. However, they failed to involve poorer peasants, workers, Harijans, Muslims, tribal minorities, i.e. the most "inflammable" social groups. The population in the more developed industrial areas remained indifferent to the slogans advanced by the opposition.

As for the students and young people who formed the vanguard of the movement, their leaders and functionaries largely belonged to the top middle class and higher castes. Ghanshyam Shan classified them as a handful of radicals lost among the rioters. While the former were conscious defenders of the poor, the latter, i.e. the majority, took every opportunity to contribute to confusion and disorder. They chanted slogans from the works by Narayan or Mao Zedong without understanding their real meaning. The developments in Bihar and Gujarat showed once more that the students are far from being a consistent and united revolutionary force.

The commentators of the time did not claim that the developments in Gujarat and Bihar were entirely without positive results. They helped secure more reliable guarantees of certain political rights and greater freedom of the press, brought about the release of political prisoners, as well as promoted certain amendments in the constitution to prevent the authorities from arbitrarily proclaiming the state of emergency. But all this was not sufficient to combat corruption and check the continuous growth of prices. This was only to be expected. The main political forces involved in the opposition movement in Gujarat and Bihar—the urban upper and middle classes and the richer peasants—did not want any radical change. What they were striving for was to topple the INC and to take advantage of the resultant situation. As for the movement's leaders, first of all Jayaprakash Narayan, who cannot be fully identified, in the opinion of some Indian researchers and publicists, with the Janata Party, they are also to blame, for their part, for what came out of the movement. The slogans they formulated—such as combating corruption—"touched only symptoms and not the disease" and, therefore, the protest campaign they had inspired largely "remained at

the level of emotional reaction". For this reason, Ghanshyam Shan concludes, the movement in Gujarat and Bihar "was no truly revolutionary movement".⁶²

A few years later, when Narayan died, many Indian authors assessed his activity as Gandhi's outstanding follower from the point of view of the "total revolution". Arun Shourie, the *Indian Express* editor, distinguishes Narayan from his followers (in particular, from those in the Janata Party) who were none other than "opportunists".⁶³ S. Ghose admits that Narayan's concept of total revolution, although "simple and practical", was not adequately understood by his followers. S. Ghose believes that there is much in common between the concept of total revolution and the ideas advocated by Jiddu Krishnamurti and Aurobindo Ghose, he stresses that it deserves to be studied more seriously both in terms of theory and, especially, in terms of practical ways to implement Narayan's neo-Gandhian strategy aimed at coping with social problems and development disproportions in post-tradition India.

Other authors believe that it was the qualities of Narayan as a political leader that prevented his doctrine from becoming a ferment of mass (and revolutionary) action. One of his critics, a *Mainstream* observer, points out that Narayan's political behaviour was highly individualistic and that he was "moved by emotions rather than by reason". This was manifested not only in the global and maximalist nature of Narayan's approaches, but also in his being indifferent to the political practicability and workability of his ideas. He "was never a man of organisation".⁶⁴ His life's work, the "total revolution", was an emotion-stimulated rather than a well-thought-out undertaking. Hence Narayan's bitter disappointment in his allies from the Janata Party: he was unable to take into account, as every major political leader should, the ideological and political qualities of his followers and to envisage the effect his activity might have in diverse social environment.

As C. N. Chitta Ranjan sees it, Narayan, a politician, did not always abide by the appropriate mode of behaviour: "Eternal search for eternal values may suit those engaged in metaphysical contemplation, but this is hardly the line to be adopted by political activists dedicated to changing the whole socio-economic system radically."⁶⁵

Narayan, a theorist and a contemplative person, clearly dominated over Narayan, a politician. Therefore, in some

of the cases when he had a real opportunity to take political action he either did not take full advantage of it or merely shunned any activity at all. For instance, since 1957 Narayan had been practically escaping any party or political activity, reappearing on the national political scene only for short periods. In the mid-1970s his leadership of the "total revolution" movement was marked by political romanticism rather than effectiveness.

What are the reasons behind such political inefficiency, behind this kind of political escapism? In the opinion of the Indian publicist Mukesh Vatsyayana, the main reason is the discrepancy between the goals proclaimed by Narayan and the means by which he expected these goals to be achieved.⁶⁶ On the one hand, Narayan was always sincere in defending the interests of the poorest classes, and this imparted strength to his teaching. On the other hand, at the end of his life he was as far removed from reaching his goal of building a just society as he was at the beginning of his political career. In the 1950s, the extremely radical programme he advocated (redistribution of land in favour of the poorer peasants; the nationalization of banks, health service and coal mining; the development of public trade; the elimination of the higher chamber of parliament, etc.) was rejected by the INC. In the 1970s, Narayan's allies from the Janata Party responded to his programme in a similar way.

Narayan's political quixotism was at times manifested in his addressing his radical ideas to the wrong people. For instance, at the time of the "total revolution" his call to the participants in the movement to give up their habit of wearing "a sacred thread" (a Brahmin symbol) and paying a large dowry (which promoted corruption) provoked a violent reaction of many of his followers, mostly representatives of the higher castes, as well as of some political and public organizations.

The main intrinsic contradiction in Narayan's political activity was that he hoped to attain radical, socialist goals by inadequate, non-violent means. Indeed, throughout his life he made repeated attempts to combine Marxism and Gandhism. According to Vatsyayana, similar efforts, characteristic of many adherents of neo-Gandhism in the 1960s and 1970s, were the reason behind the hesitations and errors of many proponents of "Indian socialism".

As a theory and a proclaimed programme, Narayan's

doctrine, just as the entire Gandhian ideological tradition in India, exhibits the consistency and intrinsic logic inherent in "normative populism" (P_n). At the same time, in the process of being applied by various political forces, Gandhism is modified, acquiring traits typical of P_r . Thus, Narayan's programme, largely anarchic in its goals, was employed by the political forces whose main objective was to replace one administration with another. Similarly, the principles of non-violence proclaimed by neo-Gandhian leaders in the course of the "total revolution" in fact gave way to the violent methods of countering government measures. The movement on whose banner Gandhi's ideas were inscribed involved extremely diverse strata of the population, including spokesmen of the bourgeoisie, anti-communist elements, reactionary communalists and others, all of whom united to overthrow the INC.

The ideals of neo-Gandhism were to various degrees reflected in the declarations made by the parties which won in the 1977 election and subsequently united in the Janata Party. Its manifesto says: "The Janata Party is dedicated to the values and ideals of Gandhiji. It is dedicated to the task of building up a democratic and socialist state in India, drawing inspiration from our rich heritage and the noble traditions of our struggle for independence and freedom."⁶⁷

In the political sphere, the new party aimed at establishing such a state system "that ensures decentralisation of economic and political power".^{67a} In the socio-economic area, priority was given to combating poverty and ensuring a higher employment rate. The manifesto indicated that these tasks could be solved provided the country worked towards such economic system in which agriculture and small-scale production would be given more priority instead of being sacrificed to large-scale industry and large towns. Full employment and decentralized economy, secured in keeping with Gandhi's ideas, is the only way to avoid the evils of capitalism, including state capitalism.

A comprehensive analysis of Janata Party's manifesto and activity during its period in power would go beyond the aims of this book. The author supports the opinion expressed in Soviet literature that Janata Party's manifesto was addressed to "highly heterogeneous socio-class strata... Hence certain contradictions in the document, though, on the whole, it was drawn up in the spirit of Mahatma Gandhi's

appeals. It was addressed to the masses, primarily to those in the rural areas, to the common man, the small owner taking note of his problems and concerns and stressing the importance of traditional values and democratic ideals."⁶⁸

However, the problem has never been translated into life. This has been repeatedly pointed out in the Indian press and scientific literature. For instance, M. Mohanty, a University of Delhi lecturer, pointed out that after the Janata Party had come to power the masses of the poor continued to be manipulated during the election campaigns so as democracy could be demonstrated, whereas the elite continued monopolizing economic and political power. Mohanty comes to the conclusion that under the conditions obtaining in India the attempts to use Gandhism "to re-decorate the liberal democratic structures which are essentially aimed to promote capitalist development, might well prove to be immaterial".⁶⁹ It is only natural that in this context the Janata Party soon started to dissolve and suffered a defeat at the January 1980 elections.

On the whole, the last decade saw the revival of Gandhian ideas and a new upsurge in the populist sentiment. This can be accounted for by the social contradictions in India which have not abated since Gandhi's time. There is a gap between the declarations of loyalty to Gandhi's heritage and the possibility of translating them into concrete policies. This is connected with the problem of workability of Gandhi's doctrine, the degree and form in which some of its principles can be realized, as well as with the prospects for the emergence of such a socio-political situation which will favour the activity of forces capable of promoting the interests of the masses and working in contact with them. The answer to this question is the matter of the future.

Thailand. In Thailand the ideological concepts of the populist type are associated with the name of Pridi Phanomyong and his political activity in the 1930s-1940s. Thai populism emerged under unique national conditions. Although Siam was not formally a colony, a series of inequitable treaties actually made it a vassal, especially in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, of Britain, France, and Germany. At the same time, the Thai monarchical elite showed great flexibility in its domestic policies. The social reforms effected in the second half of the 19th century improved the position of the peasantry. This resulted in a

substantial economic growth. In the early 20th century both industry and agriculture were on the upgrade.

However, the development of bourgeois relations involved a host of problems. Large numbers of peasants were deprived of land and turned into day labourers. The country's entry in the world capitalist market was not without adverse consequences. The world economic crisis of 1929 had a painful effect on the Siamese economy. There was a sharp drop in the prices of the main staples of Siamese export, such as rice, tin and rubber. Numerous smallholders were brought to ruin.

As a result of the June 1932 coup d'état, which took place against the background of acute social crisis, the power of the king was limited and constitutional government was introduced. The People's Party took over. The young lawyer Pridi Phanomyong was one of the leaders and the chief ideologist of the People's Party whose membership (about 200 people) was made up of army officers, officials and intellectuals. He had made a name among the Siamese students in France. On returning to his country, Phanomyong took up political propaganda among the students.

In his message to the people issued after the coup, Phanomyong urged democratic and far-reaching socio-economic reforms. The main principles formulated in the message were to be subsequently developed in Phanomyong's main ideological work "A Programme of National Economic Policy".

In it he wrote that "the progress in the well-being of people could be achieved only through the state taking into its hands the entire national economic policy".⁷⁰ The nationalization of practically all economic branches, as he saw it, would result in the public employment of the majority of the population and securing for them wages paid by the state.

According to Phanomyong, these radical measures were necessitated by the deep-reaching crisis which had been ravaging the existing system since its transition to a bourgeois footing. As many as 99 per cent of the people had neither land nor capital. Peasants were increasingly deprived of their plots of land and getting bogged down in debts. All this, Phanomyong concluded, was "a direct result of the system of private enterprise, under which productive forces are squandered, workers' wages are lowered, machinery and equipment ... are used ineptly and social parasites

grow in their numbers".⁷¹ He exposed capitalism as a system of private owners, in which the majority of small producers are the losers, a system which disregards national interest. He stressed the chronic "instability of the economic order" brought about by capitalism.

The advocates of private enterprise, Phanomyong maintained, "must know that this inevitably leads to social conflict".⁷² Thailand's socio-economic picture had come to be dominated by landless peasants, impoverished urban migrants, workers' unrest. As Phanomyong saw it, these afflictions could only be remedied by establishing a full-scale state control over the economy, thereby mitigating and even preventing social conflict.

Phanomyong's project envisaged, among other things, the following. The state would redeem the means of production—land, enterprises, commercial firms—from private owners. The gradually liquidated state bonds and the system of indirect taxation which would keep the public coffers full would provide the funds from which the redemption fees would be paid out. Although Phanomyong did not insist, obviously for tactical reasons, on expropriating big owners and abolishing the private sector, particularly the small-scale trade, his project was essentially aimed at fostering non-capitalist development. Under the project, the land acquired by the state was not to be sold to private owners.

Phanomyong's substantiation of the programme included, among other things, references to philosophic and moral considerations. He argued that private ownership was manifestation of egoism; consequently, the private owner could not love his fellowmen, his country and his people. He concluded: "There is nothing in common between private property in land and nationalism, or love for one's compatriots."⁷³ Conversely, altruistic and collectivist sentiments provided, he believed, a firm foundation for nationalism and patriotism.

Importantly, Phanomyong's programme was permeated with a belief in the reforming ability of the state. He was convinced that only the state could run the national economy on the basis of an economically sensible plan and secure large-scale introduction of technology in the production sphere. He believed that only the state could amass enough capital to afford the introduction of machinery. Lastly, only the state could secure equal rights and opportunities

for all, guarantee minimum wages, pensions for the old and education for the children. Phanomyong regarded such a policy as one ensuring both the political and social equality of the Siamese—"universal equality not on paper, but in reality, based on equal opportunity for all to receive wages from the state".⁷⁴

Phanomyong attached great importance to cooperation. He expected a broad network of industrial and rural co-operatives to function as mediators between the individual and the state. Admittedly, in this respect, just as in many others, his project was controversial. For instance, while proclaiming the autonomy of prospective cooperatives, he envisaged their complete subordination to the state. Equally utopian were his hopes for creating cooperatives "both for the poor and for the rich".⁷⁵

Land nationalization was the pivot of Phanomyong's project. Through it he expected to abolish absenteeism and large-scale private property in land. The state was to undertake a nationwide irrigation project and introduce advanced agricultural methods. The French scholar Pierre Fistié points out that Phanomyong regarded radical reforms in agriculture as an essential prerequisite for industrialization and social progress in the country.⁷⁶

On the whole, Phanomyong's programme reveals a drive for modernization and technological innovation often found in populist writings. At the same time, in substantiating his ideas he relied on national traditions. He wrote: "It is well known that the Siamese are willing to work for the government and receive a regular salary."⁷⁷ In his classification of wages and salaries he partly proceeded from the idea of "feeding" civil servants, a system (*saktina*) existing in feudal Siam. He also referred to the Buddhist texts, recalling, in connection with his project, a kingdom of justice to be established by Buddha Sri Aria Maitreya.⁷⁸ At the same time, Phanomyong disapproved of some traditional relations and customs. For instance, he thought that it was high time to put an end to endless festivals in the countryside, which resulted in that the peasants worked only six months a year.

Exaggerated economic etatism is by far the most characteristic feature of Phanomyong's concept. Under his programme, state regulation of economic life would know no bounds. As has been pointed out in Soviet literature, his project constitutes a curious "feudo-socialist utopia".⁷⁹ In

this respect, it is reminiscent of the projects which were put forth by the liberal Narodniks in Russia and combined, as was noted by Lenin, state-feudal elements with bourgeois and socialist ones. Phanomyong himself admitted that the implementation of his plans would impose certain restrictions on personal liberties. This, he explained, would be made up for by a higher living standard of the working people.⁸⁰ This reveals the influence of feudal traditions and vestiges of despotism in Thailand.

For this reason, Phanomyong's project can hardly be regarded as a revolutionary one, especially from the point of view of the suggested methods of implementation. The project combined democratic tendencies with an apology of feudal-state capitalism, anti-capitalism with petty-bourgeois illusions about private sector "growing" into the public economy. In this respect, too, Phanomyong is close to liberal Narodniks with their hopes for a "supra-class" state. His financial plans are equally groundless and utopian, especially as far as the redemption of private means of production is concerned.

Nonetheless, at that stage of Thai history Phanomyong's programme was extremely radical. It was largely spearheaded against the exploiters and reflected the author's desire to meet the needs of the working people. One could say that his populist concept, while constituting a variety of P_r , contains certain elements of P_l .

As has been noted in literature, socialist transformation effected in the Soviet Union obviously influenced Phanomyong's outlook, although he disagreed with this opinion, regarding himself only as a radical drawn towards the socialist ideal and searching for a "third road" between capitalism and communism.⁸¹ It is no accident, however, that King Prachatiok, in his commentary to Phanomyong's social project, repeatedly stressed that the author's ideas mirrored much of the Soviet experience.

Phanomyong's programme was welcomed by his petty-bourgeois followers. The Thai press of the time noted that 90 per cent of the population supported his initiatives.⁸² However, his ideas were vigorously opposed by conservatives and the bourgeoisie, and he was dismissed from his post and was forced to emigrate.

However, both Phanomyong's ideas and his authority as a politician continued to make themselves felt. In the years of World War II he reappeared on the political scene.

In 1945-1946, Phanomyong was the recognized leader of the democratic movement in his country, taking important political posts. However, he failed to turn for support to the revolutionary-democratic opposition and his tactics of political manoeuvring among the ruling circles suffered a setback. After the military coup of 1947 he was again compelled to leave the country. Nonetheless, a long-time émigré, Phanomyong continues to enjoy popularity, as an ideologist and politician, among the opposition quarters, especially the students. This was corroborated by the materials published by the left-wing Thai press in the 1970s.

That Phanomyong's populist ideas were not a success in Thailand in the 1930s-1940s is historically justified. Owing to the organized reforms from the top and the availability of sufficiently large acreages of free land, both agrarian and broader social problems for a long time remained less acute in Thailand than in other developing countries. This is not to say that Phanomyong's social utopia was groundless. To say more, it may gradually gain increasing ideological and political recognition since Thailand has long ceased to enjoy relative social equilibrium and is suffering from land deficit and growing "depeasantization" of the peasantry.

The political picture of Thailand today is not devoid of populist-type slogans and ideas. In this connection, mention should be made of Kukrit Pramoj, a public and political figure whose outlook is based on certain populist principles. An aristocrat by birth and a newspaper publisher, Pramoj enjoys considerable influence in Thailand's radical quarters. This became especially obvious during the 1973 "student revolution" and the developments of 1975-1976. He became one of the founders of the Social Action Party, opposed to the military regime.

Pramoj's articles sound a didactic and moralizing note and stress the ethical aspect of things. They are often devoted to exposing the bad faith of the high ruling circles. Pramoj does not believe that the "Japanese model" is the ideal to be emulated by Thailand. He urges more balanced, egalitarian development. In the opinion of the German author Hans U. Luther, Pramoj's concepts are indicative of the desire to bridge "the gap between the rich and the poor" and "to create a populist state".⁸³ As opponent of imperialism, Pramoj urges to restrict the influence of foreign capital in Thailand.

Populist-type ideological tendencies and movements emerged in some other countries of Asia, too. In the 1930s, for instance, the Ahali political group was active in Iraq. Its members referred to their system of views as "Sha'biya" (populism) and urged to combine democratism and socialism.⁸⁴ Populist movements were also active in Japan in the late 19th-early 20th centuries. It is noteworthy that Russian Narodism had a great impact on these movements. The ideas of Russian "peasant socialism" largely determined the activity of the Oriental Socialist Party (Toyo Shakaito) and, especially, the Commoner Movement (Heimin undo), among whose members in the early 20th century was the prominent Japanese democrat and poet Kotoku Denjiro (Shusui). Populist-type ideological phenomena emerged in Japan in more recent years, too.

Populism had a great impact upon the ideological and political life in Indonesia in the 1930s-1960s. Mention should be made of "Marhaenism" (after Marhaen, a collective name of the "common man"), elaborated by Ahmed Sukarno, and the theory of cooperation, created by the prominent populist thinker Hadji Mohammed Hatta. Populist-type ideas were also put forth by the participants in the national liberation movement in Burma (the Thakins, Aung San, later Ne Win and others).⁸⁵

From time to time, populist ideological tendencies emerged in the Philippines. They were especially pronounced as early as the 1920s and 1930s, and even earlier, during the 1902 uprising, as well as in the years of the Sakdal and Santa Iglesia mass movement. In the 1960s and 1970s, populist elements were to be found in the Christian socialism of Raul S. Manglapus, in the radical utopias of Benigno Aquino and Jose Ma. Sison, as well as in the official ideology of President Ferdinand Marcos. This issue is dealt with in the works by the Soviet orientalist G. I. Levinson.

4. POPULIST SOCIALISM IN AFRICA (THE 1950s-1970s)

The characteristic features of the national liberation movement in African countries, as well as the peculiarities in the latter's development upon their gaining independence

are largely determined by the predominance of pre-national entities and tribal structures throughout the continent, especially in Tropical Africa. The ethnical-tribal relations, which tend to grow and counteract the process of national integration, make the formation of nations more complicated. Moreover, the formation of national entities is hampered by the fact that the process often unfolds within the artificial state boundaries which had been established by the colonizers without any regard to the actual boundaries of the areas inhabited by the tribes. These circumstances encourage the efforts of African ideologists and political leaders towards national unity. Populist trends in African countries emerged as factors of national consolidation within the limits of a state, advancing the slogans of national unification and seeking to overcome tribalist sentiment and tendencies towards disintegration.

It stands to reason that African populist trends are fostered both by national and social problems. In the colonial period, Africa was the world's most backward region which suffered most from the consequences of the "economy of trading" imposed by imperialism. This has led to the emergence of islets of export-oriented intensive production. Apart from such islets, the majority of the peasants remained at the level of pre-capitalist relations. They retained many of the communal structures despite the latter having been jeopardized by colonial economic and political management.

As has been noted in scientific literature, modern African ideologies have much in common. This is also true of the populist trends which make up the ideological complex of "African socialism". Despite tribal and language barriers, African ethnic entities, Northern African excluded, coexist within a single cultural, historical and social framework (mythological thinking underlying their cultures and their belonging to the same race certainly serve a unifying factor). Hence the reliance on African traditions and fundamental principles of Negro-African civilization.

Algeria. The socio-historical background for the emergence of populism in Algeria was formed by prolonged struggle of its people against the French colonisers which culminated in the bloodshed of the 1954-1962 war. It is no accident, in the opinion of Jean Leca, that the catchwords of Algerian populism were "militant", "fellah" and "brotherhood" as most directly associated with the national liberation movement.¹ It is no accident also that Frantz

Fanon, an ideologist, public figure and typical representative of modern populism, was most active at this stage of the national liberation struggle in Algeria.

Vast literature on Fanon's life and work is available in many languages. Soviet authors dealing with the modern national liberation movement tended, until recently, either to overlook or to show a very cautious approach to Fanon's contribution. There was a hint of wariness and distrust in the controversial assessment of his activity. This kind of attitude was hardly justified, as has been shown in the fundamental work by A. V. Gordon.² Fanon was certainly a revolutionary, a paragon of militant democratism. What Lenin said about Chernyshevsky, another "peasant democrat", can well be applied to Fanon; "His writings [are] breathing the spirit of the class struggle."³

Although Fanon ranked among the prominent figures of the early stages of the national liberation movement, his views offer a foreglimpse of the thought patterns generated by the challenges of development and social struggles in the developing world and typical of many subsequent ideologies in the newly emerged countries. Fanon combined the intuition of a revolutionary, sensitive to the needs and sentiment of the masses, with the introspection of an enlightened intellectual, philosopher, sociologist and psychiatrist. All this accounts for the fact that his ideological heritage is popular and highly valued not only in Asia, Africa and Latin America but also among the left-wing radicals in the West.

Fanon's universe of discourse incorporates many of the populist thought patterns: philosophic anthropologism, the presumption of human "integrity" ("an individual should tend to assume universalism inherent in human nature").⁴ It is on the basis of this mental outlook that bourgeois civilization is denounced for causing "in man pathological diversification of his functions and disintegration of his wholeness; in society—rupture, stratification, and sanguinary strife generated by the existence of classes".⁵ This is reminiscent of N. K. Mikhailovsky's philosophico-historical discourse on the adverse consequences of differentiation of the personality and society. For all Fanon's anti-colonial edge, his assessment of the "cost of progress" brings to mind similar attitudes of Russian Narodniks. He wrote: "Behind Europe's well-being and progress there are the sweat and dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians..."⁶

In his way of thinking Fanon is closer to the anarchic faction of populism. According to his conception, the bridgehead of the national liberation revolution is made up by the peasantry, "a solid mass, always 'medieval', inciting numerous jacqueries". Just as M. A. Bakunin, Fanon tended to place the lumpenproletariat and the younger generation on the same footing as the peasantry. He described the former as "a cohort... [constituting] one of the most spontaneous and radical revolutionary forces of the colonized people". As for the young people, he regarded them as "one of the most important factors in the less developed countries".⁷ Just as the theorists of anarchism of the past, Fanon reiterated the importance of "destruction" and "violence" which offer the masses "a key to social realities".⁸

Fanon takes a classical populist stand on the issue of the "people" when he counterposes them to "the elite" and "the bourgeoisie". The juxtaposition of contrarities, often found in Fanon's writings, is also typical of populist thinking. While exposing the conservative nature of traditions, he, at the same time, defends them against the encroachments of the colonizers and reproaches the latter with their perfunctorily patronizing attitude to the traditional culture of the colonized people; while hailing the peasants he recognizes their narrow-mindedness, etc. This intrinsic contradictoriness of Fanon's posture is analysed in the above-mentioned work by A. V. Gordon.

At the same time, Fanon is a highly original thinker, an outstanding representative of peasant democracy in the 20th century. It should be recognized that, despite his inclination to idealize the peasantry, which was obviously accounted for by his assessment of the situation in Algeria in the 1950s as something unique and unprecedented, he thought highly of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry in the national liberation movement and social struggles in developing countries. He showed that radical social change in emergent states was unthinkable without direct involvement and initiative of the peasants, who constitute the overwhelming majority of their population. At the same time, Fanon was mindful of the political inertness of the village. Therefore, he stressed the importance of the masses being led by the revolutionary avant-garde and progressive intelligentsia who should be entrusted with democratic education of the masses and "rationalizing popular practices".⁹

Unlike various radical factions whose doctrines urged

to "place the masses in ward", Fanon was consistent in his democratism: he advocated the principle of government not only "for the people" but "together with the people". His belief in the democratic initiative of the masses in their exercising public management and control was directly linked to his conviction that the inevitable blunders, committed by the people's self-government bodies in the early days of their existence and brought about by their lack of political culture and competence, will be gradually made up for by the enterprise and initiative of the masses, their growing political awareness and organizational skills.

Fanon urged the following as methods to secure the process of democratization: organizational and educational work conducted by a revolutionary party and entrusted primarily to its basic organizations with the object of developing initiative at the grassroots level; protection and utilization of the institute of communal democracy the masses are used to as a means of involving them in political construction. The latter should not be taken to be tantamount to the idealization of communal traditions—an attitude alien to Fanon. One cannot but agree with A. V. Gordon that Fanon stands out among national democrats in the present-day developing countries for his sincere and consistent democratism, his belief in the people's self-government and a complete lack of any symptoms of "massophobia".¹⁰

Concerned with the problems involved in the struggle for independence, Fanon did not, at the same time, underestimate the importance of deciding on the ways of the future development of the emergent states. He was among the first to warn against the narrowness of the national bourgeoisie in the developing countries and its having no prospects for the future. According to Fanon, the national bourgeoisie "inherits the negative, decadent traits of the Western bourgeoisie, but lacks the experience of the latter's early stages of search and discoveries which, in any case, constitute its asset".¹¹ Since the bourgeoisie in the former colonies is "incapable of fulfilling its historical role", there is every reason for the democratic forces to opt for the non-capitalist way of development and bar the way for the local bourgeoisie. At times, Fanon's anti-bourgeois zest acquired the dimensions of global "tricontinentalism." He admired the prospects opening before the developing world which ought "to try to cope with the problems [alienation of the individual, exploitation, the need for all-round

development of the personality] Europe failed to tackle". "Can't we do anything better than create a third Europe?", he exclaimed.¹²

Accordingly, Fanon renounced the strategy of "catching-up development" and repudiated modernization as the ultimate goal and, especially, as an end in itself. As he saw it, this strategy presupposed imitating the bourgeois way of development, a road to nowhere. Foreseeing the emergence or, probably, witnessing the first signs of the tendency towards technocratism and lop-sided industrialism in the young states, he warned against the danger of development without man or at the cost of man. He believed that it was vital to cultivate in people a consciencious attitude to their work and collective participation in society's endeavours, even if this might involve a slowdown in economic development. Although higher rates of growth might be sooner attained by bullying and pressurizing the workers, the time and efforts spent on persuading and educating the consciencious worker will in the long run prove to be more rewarding.¹³ These ideas ring of economic egalitarianism, the strategy and tactics of development which in our days have become characteristic of many developing countries, especially those where populist doctrines have gained wide recognition.

Although Fanon's populism is certainly dominated by the elements of P_I , it also contains certain features of P_n (consistent democratism, the idea of the people's self-government, anarchic tendencies, etc.). This accounts both for the advantages and disadvantages of Fanon's concepts, such as exaggerated peasantophilism, belittling the role of the proletariat, overestimating the tendencies towards the emergence of the workers' aristocracy and counterposing, on these grounds, the peasantry and the lumpen-proletariat to the workers. Although Fanon did not escape the influence of Marxism, he tended to be non-partisan or even prejudiced about it because of "the immaterial and perfunctory interpretation"¹⁴ offered in the works by the vulgarizers of Marxism. Fanon's famous concept of violence is quite vulnerable when considered from the point of view of revolutionary humanism. However, one should distinguish between Fanon, who was, by and large, gradually overcoming his extremist approach to the issue, and some of today's ardent "Fanon-followers" or bourgeois analysts who tend to overemphasize the theme of violence in his works.

In their substantive importance Fanon's ideas certainly go beyond the boundary of his native country. This is not to say that Algerian populist ideological tendencies did not gain a firm hold (which cannot be ascribed solely to Fanon's efforts). This is borne out by the ideology of the National Liberation Front and its leaders, first of all Houary Boumediène. Algerian socialism has retained its populist colouring until today.¹⁵

Kenya. The spread of populist ideological trends in Kenya was largely stimulated by the peasant movement of the 1950s, above all by the famous Mau-Mau uprising. The uprising, one of the largest in postwar Africa, was brought about by the dissolution of the traditional social ties of the Kikuyu peasants and their partial proletarianization. From the point of view of the emergence of populist ideological tendencies, the social background of this movement was highly typical. The Mau-Mau uprising was followed by a number of other anti-colonial peasant revolts organized by the Land Freedom Army, the Society of the Impoverished, and other associations¹⁶ whose slogans were certainly inspired by populist sentiment. It is in this context that the populist ideology of the country's main political party, Kenya African National Union (KANU) emerged and the populist declarations of its leaders of the 1950s-1960s (Jomo Kenyatta, Tom Mboya, Bildad Kaggia, Oginga Odinga) were made.

The pronouncements by Kenyan statesmen and public figures are permeated with the populist motifs. For instance, colonialism is criticized from the point of view of the destructive effect it exerts upon the traditions of African nations who "found themselves uprooted and placed outside the old values and beliefs on which their communities had thrived for centuries". The culture and technological innovations imported by Europeans did not benefit the Africans: although "the demonstration effect" had left its imprint and the people "learned that they [were] entitled to a better life", the process of development did not improve the position of the increasingly impoverished African masses. The Western pattern of economic progress was one-sided and alien to the Africans. Mboya wrote: "It is not mere propaganda to say that, under colonial rule, economic, human and social development in Africa has been unduly subordinated and subjected to the profit motive."¹⁷

Many of the Kenyan public figures were among the most

active advocates and defenders of African traditions. The book by Jomo Kenyatta on the Kikuyu traditions has gained wide recognition.¹⁸ At the same time, traditionalism remained an important component in the outlook of the Kenyan populists. For instance, Mboya wrote: "In Africa the belief that 'we are all sons and daughters of the soil' has always exercised tremendous influence on our social, economic, and political relationships. From this belief springs the logic and practice of equality, and the acceptance of communal ownership of the vital means of life—the land... The acquisitive instinct, which is largely responsible for the vicious excesses and exploitation under the capitalist system, was tempered by a sense of togetherness and a rejection of graft and meanness. This was loyalty to the society, and the society gave its members much in return: a sense of security and universal hospitality."¹⁹ As African thinkers see it, African traditions are radically different from those generated by European civilization in that they are of "communal nature". For this reason even in the hard times of colonial rule the African tended to cling to his peasant values; he "came to work for wages; but still maintained contact with his native land. He was secure in his mind that he could go back to his home and be taken care of by his people."²⁰

At the same time, Kenyan leaders visualized their country's future development as a synthesis of the traditional and the modern. They took a selective approach to the traditions. They believed that Kenya would undergo the process of modernization which would require "new values". Therefore, it was necessary to "decide what part of the traditional African social and cultural structure can play in the country's economic development."²¹ Cooperatives were expected to become constituents of a new society by combining both traditional and modern elements. Through such cooperatives "a clan can translate the old tribal structure into the modern money economy."²² Kenyatta maintained that "cooperatives built upon the traditional values of our society [transform] these values into effective economic and social institutions."²³

Kenyan ideologists held that this strategy was designed "to establish a socialist basis for future development."²⁴ In a 1963 speech, Kenyatta said that the Kenyan people had a right to be free from economic exploitation and social inequality and that Kenyan leaders wanted all people in

the country to be guided in their activity by a desire to serve the society and not by a drive for personal profit.²⁵ According to the Soviet scholar A. M. Pegushev, the fact that socialism was visualized as a direct continuation of the African *ujamaa* traditions is indicative of a certain influence of Julius Nyerere's ideas.²⁶ To put it in Mboya's words, "the challenge of African socialism is to use these traditions to find a way to build a society in which there is a place for everybody, where everybody shares both in poverty and in prosperity, and where emphasis is placed upon production by everyone, with security for all."²⁷

That populism underlies Kenyan official ideology is also manifested in the repudiation of class struggle ("the theory of class struggle has no relevance to our particular situation here"²⁸), combined with the intention to avoid it in future by pursuing a policy aimed at moderating social conflicts so "that antagonistic classes do not emerge in Kenya as development progresses".²⁹ Typically, in the 1960s Kenyan leaders formulated the motto "back to the land" in response to the migration of the rural population to urban areas.³⁰ Also significant was the emphasis on the importance of moral factors. In this connection, one may recall Mboya's message to the educated young people of the country in which he warned against the danger of forming a privileged elite. He urged the students to maintain high moral standards, to serve the people and to "maintain constant touch with the people". He persuaded the students to take the people's problems as their own, emphasizing that it would be disastrous if the educated elite chose to enjoy comfort at a time when the masses continued to live under the same dire conditions they had suffered from through centuries. They ought to be selfless and ready for sacrifice. "In accordance with our philosophy of African socialism," Mboya said, "the privileged must be prepared to sacrifice proportionately even more, so that the gap between the rich and the poor can be narrowed down as fast as possible."³¹

However, even in the early period of the KANU activity, the populist rhetoric of its leaders sounded an unmistakably bourgeois reformist note. What they denounced was not capitalism in general but *laissez faire* capitalism.³² The call to maintain traditions gradually gave way to the call for "realism" in following the "logic of progress" and to propagating "economic incentives" and reliance on technology as the main levers of development. Significantly, the typical

populist theory of "leaping over" development stages was based, in the ideology of Kenyan leaders, on technical and economic rather than social considerations. For instance, Mboya wrote: "The ability of Africa to borrow advanced technological knowledge, modern methods of industrial organisation and economic techniques of control and guidance from more advanced countries provides the opportunity for us to leap over many hurdles that have restrained development in these modern societies in the past. It means also that African socialism as a system can profit from mistakes made by others. Unlike many countries that have eliminated many successful economic mechanisms on narrow ideological grounds, Kenya is free to pick and choose these methods that have been proved in practice and are adaptable to Kenya conditions regardless of the ideologies that others may attach to them."³³

The tendency to accentuate technocratism and pragmatism imparted a bourgeois colouring to the views held by Kenyan leaders. The contradictory nature of their goals became especially obvious in a major document issued by the government in the 1960s, *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya*. Explaining its principles as applied to the agrarian issue, for instance, Mboya maintained that, on the one hand, Africa's tradition of communal ownership of land that prevents people from treating their plots as their property was an advantage. But on the other hand, this did not fit into the modern pattern of monetary economy which should be given priority at the present stage of development. "The ownership of land must, therefore, be made more definite and explicit if land consolidation and development are to be fully successful,"³⁴ he concluded. In other words, he urged introducing private ownership of land. This signified a retreat from even those modest commitments Kenyan leaders had made previously when they (Mboya for instance) denounced the foreign system of private ownership of land instituted by the colonizers and held that "it would be a mistake to adopt this as a standard system for all parts of Kenya, or for all of Africa".³⁵

Thus, the programme of "Africanization" of land publicized as one designed "to prevent the emergence of antagonistic classes among Africans"³⁶ in fact implied nothing less than replacing the white farmer minority by the African farmer minority and contributed to the process of social

and property differentiation of the peasant population. As the KANU plans were implemented it became clear that they were pushing the country towards capitalist development.

The emergence in the mid-1960s of a left-wing populist faction headed by Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia, a veteran of the Kenyan national liberation movement and one of the organizers of the Mau-Mau uprising, was a response to the bourgeois policies pursued by the powers that be. In their censorious manifesto, the left leaders charged that the declarations by the government and KANU leaders made nonsense of the idea of African socialism³⁷ since what they referred to as African socialism was neither African nor socialism but only a screen for capitalism.³⁷ In 1966, a group of left-wing leaders set up an independent party, Kenya People's Union (KPU).

In its documents, the KPU urged to "pursue socialist policies to benefit [the people]" and to "share out their nation's wealth equitably among the people". It was stressed that equitable distribution in an impoverished society was possible provided economic power was passed over to the people guided by a democratically-elected government capable of defending the interests of small farmers and workers.³⁸ It was declared that the party bosses were "re-treating from the people" and "blocking the expression of the popular will", despite the fact that the battle for freedom had been carried on "so that the people may rule themselves". The KPU denounced the tendency toward etatism and the corruption and extravagance of the office-holders, resulting in the emergence of "a class of politician-businessmen".³⁹

The controversy over the approach to the agrarian issues was especially pronounced. Bildad Kaggia thought it vital to nationalize the plantations belonging to Europeans and turn them either into state farms or cooperatives of landless peasants.⁴⁰ The KPU agrarian programme urged the distribution of land in favour of "the neediest", diminishing the size of personal plots (so as not to promote the emergence of "a new class of big landlords") and distribution of land on democratic principles.⁴¹

The KPU programme condemned "the basically false assumption that there can be a harmony of interests between private capital, including private foreign capital, and Government as the representative of the public interest in Kenya"⁴². On behalf of the broad masses, the left-wing oppo-

sition urged "to deal with landlessness, combat unemployment, give the children more schools, and the people more hospitals, push up living standards of the poor",⁴³ etc.

The KPU proved to be a short-lived organization. In the late 1960s the party was banned and its leaders were compelled to relinquish political activity. This is not to say that the left-wing populist opposition in the country melted away. A group of members of parliament headed by Josiah Kariuki (killed in 1975) continuously denounced current policies and won a recognition as "champions of people's interest". As for the influence of Oginga Odinga and his followers, it still makes itself felt in the country.

It would be a mistake to regard the stand by the KANU and those who criticize it from the left as diametrically opposed. A. M. Pegushev is justified in pointing out the similarity, at least at the level of programmatic declarations, in their main political guidelines⁴⁴. This testifies to the above-described ideological and theoretical affinity of P_r and P_l , coexisting within the framework of the same ideology. The thing is that the KPU was more consistent in implementing those very principles which the KANU leaders advocated in theory but shunned in practice. This kind of retreat was not accidental, it was predetermined by the ambivalent socio-class orientation of the populist trends which incorporate both bourgeois-democratic and anti-capitalist tendencies. Similarly, it was no accident that while left-wing populism emerged as a counterbalance to right-wing populism, the two continued to coexist within the framework of the same party and the same country.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, the policies of the Kenyan leaders continued to be dominated by pro-bourgeois tendencies which had emerged in the preceding decade. The development of local enterprise, in the context of mixed economy, and the waning of communal ownership were fostered. In addition to the remaining enclaves of large-scale European colonizers' property in land, there appeared a large and powerful group of well-to-do African farmers.

All this cannot but foster gradual aggravation of social contradictions involved in the rapid process of a backward country's "going bourgeois": the socio-class polarization of society and the consequences of the surviving economic dependence on the world capitalist market become more pronounced. It is no accident that in the mid-1970s the country was swept by massive anti-government campaigns,

to which the regime responded by developing stronger etatist tendencies and concentrating all power in the hands of a limited group of the high-ranking officials in the KANU and central government bodies. Nevertheless, social contradictions in the country persist, still awaiting their resolution.

Madagascar. The populist trends in Madagascar developed in the struggle against the bourgeois-reformist regime of Philibert Tsiranana, head of government since 1960. His government adhered to a predominantly pro-French policy and represented the interests of "the three bourgeoisies", money, power, and knowledge. This widened "the gap between power and the masses" and fostered the impoverishment of the broad strata of the population.⁴⁵

The peasant uprising of 1971, organized in the southern part of the island by the National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (MONIMA) and brutally suppressed by the authorities was the first major anti-government action in the country. It was followed by a series of anti-government campaigns launched by the young people and students. The Tsiranana regime was toppled and a new government was formed by the military headed by General Gabriel Ramanantsoa.

The new regime in many ways contributed to the establishment of a populist ideological atmosphere in the political life of the country. The head of the government denounced the anti-egalitarian tendency of the previous regime and favoured the policy of "dialogue with the people" who "have been for a long time deprived of their right to participate in national life and [were] now prepared to rally and determine their own future". It was stressed that "the future of the country was closely linked with the destiny of the peasants. National development is determined by the peasantry's ability to develop."⁴⁶

Ramanantsoa and his followers intended to radically restructure the entire political system in the country on the basis of the fokonolona, the traditional commune. It is a variety of the traditional commune based on neighbourly relations and respect for the forebears whose tombs are a "mystical magnet which attracts the whole of the group who come here to regain their cohesion".⁴⁷ Neighbourly relations implied mutual assistance in work, collective settlement of disputes and regular general meetings whose decisions were binding on all the participants.

Fokonolona, chosen as the main unit of the political system developed in Madagascar after 1972, was expected to consolidate traditional collectivist values, foster "authenticity" and adequate national ideology. Ramanantsoa said: "We the Malagasy have no doubt about what to choose—the imported philosophical theories, which some would like to impose on our people, or our identity and our values, which should be guarded against all sorts of ideological phenomena; that may impress our compatriots but cannot offer a concrete and satisfactory solution to the problems involved in eliminating social inequality."⁴⁸

At the same time, this kind of populist nationalism was aimed at replacing the multi-party structure by "direct", "popular" democracy, the people's government. The main ideologist and instigator of this project was Richard Ratsimandrava, Minister of the Interior in Ramanantsoa's government, who formulated the doctrine of "people's government". He vigorously campaigned for restructuring the political system in the country on the basis of fokonolona, travelled widely about the country, talked to peasants and gained popularity with the masses. The declarations made by Ratsimandrava and other leaders after 1972 manifested their belief in the ability of the people to effectively participate in political life as well as their disapproval of political elitism which took refuge in the phraseology about alleged "unsurmountable passivity of the people." They made declarations to the effect that the people would meet the challenge of its disparagers and form inside the nation an immense united majority in the name of a better future.⁴⁹

On the whole, Ramanantsoa's government followed a progressive socio-political course, making changes in the taxation system in favour of the lower classes, limiting the income of the well-paid officials, restricting the activity of foreign companies, establishing state control over the key industries, revising the attitude to French neo-colonialism, etc. These measures had previously been opposed by the reactionary forces. In the course of political strife unfolding in early 1975 the Ramanantsoa government was made to resign. Richard Ratsimandrava was assassinated. But in the end, the revolutionary democratic forces headed by Didier Ratsiraka took the upper hand and he became President and head of the new party, the Avant-Garde of the Malagasy Revolution.

The new regime set forth its programme in the Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution issued in 1976. The Charter elaborated on the concepts formulated over the preceding period, proclaimed the country's socialist orientation and its adherence to egalitarian principles in socio-economic and socio-political development. The revolution "proceeds from the interests of the underprivileged strata of the Malagasy people",⁵⁰ declared the authors of the Charter. "Our socialism is the socialism of the poor."⁵¹

Malagasy socialist populism is based on traditional collectivist values and institutions. As is pointed out in the Charter, the peculiarity of the Malagasy revolution lies in its promoting socialism in fokonolona.⁵² Fokonolona provides the basis for establishing a system of people's self-government bodies.⁵³ This, by the way, mirrors one of the typical intentions of the populist political doctrine—promoting political decentralization.

At the same time, fokonolona is regarded as a symbol of national unity and authenticity. The priority given to fokonolona is consonant with one of the slogans formulated in the Charter—preservation of national institutions and national culture. According to the Charter, regaining national wealth, restoring the country's sovereignty, and fostering its economic self-sufficiency "will be in vain unless we assert our Malagasy identity and culture, the main constituents of which are our language and history".⁵⁴

The Charter emphasized that "the fundamental values of the Malagasy people are founded on the primacy of the spiritual element... Development and economic growth are not an end in itself, they serve to promote the social and cultural progress of the Malagasy people."⁵⁵ Accordingly, the Charter proclaimed "a revolution in mentality ... [which] constitutes the foremost demand and determines all the others".⁵⁶ Hence the enormous importance attached to the moral factor: "The new revolutionary ethics should impregnate everyday life."⁵⁷ The topic of the intelligentsia vs the people or, rather, intelligentsia's services to the people is interpreted in the same spirit: "Pupils and students ought to regard themselves as the people's servants who, on completing their studies, should reintegrate themselves in the community they come from and help to transform it from within."⁵⁸

The Charter reveals a benevolent and, at the same time, discriminating attitude to religion and religious in-

stitutions: "Religious beliefs which are not contrary to our socialist option are identified in the minds of the masses with equality and justice and are therefore conducive to socialism."⁵⁹

Significantly, Malagasy socialism presupposes a democratic and, at the same time, anti-capitalist stand on the agrarian issue. Land is handed over to peasants "provided they cultivate it, but it is strictly forbidden to sell it or leave it unused". This measure is designed to "impede the reappearance of metayage and the development of the rural bourgeoisie."⁶⁰ As for the future, the Charter envisages socialist cooperation of the peasantry, which "in Madagascar will be facilitated by the age-long communal tradition embodied in the foconolona, fihavanana, and fifanampiana."⁶¹

At the same time, the Charter tolerates the "existence of private property provided it does not contradict the programme and objectives of the revolution."⁶² While criticizing the bourgeoisie and bourgeois civilization as a whole, the programme recognizes the possibility of an alliance with capitalist elements. Since the national bourgeoisie often suffers from and comes out against imperialism, the state can win it over to its side; however, the Charter warns that "the struggle against that section of the bourgeoisie who will refuse to reform or re-educate itself will be as pitiless as the battle against the compradore bourgeoisie and imperialism". At the same time, the Charter emphasizes that bourgeois elements also exist among the common people: "It should be remembered that among the peasantry and the other poor there are many whose mentality is petty-bourgeois and who are prepared to exploit the others."⁶³

MONIMA is another party whose slogans are populist in nature. In its programme, issued in 1975, the party called for the country's non-capitalist development and upheld egalitarian principles in domestic policy. The party urged to "redistribute all land in Madagascar", eliminate private (both local and foreign) property in land, hand all land over to the foconolonas, organize various cooperatives, ranging from family to production ones. Foconolona was proclaimed a school of management for the masses.

On the whole, the Ratsiraka government policy is pursued in keeping with the declared principles. By mid-1976, over 50,000 hectares of land were redistributed in favour of the poorer peasants. By 1978, over 200,000

hectares of land had become the property of the state.⁶⁵ The political structures were vigorously revamped with a view to adjusting them to the self-government goals. Founding an administrative system on the foconolona principle was practically accomplished as early as 1977. It was envisaged to increase the number of schools, medical posts, recreational centres. Measures were taken to stimulate agriculture, especially the production of foodstuffs. In 1977, the production of rice increased by 10 per cent as against 1976.⁶⁶ Adhering to the policy of non-alignment, the Malagasy regime also actively seeks to strengthen friendly relations with the socialist countries.

Malagasy populism, although comparatively unsystematized, is, in its basic principles, a revelatory phenomenon. Pivoted on the issue of the commune since its inception, Malagasy populism could be described as variety of P_n . Its subsequent evolution was accompanied by its growing politization. While until 1975 it had combined the elements of P_n and P_r , now it presents a combination of P_n and P_l , with the elements of P_l prevailing.

Senegal. The development of populist ideology in Senegal was promoted by the activity of Léopold Senghor, Mamadou Dia, Abdou Diouf and other Senegalese theorists and politicians. Senghor's concept of Negritude, popular in Africa and elsewhere, forms the basis of Senegalese populism. Leaving aside the philosophic principles of Negritude, which were extensively described in literature,⁶⁷ I shall dwell, instead, on those aspects which are directly related to populism. Negritude is a teaching concerned with the spiritual and cultural essence of Negro-African civilization and African social traditions. As such, it has provided a suitable theoretical foundation for Senegalese populism. According to Senghor, "the permanent values of [African] civilization ... [are] communal spirit, the spirit of enterprise, the respect of cultural values, of spiritual values, the sense of the concrete, the sense of the facts".⁶⁸ He emphasized that the most important among them was "the communal spirit", i.e. an inclination to joint activity. Senghor wrote: "Negro-African society is collectivist or, more exactly, communal, because it is rather a *commun-ion* of souls than an aggregate of individuals." Essentially, this society can be described as one which has attained socialism. Senghor continues: "We would learn that we had already achieved socialism before the coming of the Euro-

pean. We would conclude that our duty is to renew it by helping it to regain its spiritual dimensions."^{68a}

According to Senegalese theorists, the merits of traditional African civilization are determined by its peasant nature. Senghor wrote: "Our countries [in West Africa] are the countries of peasants... and shepherds; they are countries which in the past were certainly feudal but historically they have never known either classes or the proletariat; these countries are *communitarian*, with the group taking priority over the individual; and what is especially important, these countries are religious... Money is not the King here."⁶⁹ To quote Senghor, "[African] rural society was a solid structure ... made up of family cooperatives on the basis of mutual assistance. The mutuality rested, in essence, on religious sentiment which imparted to the members of the commune spiritual unity and, along with it, the ideal of solidarity shared by all."⁷⁰

Mamadou Dia, comparing pre-colonial African society with Incaic civilization in Peru, stressed their inherent social balance: "Supply was adapted to demand by means of conscious discipline. The simple ways which ruled out excessive spending, the communal mode of life which ensured a just distribution of the boons and prevented the emergence of surplus or a taste for luxury—all this constituted a natural means to regulate the demand, while supply was stimulated by enthusiasm shared by all the members of the community."⁷¹ He refutes the opinion of those Western authors who treat the traditional agricultural economy in Africa "with intolerable contempt". He argues that it was "a singularly dynamic rural economy indicative of the active intervention of human intellect in nature which, for all its austerity, provided a stimulus for advancement and progress".⁷²

The appeals to rely on Negro-African "sources" are accompanied by diversified criticism of capitalism. First of all, Senegalese theorists denounce colonialism and "the economy of trade" which was imposed on the country by the colonizers and which, to put it in Senghor's words, constituted "a colonial version of capitalism".⁷³ According to Dia, European colonizers turned African countries into the metropolies' raw-material appendages. Staple food crops were ousted by export crops which had a negative effect on the population's diet, impeded national enterprise, boosted the taxes, and added to the country's backward-

ness. The colonizers' "economy of trade" proved incapable of producing the autochthonous bourgeoisie, fostering instead the emergence of the semi-proletariat. On the whole, Senegalese theorists put the blame for "rendering African rural economy rickety" on Western capitalism⁷⁴. Fostering profit-oriented economy proved to be no less destructive socially and culturally.

Secondly, global criticism of capitalism strikes a note of economic romanticism, especially in the writings by Mamadou Dia. He maintains that capitalist economy, "concerned only with the flourishing of business and having no other criterion but profit, is unable to take care of cultural values since man is completely outside the area of its interests". Under capitalism, economics "very soon became a science treating only production and prices and forfeiting any human focus, a science in which the notion of welfare or progress gave way to the considerations of immediate profit and interest rate... It is a science that forgets about the people." In a word, "the process of dehumanization of economics" is taking place.⁷⁵

In the opinion of Senegalese ideologists, the above considerations should be taken into account in charting national socio-economic development. Abdou Diouf, referring to the traditions of African society in which "the attainment of material strength" has never been regarded as an end in itself, urges that the Senegalese should not feel envious at the sight of Western consumer society which "never ceases to produce, even at the price of total alienation of man and reducing him to an instrument of production. What is essential for us is, along with satisfying our material requirements, gaining moral, spiritual, aesthetic and cultural achievements." He stresses that capitalism is responsible for upsetting the vitally important equilibrium between man and nature and causing ecological crisis. A Negro-African "would betray the authenticity of his culture if tomorrow he created civilization suffering from an acute ecological crisis of the type the industrialized societies are vainly trying to cope with and involving deforestation, pollution, etc".⁷⁶

All this does not entail rejection of modern civilization. On the contrary, the Senegalese populists are fully aware of the negative aspects of traditional structures. Senghor, for instance, believes that the commune is far from being free from numerous drawbacks rooted both in its low tech-

nical and economic development level and in its social structure, with its sluggishness and social inertness. It is vital to stir up, in the process of development, the dormant energy of the people, eradicate the streak of fatality and cultivate, instead, a taste for innovation in the members of the commune.⁷⁷ Traditions may become a moderating factor of modernization. Therefore, in Dia's opinion, while Africa should not head for purely agricultural development, "excessive industrialization" should also be avoided.⁷⁸ In recently published book Dia describes Islam and traditions as tool to regulate the development of industrial society and to prevent it "from engendering, in the efforts towards higher productivity, a new kind of slavery".⁷⁹ At the same time, traditions may contribute to socio-economic progress and provide an impetus to development. "Development," wrote Senghor, "should be something *mystical* ... a kind of fervour inspiring our action, a *union* of "our souls in the effort to create an integral man."⁸⁰

On the whole, the development pattern outlined by Senegalese ideologists is close to the formula "African ethics plus Western technology". According to Dia, it is vital "in promoting the kind of modern economy we seek to build to safeguard the essential values which constitute African originality".⁸¹ Senghor maintains that African development will be a synthesis of Negro-African cultural values and socialist social and technical values.⁸² The bourgeois implications of modernization urged by the Senegalese leaders are increasingly obvious.

These implications surfaced as the Senegalese concept of socialism was further elaborated. According to Dia, socialism in Senegal is to emerge "from primary communes". To stimulate this process it is necessary "to promote at all levels up to the very summit, the feeling of mutual responsibility inherent in the commune."⁸³ As Senghor sees it, priority should be given to meeting the interests of the peasantry since "the socializing activity of the state will have its privileged terrain in the rural sector where it is necessary to assume the protection and education of the peasants who have most suffered from the economy of trading. The state will not tolerate any private interference without control on its part."⁸⁴ In this connection Dia wrote: "Our way to development leads also to community-centred socialism; to a socialism not of coercion, but of solidarity, of free adhesion and free cooperation."⁸⁵ Therefore, the "vil-

lage cooperative", is proclaimed as the basic unit of development.⁸⁶

Typically, while stressing that Africans do not intend to mimick capitalism Senghor makes a reservation: "in its nineteenth-century form, at least".⁸⁷ Senegalese populists rejected capitalism only in its *laissez-faire* version (more in theory than in practice, at that). Senghor, for instance, resolutely opposed any form of nationalization of private capital, foreign capital included: to do this would mean "killing the goose that lays the golden eggs".⁸⁸ In Senghor's opinion, modern capitalism, with its tendency towards rationalizing and planning production, does not jeopardize the aims of Senegalese socialism and can be integrated in the process of national development.⁸⁹ Of course, this may be impeded and is being impeded by social differentiation and the emergence of social hierarchy in Senegal, but, in Senghor's opinion, this can be made up for by the traditional "communitarian spirit": African society used to be hierarchical but the inequality was always smoothed out through traditional collective discussion and decision-making.⁹⁰

Senegalese ideologists maintain that the kind of socialism they advocate constitutes a "third road", that is one lying between capitalism and communism. In fact, the concept of "lyrical socialism" propagated by Senghor and other Senegalese ideologists is a combination of "back-to-the-soil" petty-bourgeois-populist slogans with bourgeois-reformist ideological tendencies typical of European Social-Democracy. It is no accident, therefore, that Senghor himself draws a parallel between the social concept he elaborated and "the old ethical trend of the French socialists" from Saint-Simon to Léon Blum. The ideological functions of these theories, as the bourgeois scientists themselves see it, consist in maintaining "a policy of evolutionary moderation".⁹¹

A bourgeois-reformist focus and a drive for capitalist modernization are among the important factors determining the activity of Senegalese leaders. Senegal, once one of the most Frenchified colonies, still keeps its doors wide open to neo-colonialism. For instance, in 1973, foreign (mostly French) monopolies controlled 80 per cent of the modern sector of the national economy, while national projects were 75 per cent financed from foreign investment.⁹²

The government seeks to translate its populist aspirations into efforts to promote the cooperative movement which is considered to be "the bulwark of African socialism". N. S. Illarionov, a Soviet expert in African studies, assesses these and similar efforts as an attempt to implement, at least to a degree, the government's ideological postulate, or else, "as an unsuccessful attempt to exceed the limits of bourgeois reformism".⁹³ Indeed, the successes scored by Senegalese cooperatives are negligible: the gradual process of capitalist accumulation is accompanied by the stratification of the peasantry and the emergence of a well-to-do stratum; at the same time, the traditional aristocracy has retained its positions and continues to enjoy authority.

On the whole, there is enough reason to reckon the ideology and policy of "Senegalese socialism" among the right-wing populist phenomena. The discrepancies between ideology and policy in this case should not be taken to be an outcome of the efforts made by the leaders to disguise the true nature of their ideological objectives. The intrinsic logic of ideology stimulated the Senegalese leaders, especially at the early stages of their activity, to elaborate on such fundamental principles of populism as "peasantophilia", a heavy reliance on the traditions, the criticism of capitalism, and a drive to institute "cooperative socialism". At the same time, by virtue of certain circumstances, the Senegalese ideologists' outlook has since the very start been dominated by strong bourgeois tendencies inherent in any populist trend. Gradually, these tendencies took on strong reformist colouring and gained priority over populist egalitarianism and "peasant socialism".

Tanzania. In recent years, the attention of researchers concerned with the developing world has been riveted on this small African country. The well-known African politologist Ali Mazrui diagnosed a kind of "Tanzaphilia" in the authors of the scientific and political literature on the subject.⁹⁴ The interest in Tanzania has largely been sustained by the country's singular experiment in non-capitalist development ("ujamaa") and the extremely well-structured social doctrine propounded by Julius Nyerere, the country's long-time president and chief ideologist. In his numerous books and speeches Nyerere put forth one of the most consistent populist type concepts. In this respect,

his works can be ranked among those by Herzen, Mikhailovsky and Gandhi. Structurally, his views pertain to P_n , although some of them are congenial to P_l and P_r .

In the literature on the matter Nyerere is recognized as the leading figure among the proponents of "African socialism" in terms of both the degree of systematization revealed by his ideological concept and the persistent character of the socio-political course which he pursues in keeping with the proclaimed ideological principles. Ideologically, Nyerere's doctrine shares its origin with the concepts advanced by other proponents of "African socialism". Common to all of them is hailing African communal traditions and contrasting them to colonialism and capitalism which, having intruded in Africa, eroded the values and institutions inherent in African civilization. But, what is especially characteristic of Nyerere is his keen resentment of the capitalist system of exploitation as a whole. "There must be something wrong in a society," he wrote, "where one man, however hard-working or clever he may be, can acquire as great a 'reward' as a thousand of his fellows can acquire between them."⁹⁵ This can only be accounted for by the monstrous one-sidedness of bourgeois society in which the criterion of any activity "is whether [it] will yield a monetary profit, or power, or prestige to them as owners of the land or capital. The needs of mankind are secondary, if they are considered at all."⁹⁶

It should be noted that Nyerere's criticism is spearheaded at modern state-monopoly capitalism, under which power and wealth are concentrated in the hands of the few. In this oversized organism, he maintains, the inherent capitalist vices become especially pronounced and this predestines imperialism's lack of prospects. Nyerere compares imperialism and colonialist racism with an enormous prehistoric beast: "... their teeth were so big, or their bodies so heavy, that they could not adapt to changing circumstances and they died out. I am convinced that, in the history of the human race, imperialists and racialists will also become extinct."⁹⁷

Nyerere stresses that capitalism differs radically from traditional African society based on communal ownership of land and means of production, egalitarianism, mutual assistance and cooperation which ensure social balance. The division of labour in pre-colonial Africa "was always on

the basis of the fact that every member of the family had to have enough to eat, some simple covering, and a place to sleep, before any of them (even the head of the family) had anything extra".⁹⁸ Such a social system, for all its apparent simplicity, carried much wisdom, which should be duly appreciated.

However, Nyerere is by no means a retrograde traditionalist. He does not shut his eyes to the disadvantages of traditional society: low level of production, the narrow outlook and prejudices of a communal farmer, the dependent status of the African woman, etc. As Nyerere sees it, accelerated modernization of the country is vital both for raising the living standard of the population and for meeting the challenge of the competition from other countries, which has become so bitter in the 20th century. Therefore, one ought not to pin all his hopes on patriarchal virtues: respect for the past "does not mean that we have in any way accepted our present poverty. On the contrary, the Arusha Declaration calls for a tremendous human effort for change".⁹⁹ It is vital to skillfully combine the most valuable elements of the traditional heritage with the achievements of modern civilization which will provide "the knowledge and the instruments necessary for the defeat of the poverty".¹⁰⁰

The poverty in traditional society had two reasons behind it: "The first was ignorance, and the second was the scale of operations. Both of these can be corrected without affecting the validity and applicability of the three principles of mutual respect, sharing of joint production and work by all. These principles were, and are, the foundation of human security, of real practical human equality, and of peace between members of a society. They can also be a basis of economic development if modern knowledge and modern techniques of production are used."¹⁰¹ However, before embarking upon modernization one should choose a way to approach it. Without confining himself to general criticism of capitalism as a social system, Nyerere seeks to substantiate, in concrete terms, the unsuitability of the capitalist road for the developing countries. Today, he believed, economic development calls for a much more substantial initial investment and technical potential than during the European industrial revolution of the 18th century. In this connection, Nyerere says, the following questions arise: "First, where in our lands are those citizens

who have sufficient capital to establish modern industry; and second, how would our infant industries fight other capitalist enterprises?"¹⁰² Therefore, the best the emergent bourgeoisie in the developing countries can hope is "to become agents of international capitalist concerns".

Although the capitalist road of development holds no prospect for African states, this does not mean that it is altogether ruled out. This is why Nyerere warns against the danger of Africa's "going bourgeois". He notes that "individual landownership" started to develop under colonial rule. The fact that Africa still has a certain surplus of land is no guarantee against the rural masses being rendered landless. "On the contrary, as land becomes more scarce we shall find ourselves with a farmers' class and a labourers' class... They will become a 'rural proletariat' depending on the decisions of other men."¹⁰³ Therefore, Nyerere concludes that "if the standard capitalist development takes place widely over the country, we may get a good statistical increase in the national wealth of Tanzania, but the masses of the people will not necessarily be better off."¹⁰⁴

Nyerere also takes note of the chaotic migration of the rural poor to towns, where, along with certain comforts and opportunities, they will face "the ever-present threat of unemployment, and consequent real hunger in the midst of apparent wealth". The attendant evils, Nyerere says, "can be excluded from life in the rural areas if this is based on the traditional principles of African society". Therefore, he thinks that urbanization should be regulated in such a way as to gradually secure the advantages of urban life for the village, too, rather than stimulate an uncontrolled growth of the town.¹⁰⁵

Thus, the task is to by-pass the capitalist stage and to embark on a socialist development strategy. The importance of this for the young states is determined by their own vital interests and needs: "Our present poverty and national weakness make socialism the only rational choice for us." Moreover, socialism as a social system offers economic, organisational and political advantages over capitalism: under it, economic organization takes into account the needs of the people; government is exercised by the people through their own elected bodies; private ownership and acute social differentiation are non-existent.¹⁰⁶ Lastly, only socialism can make it possible to utilize, in the process of

modernization, traditional collectivist values and institutions which have much in common with socialist ones.

Nyerere opposed bourgeois ideologists who accentuated the drawbacks of socialism, its "inefficiency", etc. He wrote: "I do not accept that the so-called unworkability of socialism has been proved. Capitalism has been developing for about two centuries. The first national commitment to socialism was made in 1917, by a backward feudal nation devastated by war, which has subsequently suffered greatly from further civil war and international conflict. Even so, few people would deny the material transformation which has been effected in the USSR during the past [65] years."¹⁰⁷

Nyerere calls for a scientific approach to socialism, stressing that "socialism is not Utopian. Nor is it unaware that men are unequal in their capacities. On the contrary, it is based on the facts of human nature. It is a doctrine which accepts mankind as it is, and demands such an organization of society that man's inequalities are put to the service of his equality."¹⁰⁸ The socialist should combine sober-mindedness with creative search, which presupposes taking into consideration the specific conditions under which socialism is being built or prerequisites for it are being created. It is also important for the socialist "to think out for himself the best way of achieving desired ends under the conditions which exist now".¹⁰⁹ The conditions obtaining in the developing countries are largely affected by the vestiges of colonialism—the imported elements of capitalism and the existence of capitalist "enclaves"—as well as by the Third World's dependence on the world capitalist market. It takes time to eliminate all this. "We shall not create socialist societies overnight," wrote Nyerere, "because we have to start from where we are, we shall have to take risks in our development. But I am convinced that Third World countries have the power to transform themselves, over time, into socialist societies in which their peoples can live in harmony and cooperation as they work together for their common benefit."¹¹⁰

Another peculiarity of the developing countries, especially in Africa, lies, according to Nyerere, in their having retained communal traditions and collectivist values. Nyerere stresses the importance for the Tanzanians "to make sure that this socialist attitude of mind is not lost through the temptations to personal gain".¹¹¹ I have already mentioned Nyerere's ambivalent attitude to traditions, his de-

nouncing the narrowness and technical backwardness which they involve, etc. and which should be overcome in the course of non-capitalist development. At the same time, Nyerere believes that traditions secure "advantages of backwardness", among them the happy fact that Africa has not yet been swept by class struggles. European socialism, in his opinion, has been an outcome of the agrarian and the industrial revolutions. While the former produced "landed" and "landless" classes, the latter resulted in the emergence of the capitalist class and the industrial proletariat. As for "African socialism," Nyerere writes, it "did not have the 'benefit' of the Agrarian Revolution or the Industrial Revolution. It did not start from the existence of conflicting 'classes' in society."¹¹² Consequently, African socialists can and must seek to avoid class struggle.

All this, in Nyerere's opinion, constitutes a specific feature of "African socialism" opposed to "capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man."¹¹³

Arguing in favour of "the advantages of backwardness", Nyerere maintains that building socialism in emergent independent states involves tremendous difficulties: universal poverty, scarcity of means, a lack of qualified cadre, illiteracy, and the like. "But these same difficulties," writes Nyerere, "also provide unique opportunities." The difficulties make it imperative to recognize the primacy of "the human factor" and "human respect". "And the absence of large financial resources—once it is understood and accepted—forces a concentration on ... the importance of men rather than money, and thus orientates the society towards the development of man instead of material wealth."¹¹⁴

The above is an illustration to a determinative characteristic feature of Nyerere's populist socialism—its "human", ethical focus. It is no accident that at the very beginning of his activity, right after Tanzania's attainment of independence, Nyerere urged to mould "national ethic" without which, in his view, all constitutions, forms of government, and political institutions are meaningless. As he put it, "If the people do not have that kind of ethic, it does not matter what kind of constitution you frame. They can always be victims of tyranny." Public opinion should

be moulded in such a way as to enable people to say: "I have the power to do this under constitution, but I cannot do it, it is un-Tanganyikan."¹¹⁵ According to Nyerere, national cultural traditions should guarantee the establishment of moral principles in society. Hence his definition of socialism as "a frame of mind".

In his "ethical" interpretation of socialism Nyerere relies, to a certain degree, on religion, too. His attitude to religion, just as to any tradition, is ambivalent. For instance, he recognizes that religion may often become "a kind of opium of the people".¹¹⁶ At the same time, he stresses that there are certain aspects in religion which permit its alliance with the revolutionary forces. In this connection Nyerere writes: "It is the institution of the Church, through its members, which should be leading the attack on any organisation, or any economic, social, or political structure which oppresses men, and which denies to them the right and power to live as the sons of a loving God."¹¹⁷ While distinguishing between religion and socialism, he stresses that "the fact that socialism and religion are two different things does not mean that socialism is anti-religious".¹¹⁸

Priority given to ethical principles and the "human factor", the assertion that "the purpose of development is man" are the cornerstones of Nyerere's concept of non-capitalist development. Socialist collectivism injects meaning into man's life because "the very purpose of society—its reason for existence—is and must be the individual man, his growth, his health, his security, his dignity, and, therefore, his happiness".^{119-119a} Hence the necessity to check slogans and development plans against the actual needs and requirements of the people. Regarding socialism as a system best suited for the developing countries economically, Nyerere warns against proclaiming economic efficiency the basic principle of socialism. He says: "Seeking for the most efficient agricultural system, it is very easy to forget that the very purpose of that efficiency is the service of the people."¹²⁰ He believes that "social and political development must go alongside economic development—or even precede it".¹²¹ According to Nyerere, the disregard of "the human factor" is the reason behind the errors in the political and economic activity of the Tanzanian government: "What we were doing, in fact, was thinking of development in terms of things, and not of people.. The people were sec-

ondary; the first priority was output. As a result, there have been very many cases where heavy capital investment has resulted in no increase in output."¹²² In other words, a one-sided, economic approach disregarding people's interests and needs failed to yield satisfactory economic results.

Nyerere attaches great importance not only to the institutional but also to the ideological and socio-psychological aspects of political and socio-economic processes in society. He lays emphasis on taking care, in the course of national development, that public opinion and ideological climate would be based on humane and moral principles. "It does not mean", he explained, "that institutions and organizations are irrelevant. It means that without the correct attitudes institutions can be subverted from their true purpose."¹²³

Characteristic in this respect is Nyerere's view of the role of violence in a national liberation revolution and in the course of transition to the socialist path of development. "A violent revolution", Nyerere writes, "may make the introduction of socialist *institutions* easier; it makes more difficult the development of the socialist *attitudes* which give life to these institutions." By no means does he believe that "violent revolutions are always wrong or irrelevant to socialism". He explains: "Sometimes they are a regrettable necessity because they are the only way to break the power of those who prevent progress towards socialism." However, a radical approach to social conflict involves other difficulties, because, "violence is a short cut only to the destruction of the institutions and power groups of the old society; they are not a short cut to the building of the new... The necessity for a violent revolution brings its own problems to the building of socialism; they may be different problems from those experienced by the states which are fortunate enough to be able to move peacefully from one kind of social system to another."¹²⁴

Nyerere holds that the post-revolutionary advance towards socialism "cannot result from force... By orders, or even by slavery, you can build pyramids and magnificent roads, you can achieve expanded acreages of cultivation, and increases in the quantity of goods produced in your factories. All these things, and many more, can be achieved through the use of force; but none of them result in the development of people. Force, and deceitful promises, can, in fact, only achieve short-term material goals."¹²⁵

Accordingly, Nyerere opposes left-wing radicalism and revolutionary extremism in the national liberation movement: "In fact those who talk as if violence must always and everywhere precede socialism, and who judge a country to be developing towards socialism only if violence has occurred, are almost certainly not socialist in their own attitudes."¹²⁶ This rings of the ideas formulated by Gandhi, Kaunda, and other populists. In Nyerere's views one may discern, along with quite realistic assertions, a streak of populist utopianism, such as the belief in the possibility of "sterile" revolution. There can be no doubt that Nyerere's outlook reflected the specificity of the Tanzanian context: independence attained by peaceful means, the absence of bitter social and ethnic conflicts, etc.

An important section of Nyerere's social doctrine is concerned with the relationships between the elite (leaders, professionals, intellectuals) and the working masses. Nyerere advocates the idea of the necessity of the educated people's "service to the people". The previous chapter cited what he said on the duty of the educated few to awaken and assist the masses. At the stage of political independence, when educated people direct the process of national construction, they should never forget that they are the servants of the working masses: "For servants they must be. And servants have no rights which are superior to those of their masters; they have more duties, but no more privileges or rights and the masters of, we educated people are, and must be, the masses of the people."¹²⁷

In Nyerere's works the tenet on the primacy of the people does not look mere "worship of the people", often met in the writings of some populists. This assertion is closely linked to his understanding of the essence of socialism and its institutions. "The people must be, and must know themselves to be, sovereign," Nyerere wrote. "If the people are not involved in public ownership, and cannot control the policies followed, the public ownership can lead to fascism, not socialism. If the people are not sovereign, then they can suffer under dreadful tyranny imposed in their name."¹²⁸

At the same time, Nyerere does not shut his eyes to the dialectic and intricate nature of the problem. He writes: "This is a technological age, and many decisions cannot be taken directly by the masses. Tremendous responsibilities therefore rest upon those of us who have had the privilege of higher education." Realizing these responsibilities

leads to understanding that "our education does not give us rights over the people".¹²⁸

To be sure, the difficulties involved in establishing effective contacts between the elite and the masses are pronounced in the developing countries, particularly in Tanzania. This is accounted for by the low cultural level of the masses, the scarcity of educated people, and the elitist-corporate sentiment of the latter. "With few socialists", Nyerere writes "we are trying to build socialism; with few people conscious of the basic requirements of democracy we are trying to achieve change by democratic means; with few technicians we are trying to effect a fundamental transformation of our economy. And with an educational *élite* whose whole teaching encouraged motifs of individualistic advancement, we are trying to create an egalitarian society!"¹³⁰

It does not follow, however, that Nyerere questions the right of the educated elite to leadership, provided it is aware of its task and interprets its commitment to the people correctly. Nyerere stresses the essential role of the intelligentsia in a developing society. "Graduates in the developed societies," he writes, "do not have such opportunities as we have in Africa, and such social satisfactions as we have."¹³¹

The necessary subjective and objective conditions, Nyerere maintains, are to be created in order to ensure the right relationship between the leaders and the masses. Above all, the leaders should realize that they must not place themselves above the masses, politically, materially and morally, and overemphasize their leader's functions. To be sure, "educated people can give a lead—and should do so. They can show what can be done, and how. But they can only succeed in effecting changes in the society if they work from a position within the society... In order to do this the educated people of Africa have to identify themselves with the uneducated, and do so without reservation."¹³²

Overemphasizing the guiding role of the educated elite is intolerable not only for moral reasons but also because it is far from being conducive to reaching the main goal of national construction, the development of the masses. A person cannot develop himself if he only follows the instructions of a more educated individual without understanding the goals they are intended to favour: "for real development means the development, the growth, of people. Every country of Africa can show examples of modern

facilities which have been provided for the people—and which are now rotting unused.”¹³³

Therefore, the building of a socialist society calls for a “feedback” between the leaders and the masses. This implies strict observance of democratic standards as well as a full-scale political participation of the masses in public life. Nyerere explains that in the process “the people will have begun to develop themselves as dignified and confident human beings, in a way which is impossible if they simply take orders from someone else. The fact that orders of an ‘expert’ may have led to greater output of a crop if they were fully carried out, does not affect this issue. By debating this matter and then deciding for themselves, the people will be doing real development of themselves.”¹³⁴

This rings of Fanon’s ideas of the importance of people’s self-government and of the unnecessary fear of the temporary difficulties and problems involved. For instance, according to Nyerere, the peasants united in cooperatives should be entitled to elect and recall their leaders. Sometimes they may underestimate the advice of some expert. Assume, says Nyerere, that peasants do not take heed of what an economist suggests to do to secure advantages in the remote future. They may, therefore, recall their leaders, who in their opinion, do not contribute to the rapid economic development of the village. By doing so, the peasants would commit a mistake. But this does not matter. The important thing is that in the future, too, they would go on enjoying their right to choose other leaders.¹³⁵ Possible errors of the management “from below” will be made up for as the activity of the peasant masses grows and they vigorously contribute to the development of socialist co-operation.

The principles of social and political construction elaborated by Nyerere lay groundwork for the *ujamaa* project, under which numerous cooperative villages were to be set up, according to the main goal of Tanzania’s development strategy. “Ujamaa” is a Swahili term to denote relations in the traditional African clan commune, based on equality, mutual respect, participation of each and all in work and collective control over the land and the distribution of the products of labour. This is how Nyerere describes the life in the *ujamaa* villages: “Most of our farming will be done by groups of people who live as a community and work as a community. They would live together in a village; they would

farm together; market together; and undertake the provision of local services and small local requirements as a community. Their community would be the traditional family group, or any other group of people living according to ujamaa principles, large enough to take account of modern methods and the 20th century needs of man."¹³⁶

Characteristically, the transition to the *ujamaa* policy, (which occurred some time after the attainment of independence) was dictated by populist motives: Nyerere's and his followers concern about the country "going bourgeois", growing class differentiation, and the exacerbation of social conflict since the early 1960s. In 1967, Nyerere made a declaration to the effect that what had been happening in the past few years contradicted the country's goals. He said that they were not so much extending and modernizing the traditional family system, as destroying it in the interest of small-scale capitalist farmer economy. Many of the most dynamic and vigorous farmers ... are extending their economy not through uniting with their neighbours on the basis of equality, but by using hired labour. Thus, what is observed is the development of the agricultural proletariat, on the one hand, and of a wealthy exploiter class, on the other.¹³⁷

Ujamaa was expected to be a flexible form of peasant cooperation allowing various combinations of personal and collective interests, and aimed at reaching a number of goals. Moving the peasants to more fertile land, enlarging the villages and increasing the areas to which collective labour can be applied, replacing outdated methods of farming by modern ones—all that was to secure, in due time, a higher productivity of labour in agriculture, a rise in the living standard of the bulk of the working population, especially in the countryside, and meeting the economic requirements of the country as a whole. At the same time, the principles of democratism, initiative and self-government in *ujamaa* were to transform these villages into schools of political, organizational, and cultural education of the masses, and to develop them into a reliable basis of the socialist regime. Lastly, preserving and multiplying the traditions of collectivism, mutual assistance and respect were expected to promote socialist relations and moral standards. Moreover, the Tanzanian leaders, just as Zambian leaders, believed that *ujamaa* would be instrumental in transforming traditional institutions, since moving peas-

ants to new places and their life in larger communes were expected to change the former traditional relations and overcome the clan narrowness of the old village.

In analyzing the activity of the Tanzanian leaders in the last decade one cannot overlook the regime's vigorous drive for implementing the ideologico-political and socio-economic programmes they had charted, especially following the Arusha Declaration. The policy of the Tanzanian leaders is aimed at restricting bourgeois elements by nationalizing industrial enterprises, limiting officials' income, and involving the masses in political life. The government carried out a series of democratic measures, such as the decentralization of management and strengthening the ruling party's ties with the masses. The *ujamaa* movement scored impressive successes: in 1977 there were 7,684 villages with a population of more than 13,000,000 (i.e. the overwhelming majority of the country's population).¹³⁸ Many bourgeois authors note the serious progressive change effected in the country. For instance, the American researcher Joel Samoff believes that Tanzania "has begun to institutionalize a fundamental transformation of its society. In the crucible of its efforts to do that it ... has encouraged others to seize the initiative."¹³⁹

The drive for non-capitalist development in Tanzania is grounded on a dual strategy: apart from the public and co-operative sectors, there is a private sector, consisting, predominantly, of small-scale farmers producing export crops, such as coffee, tobacco, and seasal. The researchers note the existence and even the growth of a bourgeois stratum in Tanzania which counteracts the *ujamaa* policy, especially in the village.¹⁴⁰⁻¹⁴¹

The *ujamaa* movement has faced serious difficulties: low productivity of labour, limited output, and, often, a formal character of the newly established villages. In this respect, the Tanzanian example is illustrative of the difficulties which are bound to accompany large-scale social transformation. To some extent, these problems can be accounted for by the development level and social psychology of the peasantry (backward methods in production, their unwillingness to part with their personal property, the fear of forfeiting their customary life style), as well as by the attitudes of the leaders (the drive for unwarranted acceleration of cooperation, a lack of organizational and technological experience).

Obviously, the shortcomings of the Tanzanian cooperative practice in and of themselves should not be taken to prove the unworkability of the *ujamaa* programme: large-scale revamping of social structures are bound to involve a temporary drop in economic indices, various errors and excesses in economic, political and cultural areas. In principle, these shortcomings can be identified and remedied in transit. The future will show whether Tanzania will succeed in doing so. In any event, the Tanzanian experiment is a major landmark in the history of populist thought and social policy.

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I have confined myself to describing only some of the populist trends in Africa, a continent which today has the greatest number of populist thinkers and ideological trends. Apart from the ideology of the Algerian National Liberation Front, the most prominent among them are: the ideology of "Zambian humanism" advanced by Kenneth Kaunda; the ideology and programme of the Democratic Party of Guinea, headed by Sékou Touré; the populist trends of the 1960s in Mali, represented by Modibo Keita, and Seydou Kouyate; the theory of "consciencism" elaborated by Kwame Nkrumah; and the ideology of "the third road" formulated by Muammar Quadhafi, I have named only the major social trends, many of which enjoy the status of official ideologies, and only a few thinkers. African populist trends are of diverse political orientation, they may be revolutionary or bourgeois-reformist in nature. Some of them belong to the past, others continue to function. However, there can be no doubt that there are many pages yet to be added to the history of populism in Africa.¹⁴²

5. "RURAL" POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA (THE 1920s-1970s)

In Latin America "ideological" populism of the type discussed in this book is represented by various concepts of "Indianism" widespread in countries with a high percentage of Indian population, such as Guatemala, Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. As for such trends as Peronism in Argentina, or the ideology of the Getulio Dornelles

Vargas government in Brazil they are, rather, a variety of political culture.

Essentially, "Indianism" is "an ideological dichotomy: ideals of modernization versus autochthonous values found in many developing countries of Asia and Africa".¹ Accordingly, the ideology of "Indianism" has two main variants: a more traditionalist one, based on the idealization of communal relations obtaining in the Indian village, and the more "modern", nationalist one, stemming from the outlook prevailing among the petty bourgeoisie. However, as it often happens to populist trends, neither of the varieties is purely traditionalist or purely modernist: modernism and traditionalism, mixed in various proportions, are present in both ideological varieties of "Indianism". Moreover, "Indianism", as a rule, exceeds the limits of the Indian problem proper and acquires a vivid social focus, combining democratic anti-latifundista slogans with anti-capitalist aspirations.

Mexico. Characteristic in this respect are the populist ideological tendencies in Mexico which since the very outset have been agrarian by nature. The history of populism here begins with the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1910-1917, during which peasants led by Emiliano Zapata and Francisco (Pancho) Villa took up arms to demand the return of communal lands. Characteristically, peasant uprisings were widespread in the regions where Indian communal traditions were especially strong. It should be noted, that in those years the entire revolutionary movement in Mexico was engendered by "neo-feudalism", a social context which is usually conducive to the emergence of populist ideological tendencies. To quote A. F. Shulgovsky, neo-feudalism combined "the brutality and barbarity of traditional feudalism with the predatoriness of capitalism".²

The demands advanced by the peasantry were to a certain extent reflected in the country's constitution adopted by the Queretaro Congress in 1917. Ideologically, the anti-latifundista struggle "was often embodied in the effort to protect the autochthonous Indian forms of landownership as opposed to the imported European principles of absolute private ownership. The progressive drive to do away with latifundism and solve the agrarian problem in the interest of the peasant masses was given a Narodnik colouring."³ Among the proponents of these ideas was Molina Enríquez

who urged to nationalize land and hand it over to the communes.

Populist ideas were expounded in the works by the publicists Alfonso Reyes, Antonio Caso, Manuel Gamio and especially in the writings by the philosopher José Vasconcelos, whose ideology is usually referred to as Mexicanism (Mexicanidad). José Vasconcelos extolled "the cosmic race" of the Mexican metis who had preserved the traditional Indian collectivist values. The representatives of Mexicanism initiated a broad culture-mongering campaign among the Indians (in the 1920s Vasconcelas was Minister of Education).⁴

It was in this period that the *ejido* problem was formulated. Proclaimed the heir of the pre-Columbian Indian commune (*kalpuli*), the *ejido* differed from the latter in that its internal relationships and structure were, in large measure, determined and regulated by the state. The state distributed tracts of land among groups of peasants who were entitled to restricted ownership of the land, without having the right either to sell it or to let it fall to desolation: if the plot was not tilled twice a year, it was taken away from the group. The *ejido* was headed by three commissars and a council of observers elected by a general meeting. This pattern was to be preserved in subsequent years.

However, in the 1920s the *ejido* project failed to score any impressive success. Latifundistas still dominated the agricultural picture. By the end of the decade, large estates of over 1,000 hectares each, accounted for 83 per cent of all cultivated land. The size of the plots owned by peasant families united in *ejidos* varied from 2 to 4 hectares.⁵ In its agrarian policy, the regime of "revolutionary caudilism" headed by Plutarco Elias Calles, gave priority to fostering individual privately-owned holdings and promoting the emergence of a well-to-do village stratum. It was under President Calles that the law on parcelling out and putting land into peasant private ownership was forged.⁶ The regime's pro-bourgeois line was opposed by the broad peasant masses. In the late 1920s, the country was again swept by a peasant movement. A National Peasant League set up in those years adopted the slogan of the revolution of the 1910s, "land and freedom". In 1924, another peasant organization, the League of Agrarian Communes of the State of Veracruz (Liga de las Comunidades Agrarias del Estado de Veracruz), issued a brochure containing its agrarian programme.

Little by little, the ideology of "agrarianism", which was to become the banner of the left in the ruling National Revolutionary Party, took shape. Coming out against the latifundistas, the agrarianists advocated communal land-ownership. Narciso Bassols, a prominent representative of this trend, in his brochure *All the Land to the Peasants—Immediately*, published in 1928, maintained that the peasantry constituted the basic force of Mexican society. He demanded to eliminate latifundios and distribute the land within the framework of communal organizations on an egalitarian principle. Gilberto Fabila, another ideologist of agrarianism, deemed it necessary to "adopt once and for ever the principles of land socialization", namely, to abolish large landownership and distribute all land according to the "work stint" which, in his opinion, could facilitate the eradication of exploitation in the countryside, and to give priority to the communal form of landownership.⁷

On the whole, the programmes of the Mexican progressive-minded bourgeoisie and intelligentsia were strongly reminiscent of the agrarian programmes advanced by Russian Narodniks. They, just as their Russian predecessors, displayed various ideological tendencies, and combined elements of P_l (radical anti-latifundism and elements of etatism), and P_r (a drive for non-capitalist transformation within the framework of the bourgeois system).

At the same time, the ideology of agrarianism was largely influenced by the experience of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the collectivization campaign in the USSR. Alberto Bremauntz, a Mexican revolutionary-democrat, wrote: "In Mexico, the popular masses were impressed by the victory and the creative activity of the Russian Revolution more than in any other country in the world. As a result, socialist ideas acquired still greater popularity and influence and the number of their adherents among the intelligentsia and the working people grew."⁸

In the early 1930s, the country's democratic forces started to group around the prominent democratic public figure Lázaro Cárdenas, the future Mexican President (1934-1940). During the pre-election campaign, he travelled widely about the country and spoke at mass meetings. In his speeches Cárdenas emphasized that the working people did not get what they had fought for during the revolution and that the Indian population lived in dire conditions. He said: "I shall hand the Mauser, with which the revolution was

effected, back to the peasantry. They will use it to defend the revolution, the *ejido*, the school."⁹

Under the Cárdenas government, a series of far-reaching democratic and anti-imperialist social reforms were carried out. Among them was the organization of a cooperative sector, the institution of "workers' self-government" in industry, the nationalization of railroads, the establishment of control over the private capitalist sector through the policy of regulating the prices of foodstuffs and consumer goods, and the democratization of the education system. The nationalization of the oil industry, a historic victory of the Mexican people, dealt a heavy blow at US and British-Dutch monopolies.

The activity of Cárdenas and his followers was clearly anti-capitalist. Headed by Cárdenas, the democratic circles came out against the bourgeois ideologists advocating a course towards "capitalist progress". Cárdenas described the Mexican big bourgeoisie as a product of the dependent capitalism of a developing country and stressed that "the creation of our own economy will liberate us from this variety of capitalism, which threatens the nation in the hard times rather than benefits it. In the final analysis, what it leaves us is only barren land, exhausted depths, miserable wages and hardships which cause public unrest."¹⁰ Upon coming into office, President Cárdenas declared that the main goal of the Mexican revolution was to create a social system where "the principles of individualism give way to an economy displaying pronounced socialist tendencies".¹¹

Characteristically, President Cárdenas' followers devoted much attention to class struggle. The official newspaper *El Nacional* wrote: "In accordance with its doctrine, the government recognizes the existence of permanent class struggle. In the face of this struggle, it acts as a force guiding the underprivileged part of society, namely the working people, and ensures their rights."¹² The militant democratism of the Cárdenas regime was repeatedly proved in practice. At the same time, in keeping with the populist ideological tendencies, the government-sponsored pressmen expressed their hopes that the class struggle would be made less acute through the action of the state whose function, in their opinion, was "supra-class".¹³

Agrarian reforms were the pivot of the activity of Mexican revolutionary-democrats and the Cárdenas government. These reforms had a double goal: to eliminate latifundism

and create a large-scale *ejido*-dominated sector in agriculture. The communal peasant, member of the *ejido*, was proclaimed the central figure of the Mexican village.

Cárdenas and his followers opposed the parcelling out of the land, even within the *ejido* framework, and came out in favour of strengthening collectivist, "social" elements. They regarded the *ejido* as the basis for subsequent development of a cooperative movement. On this issue, they tended to resort to the collectivist communal traditions in Mexico and to the values of "the national spirit". Cárdenas' followers, the agrarianists, believed that the country was returning to Indian agrarian collectivism enriched by the achievements of modern science and technology.¹⁴ Molina Enríquez was among the most active proponents of this view. This typically populist ideological tendency became widespread in Mexico in the 1930s. Government publications repeatedly pointed out that the *ejido* "as an institution ... is peculiar to Mexico alone, and is not based on any theory imported from abroad",¹⁵ and that owing to the collectivist principles inherent in the *ejido* Mexico would be able to advance along its own road of development.

In this connection, A. F. Shulgovsky points out that "agrarianism, an ideological and political trend in Mexico, combined sufficiently pronounced features of 'peasant socialism' with the ideas of agrarian democratism".¹⁶ The prevailing democratic principles of Mexican populism added to the determination and consistency shown by Cárdenas and his followers in their practical activity. The agrarian reforms yielded striking results. Within a few years, the Cárdenas regime managed to deal a series of deadly blows at latifundism and the vestiges of feudalism in the Mexican village and to redistribute large areas of land in favour of the broad peasant masses, according to the *ejido* principles. While in 1930 the peasants united in the *ejidos* accounted for only 15 per cent of the able-bodied Mexican population, in 1940, subsequent to the Cárdenas reforms, they accounted for 41.8 per cent.¹⁷ In carrying out the reforms the regime had to overcome bitter resistance of large landowners and the bourgeoisie. The successes scored by the government are explained by the fact that it succeeded in stirring up the peasant masses to active political life and in organizing them (for instance, through setting up

peasant detachments) to participate in effecting agrarian reforms.

The Soviet experience in setting up collective farms had a certain impact on creating the *ejido* sector in Mexico. Some of the Mexican theorists and economists, among them Treviño Roberto Martínez and González Aparicio, urged to transform the *ejidos* into producers cooperatives so that they could form "an integral collectivist system".¹⁸ On the whole, however, the efforts to set up producers cooperatives failed to yield any impressive result. Basically, the *ejidos* remained nothing more than associations uniting independent landowners who, although they pooled their efforts to solve certain social or economic problems, ran their own individual holdings. Moreover, the private capitalist sector which coexisted with the *ejido* sector was thriving. When Cárdenas had relinquished his post, the interest in the *ejido* project waned, while the private capitalist sector started to be given more and more priority.

Nonetheless, the social gains registered under the Cárdenas government were enormous and are still of great importance for Mexico. The government has made effort to promote the *ejido* sector by allotting additional land to the peasants united in *ejidos*, rendering financial assistance and granting credit privileges to them, undertaking irrigation projects, etc. To a certain extent, the *ejido* remains the ideal of the country's progressive circles. This is made obvious by the works of contemporary Mexican economists who think highly of the Cárdenas reforms and urge to promote the *ejido* cooperative principles.¹⁹ In the 1970s, the revolutionary ideas of the 1910s-1930s continued to enjoy popularity with left-wing intellectuals and students.²⁰

Analysis of Mexican agrarianists' activity corroborates Lenin's idea that the implementation of the Narodnik revolutionary ideals may objectively develop into a democratic process of paving the way for capitalism, into the "American" road of agrarian revolution. It goes without saying that Mexico followed its own pattern of democratic reform. The nationalization and allocation of land to cooperative associations covered only a part, although a significant one, of the rural population. However, this process gave a powerful impetus to the development of national capitalism. By undermining the system of large landownership and mitigating, through establishing the *ejido* sector, social contradictions and disproportions of "belated" capi-

talism, the social reforms effected under the Cárdenas government promoted growth of the private capitalist sector in agriculture and the development of Mexican capitalism as a whole. Such was the objective result of the policy of agrarianism.

Peru. The populist tendencies inherent in Latin American Indianism are well illustrated by the activities and writings of its representatives in Peru. Manuel González Prada (1848-1918), a prominent Peruvian thinker, instigated the development of the Peruvian trend of populist "Indianism" by his efforts to tackle the Indian issue and urging a radical solution to the agrarian problem in favour of the communal peasant. He emphasized the "social value" of the economic and cultural traditions of the Kechua and Almara Indians²¹ and maintained that it was Indians who constituted the core of the nation.

The followers of González Prada, Manuel Vicente Villaran, C. Herald, Pedro S. Zulen, Dora Mayer and others, vigorously propagated his ideas. In 1909, they founded the so-called Pro-Indian Association (La Asociación Pro-Indígena). Some of them, for instance, Hildebrando Castro Pozo and Carlos Véldez de la Torre, just as Russian Narodniks, undertook a detailed study of the Indian commune.

The way this trend developed in the 1920s makes it possible to rank it among the varieties of Indianism. Luis E. Valcarcel, José María Arguedas and other Peruvian thinkers, while exposing the horrors of capitalist accumulation, dehumanization, alienation and the "materialization" of human life caused by bourgeois civilization, eulogized the world of the Indian farmer and the mythopoetic consciousness of the Kechua peasant, the "natural man".²² The Peruvian Indianism was pivoted on the agrarian issue, to be more exact, on checking the process of dispossessing the Indian peasants of land fostered both by the latifundista feudal oppression and the onslaught of the bourgeois elements.

The ideas of González Prada and other founders of Peruvian Indianism exercised noticeable influence on the petty-bourgeois politician Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who founded, in the 1920s, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), one of the largest political parties in Peru. Víctor Villanueva, a prominent student of aprism, described its ideology as populism.²³ Among the basic goals of aprism he listed anti-imperialism, Latin-Americ-

anism (i.e. a drive for Latin American political unity), nationalization of land and major industries, and solidarity with all the oppressed peoples and classes.

Proceeding from the ideas of González Prada, José Vasconcelos and others, Haya de la Torre maintained that the specific character of Latin America lies in the Indian element, with its traditions dating back to "Incaic socialism". The works by Haya de la Torre and his followers reveal their sympathy for the peasantry with their "communist instinct" and anti-capitalist sentiment.

However, the democratism and anti-capitalism of the aprists were, in fact, quite moderate. As was pointed out by Soviet researchers, "almost since its inception aprism has paradoxically combined ultra-revolutionary appeals to fight against imperialism ... with trivial bourgeois nationalism, timid and uninspired bourgeois-reformist recipes concerning the restructuring of Latin American society".²⁴ This can be illustrated by the aprist project of "non-capitalist" development. The only "non-capitalist" element of aprism consisted in its repudiating the possibility of applying the experience of Europe's evolution (from free-enterprise capitalism to imperialism) to Latin America and its urging to take advantage of foreign capital and imperialism which, in the opinion of aprists, represented "the first stage of capitalism" in Peru, "under the aegis of the anti-imperialist state".²⁵ In their debate with the Peruvian Marxists the aprists defended the theory of "constructive imperialism".

It should be noted that aprism was to some extent influenced by Marxism. During a certain period, Haya de la Torre maintained contacts with the founder of the Peruvian Communist Party José Carlos Mariategui. In a short while, however, the aprists entered into polemics with the Peruvian Marxists criticizing them for their efforts to "dogmatize Marxism" and their disregard of the specific conditions obtaining in Latin American countries. Accordingly, aprism gradually acquired anti-communist orientation, which dramatically manifested itself in the aprist theory of Peru's "third road" expressed in the formula: "*Thesis*—capitalism, *Antithesis*—communism, *Synthesis*—aprism."²⁶

The history of the political activity of the APRA and Haya de la Torre is usually divided into two periods. The period up to 1931 was marked by petty-bourgeois revolutionaryism, when the party advanced more or less radical

anti-imperialist and democratic slogans, particularly in the agrarian sphere. The early 1940s ushered in a period of overtly petty-bourgeois reformism which led to an alliance with reactionary and imperialist forces often disguised by "revolutionary" demagoguery.²⁷ The foregoing is true of present-day aprism, too. On the whole, Peruvian aprism has developed into a typical right-wing populist trend exercising certain political authority.

In the 1920s and 1930s, aprism coexisted with left-wing tendencies in Peruvian Indianism. These tendencies were associated with the peasant democratism of the Peruvian populists and their basic demand to return to the peasants the communal land alienated by latifundistas and large private capitalist landowners. Many of these tendencies were inspired by the Great October Socialist Revolution. Luis Valcarcel, a well-known writer and publicist, the author of a popular book *A Tempest in the Andes*, urged the Indians to launch their own liberation struggle, emulating the example of the "Russian muzhiks". In the early 1920s, he wrote that the Indian masses awaited their own Lenin.²⁸ Similar Indianist views were advocated by Enrique López Albújar, Ciro Alegría, and others.

The mid-1950s signalled a revival of Indianism in Peru, caused, first of all, by the upsurge in the peasant movement and the large-scale Indian protest against exploitation and their being dispossessed of land.²⁹ In the 1950s and 1960s, the Indianists lay special emphasis on attaining national political and economic independence and on the necessity to preserve "all that is Peruvian", including communal collectivist values.³⁰

The ideological Indianist and populist tendencies acquired a new dimension in the 1960s, under the Fernando Belaúnde Terry government. Belaúnde Terry, an ideologist of Indianism, set forth his views in his books *The Conquest of Peru by the Peruvians* and *The People for the People*. Another prominent ideologist of the ruling party Popular Action was Francisco Miró Quesada. The programme of the Popular Action Party combined the ideas of social development in the spirit of modernization with the principle of preserving "traditional values" (first of all, communal) of the Peruvian people.

Analyzing the situation obtaining in the country, Miró Quesada wrote that the changes mapped out by the party, first of all the agrarian reform, were designed to stem the

dangerous social crisis, or, as he put it, "structural tension" which was growing in the geometrical progression. In this case, we are faced with a typically populist approach to social problems in the context of belated, backward capitalism in a developing society, based on a dual strategy: bourgeois-democratic reforms aimed at modernization, on the one hand, and amortization of the latter's consequences for the traditional peasant masses and easing social tensions, on the other. Miró Quesada urged a regulated, planned development of capitalism, including the capitalist sector in agriculture, on the basis of redistributing land property in favour of the poorer peasantry and eliminating latifundism and other vestiges of feudalism. Communal traditions were regarded as a factor stimulating this process, and they were expected to be utilized within a system based on "popular cooperation".³¹

According to Belaúnde Terry, popular cooperation would be helpful in reviving "the ancient communal spirit of the Peruvian people" and utilizing it in the context of modern industrialized society.³² Such a right-wing populist programme (which incorporated certain features of *P_n*) was sufficiently radical in its agrarian part. It envisaged eliminating feudal forms of exploitation, preserving and promoting small- and medium-scale peasant landownership and communal institutions, granting credit and technical assistance to the peasantry.

Little by little, however, Belaúnde Terry and his followers, pressurized by the reactionary forces, went back on their projects and agreed to a far more reformist, compromise agrarian law under which a high ceiling in land ownership was preserved. By way of response, in 1965, when the government announced its agricultural reform, the left-wing Indianists, representing the younger generation and students, set up a Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario—MIR). Its ideologists vigorously propagated the Indianist principles of "agrarian communism". They proclaimed the peasantry "the moving force of the revolution" and condemned the regime's agrarian reform which jeopardized, in their opinion, the existence of the commune and collective ownership. The MIR was supported by other trends, for instance, by the group headed by Carnero Oke, who urged the "synthesis of communism and nationalism".³³

In the second half of the 1960s, the agrarian reform was

the subject of acute controversy which involved, apart from the government and the left, the reactionary forces and the aprists. In the context of the resultant social and political crisis, the military, headed by Juan Velasco Alvarado, toppled, in 1968, the Belaúnde Terry government.

Among the first steps of the new government was the adoption of a law on the agrarian reform. The law, passed in 1969, took into consideration the demands of the peasantry and was quite radical, anti-feudal and anti-capitalist. Under the new legislation, considerable acreages were to be redistributed in favour of the landless peasants, the owners of small plots and farm hands. Apart from direct anti-latifundista clauses, the law contained provisions restricting capitalist ownership and capitalist exploitation. The ceiling of private landownership was considerably lowered. The economically profitable farms, which were granted certain privileges, were to distribute no less than 10 per cent of their total revenue among the workers.

As the agrarian reform was carried out, the government concentrated on founding "peasant associations", i.e. co-operatives, which were the first to be allotted land, granted credits and technical assistance. The government announced the creation of a "public ownership" sector, in which communal traditions were to be utilized, and, at the same time, modified. The cooperative sector was expected to counterbalance the capitalist one. In this connection, Velasco Alvarado said that the basic problems facing the country had been engendered by capitalism, and it would be highly illogical to try to cope with them while retaining the system which had engendered them. For this reason the Peruvian revolution should be interpreted as non-capitalist in the sense that the socio-economic system it was striving after would not be a capitalist one.³⁴

The regime that obtained in Peru after 1968 and its programme are often referred to as "controlled populism".³⁵ It is characterized by an orientation towards the peasantry, a strong reliance on the working masses, a drive for establishing contacts with the latter and stirring them to social and political activity. In 1971, Velasco Alvarado declared that the creation of a new peasant society in Peru should be the task and the responsibility of the peasants themselves, for it was high time to cease to regard the peasantry as being 'unprepared' to solve their own problems by themselves.³⁶ On the whole, the populist ideological

and political tendencies have proved to be lasting. This is corroborated by the fact that at the recent presidential elections the victory was won by Belaúndo Terry, the leader of the Popular Action Party.

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Talking about the peasant-oriented populism in Latin America, one should mention that similar ideas of "Indianism" are put forth in the works by various thinkers and public figures in Bolivia (Franz Tamayo, Mercedes Anaya de Urquidi, and others). Certain elements of populism can also be found in the views held by Juan Bosch (Dominican Republic), Horhe Elleser Gaitán (Colombia), and others. Typologically, "urban" populisms in Brazil, Argentina, and some other countries, are more similar to the above-described populist trends obtaining in developed or relatively developed countries.

6. THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF POPULIST TRENDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The Specific Features of the Present Age. The foregoing analysis of the basic populist trends in developing countries shows that they differ in many important respects from the populist trends of the past, first of all from Russian Narodism. The difference is largely determined by the age in which the modern liberation movement has been unfolding. A powerful impetus for the latter was provided by the triumph of the Great October Revolution, and, subsequently, by the emergence of the world socialist system and the international communist movement.

Furthermore, what is new in comparison with the conditions that obtained in Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries is the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist orientation of the struggle waged by the developing countries and the more acute conflict between international capitalism and the world's outlying districts. The outlook of the populist ideologists active in the emergent states has been moulded in the years marked by the general crisis of capitalism and the collapse of imperialism's world colonial system, it is only natural for them to oppose colonialism

and neo-colonialism. Their outlook developed in a context when the gap between the centres of developed capitalism and the world's outlying districts was rapidly growing. The East-West problem and the clash between the traditional and modern elements in the developing countries was acquiring a more and more dramatic character. The peculiarities of modern development are also determined by the fact that in many countries the liberation from colonial development coincided with the process of national self-determination and national self-assertion. All this determined the substance of modern populist ideologies in the emergent states.

Let us consider in greater detail the specific aspects of modern populist trends. One cannot overlook the fact that these trends have a more pronounced nationalist colouring than Russian Narodism used to have. According to Léopold Sédar Senghor, "the nation is the premier reality of the 20th century".¹ The difference manifests itself even in terminology: for instance, Sukarno referred to himself and his followers not as socialist-revolutionaries but as "nationalist-revolutionaries".² This is only natural since in the populist ideologies of the developing world priority is given to the slogans of national unity essential in the face of imperialism and colonialism. At the same time, these slogans call for national consolidation and overcoming obsolete ethnic and tribal conflicts. Characteristic is the call to "become a *nation* soon" advanced by Sukarno and his colleagues in the National Party.³

Nationalism imparted an original colouring to the modern populist theories of non-capitalist development. These theories either negate or draw a veil over class contradictions, advance concepts of a "special", "intermediate", or "third" road and call to search for national cultural "sources". Populism in turn has influenced modern nationalism in developing countries, thus promoting the emergence of one of its varieties. Hence the phenomenon pointed out by the prominent Indian historian Kayala M. Madhava Panikkar: "The acceptance of the principle that the source of authority is in the people is the political nature of nationalism [in Asia]".⁴ Hence "the blending of nationalism and socialism", which, in the opinion of the American scholar Louis L. Snyder, constitutes "one of the most significant trends of the twentieth century".⁵

The nationalist element does not remove populism fur-

ther from socialism; on the contrary, the socialist orientation in populism has become even more pronounced than before. This is only natural since the socialist influence exerted upon populist ideological trends has dramatically increased. The anti-capitalist tendency is fostered, to a greater degree than ever before, by the criticism of "external" capitalism, since the latter is identified with colonialism, and the repudiation of "external" capitalism is extrapolated to "internal" capitalism and capitalism in general. For national leaders, socialism becomes a form of conceptual opposition to the West, which, in the current historical context, is enhanced by the general international situation, by the confrontation of the two world social systems.

The nationalist character of modern populism is determined by the traditionalist elements it contains, which are more pronounced than those in the populist concepts of the past. There are several reasons behind this: the reliance on the traditional values and the revival of traditional institutions are a kind of a protective reaction of backward societies, in which the process of modernization in a colonial or post-colonial context, by virtue of the destructive effect of "overripe" capitalism, creates tremendous social tension. Hence the emphasis on moral factors and spiritual values, the repudiation of the West's "materialism", and the like. In a context of a poor country this is expected to console and encourage the man-in-the-street, to provide an ideological compensation for his sufferings. This also explains why religion is an important component of the majority of modern populist doctrines. While Russian Narodism was a secular trend, modern populist theories in developing countries take on the form of (or are supplemented by) "Buddhist socialism", "Islamic socialism", etc. Religiosity is a variation on the inherent populist theme of "originality" and "a special road".

Significantly, the growing importance of traditionalist motifs in modern populism is accounted for not only by the social and cultural confrontation with the imperialist West and the necessity of searching for national "authenticity"; it is in large measure stimulated by the West itself, by the "self-criticism" of Western civilization which becomes increasingly characteristic of present-day bourgeois thought. "Anti-Westernism" was characteristic of Russian Narodniks, too. Today, however, it is even more natural for an

Asian or an African populist to resent the European picture with its "crushing anonymity of industrial urban life, the loneliness in the crowd, ... the moral degradation of the worker",⁶ since he will be thereby sharing the attitude repeatedly expressed by Jean Paul Sartre, Erich Fromm or Herbert Marcuse. He will also thereby subscribe to the European left-wing bourgeois intelligentsia's repudiation of "Euro-centrism" and assertion of "Oriente-centrism". The African populist will be doubly confident of his rightness when he reads the writings by the prominent British expert in African studies Basil Davidson who admires African traditional relationships engendered in "materially simple but morally not defenceless societies" and stresses that these relationships constitute nothing less than "a controlled freedom which we, abandoning a community morality, may find difficult to conceive today".⁷ B. S. Yerasov is quite justified in saying that the works by European ethnographers and anthropologists (such as Leon Frobenius), who think highly of the cultural originality and "emotionality" of the Africans, promoted the elaboration of the concepts of Negritude and "African socialism".⁸

As for the ecological problem, which is undoubtedly a new element in the system of argumentation used by modern populist thinkers in developing countries, here, too, certain "prompting" on the part of Western sociologists and economists can be observed. Suffice it to mention the discussion at the Conference on the Ecological Aspects of International Development held in Washington University in December 1968. Many participants expressed their doubts as to whether "development should continue". "What relevance do the values of a predominantly capitalist, predominantly Christian, predominantly temperate-climate civilization have for other countries for good or evil?"—wondered Peter Haskell⁹. Speaking at the Conference, the Canadian sociologist Timothy Parsons said: "The uniqueness of the underdeveloped countries is to be found in their closeness to nature: in their strength through not having to rely on highly mechanized agriculture, transportation, or other forms of industrialization that make the developed nations so fragilely depending on an external source of energy." Parsons urged to have a closer look at the traditional methods in agriculture where "success has been achieved through communalism and not through a heavy injection of industrial technology".¹⁰ D. A. Chant and

H. A. Regier showed an even more global approach to the problem: "Recently, the world has begun to question the long-term environmental consequences of exporting our Western culture, based on production, marketing, and consumption, with its grossly materialistic set of values, to the so-called underdeveloped nations. The question is asked, can the underdeveloped nations afford to accept a culture, that already has abundantly proved its destructive environmental effects?"¹¹

Therefore, when a populist stresses the necessity of adhering to such a development strategy which would ensure the protection of the environment,¹² he approaches the issue not merely in terms of technology and economics but from the point of view of a world outlook according to which it is essential to maintain "peasant socialism", and "rural orientation", and to repudiate urbanism. Similarly, a populist may combine misgivings about the ecological consequences of the green revolution with the criticism of its social outcome.

Thus, as compared with the Russian Narodniks' criticism of the European positivist concept of progress, the attitude of modern populist thinkers to the Western pattern of development is even more negative. According to Jacques Berque, the nationalist theorists in independent states tend to "radically reconsider the primacy of the industrial element they have always associated with the times of the empires [that is, colonial empires]".¹³

At the same time, paradoxically as it may seem, modern populism shows an ever stronger drive for modernization and mastering the technological achievements of developed countries. I. L. Markovitz, for instance, points out that the ideological evolution of "Senegalese socialism" involves the process of deromanticization, that is transformation into "practical Negritude" through a synthesis with technocratism.¹⁴ The combination of sociological romanticism with technocratism is characteristic of many other populists. However, such apparent paradox can be accounted for by the fact that populist thinking in general is based on antinomies; in the 20th century, with its characteristic discrepancies in economic development, this tendency in populist thinking has become even stronger. Populism today is developing in the context of the scientific and technological revolution and this cannot but influence its ideological doctrines. The latter trend, even to a greater extent

than before, seeks to assimilate the achievements of modern science and absorb certain elements of scientism and technocracy, both at the level of the theoretical substantiation of ideology and, especially, at the level of its practical implementation.

This does not exhaust the list of the specific features of modern populism in developing countries. A distinctive feature of the present-day populist ideologies is that they are often developed by ruling parties and groups.

Hence, the concrete, "routine" character of their programmatic principles,¹⁵ and the preponderance of etatism over anarchical tendencies. This does not mean that the latter are negligible. Anarchism in the modern state has deep-going social roots and is fostered by a variety of factors: the centrifugal tendencies displayed by isolated peasant communes, the separatist manifestations of tribalism, the apology of peasant partisan action, etc. Still, the fact that etatist tendencies dominate the majority of populist concepts in the 20th century is obvious. Anarchism is criticized as "the political expression of subjective idealism" and "the political extreme of individualism".¹⁶

The bent of modern populists on etatism can be explained variously. To a certain extent, this can be accounted for by the general atmosphere in the era of state-monopoly capitalism. At the same time, this is also accounted for by the experience of the planned economy in the USSR and other socialist countries. Moreover, the role of the state in developing countries objectively grows in the course of economic and social construction, in the process of eliminating backwardness. Last but not least, the etatism of modern populist ideologies is explained by the fact that many of them were, or still are, officially recognized ideologies.

It should also be noted that "agrarian democratism" inherent in populism and the drive towards land nationalization have become less pronounced in the ideologies of modern petty-bourgeois democracy. The reason for this lies in the different nature of the land problem. For instance, in many Asian countries the comparatively small acreage of landlord-owned land does not permit a redistribution of land in favour of the peasants at a stroke, as was the case in Russia. Although the agrarian situation in Latin America is more or less similar to that in Russia in the 19th century, it is marked by various peculiarities engendered by the specific character of latifundism, by the Indian problem,

etc. As for the African states, here the problem of land nationalization and redistribution is less acute since large acreages of free land are available.

Lastly, it should be borne in mind that while in the past populist ideological trends emerged spontaneously, more or less independently of one another, nowadays the links between them and the influence they exert on one another have become much stronger. Populists today show increasing interest in and reliance on the heritage of their predecessors. For instance, El Hocine Bénissad, a lecturer in the University of Algiers, in one of his articles stresses the viability of "economic romanticism" of Sismondi, who proved that "the industrial revolution will result in disorganizing the traditional society and the emergence of a new and more mercenary one", which "will ruin the working man" and in which "the level of consumption will outstrip the growth of production".¹⁷

The Attitude to Scientific Socialism. I have already mentioned that Marxism exerted a considerable influence upon Russian Narodism, that it was "reflected" in the Narodnik petty-bourgeois literature and that some of the revolutionary Narodniks, among them G. V. Plekhanov, eventually went over to Marxist positions. Similar processes are observed in the populist trends of the 20th century. For instance, the populist theories active in the first half of this century, among them Sun Yatsen, Sukarno, Mexican agrarianists, were strongly influenced by the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The views of the populists of the second echelon of the national liberation movement were moulded in the years when the world socialist system was being created and consolidated. They were also largely influenced by the international communist movement. For instance, Ali A. Mazrui points out that in the African French colonies socialist ideas took a firmer hold than elsewhere owing to the authority of the French Communist Party.¹⁸ That Marxism influences the ideological constructions of Algerian populists and that such an ideological symbiosis is "absolutely normal" for populism is also stressed by Jean Leca and Jean-Claude Vatin.¹⁹

On the whole, the degree of Marxism's penetration into contemporary populist theories has become much higher. This is pointed out by R. A. Ulyanovsky: "Considering the issue of Narodism in the present-day context, one should

note that if Narodnik ideology remained at its former level (which could not have happened), i.e. if it had not incorporated certain principles of scientific socialism, it would have come to an impasse, merged with bourgeois ideology and become dissolved in it."²⁰ Ulyanovsky believes that "vast sections of Narodnik ideologists are still involved in such negative evolution". He stresses, at the same time, that the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the world socialist system and the international communist movement bring influence to bear on the attitudes of public figures and politicians of the Narodnik type in the emergent states; this has resulted in their stronger anti-capitalist sentiment and their socialist orientation.

The populist statesmen and public figures in the developing world are interested not only in Marxist-Leninist theory, but also in the experience of socialist construction in the USSR and other socialist countries which have gained impressive results in socialist development. In this connection, the American scholar Hans Morgenthau wrote: "Seeking the same results, the underdeveloped nations cannot help being attracted by the methods which brought about these results elsewhere. In contrast, the slow process, stretching over centuries, through which the nations of the West achieved a high standard of living, ... must appeal much less to them."²¹

It stands to reason that the left-wing populist ideologists and politicians show greater interest in scientific socialism. For instance, Kwame Nkrumah sought to base his "consciencism" on the principles of materialism and dialectics. Similarly, Ahmed Sékou Touré in his writings repeatedly expounded principles of dialectic and historical materialism and recognized their validity.²² It is not only revolutionary-minded public figures who show interest in Marxism. For instance, Ahmed Diouf, Prime Minister of Senegal, declared his intention "to build a specific kind of socialism proceeding from Marx and Engels"²³ while Léopold Senghor devoted many pages of his works to the founders of Marxism. Even the followers of Gandhi draw a parallel between Gandhi and Marx on the grounds that they both sought to achieve a classless society.²⁴

For all that, the populists are extremely selective in their attitude to Marxism-Leninism. Thus, Modibo Keita wrote: "We view scientific socialism with a critical mind. We analyse it, we dissect it. We try to draw from it values

which enable us to make fruitful the positive realities of Mali, with our temperament, our culture, and our heritage of mysticism. We have never blindly accepted any ready-made idea whoever it came from."²⁵ Just as their predecessors, populist thinkers and public figures today interpret Marxism in the light of their own views and concepts. Senghor, for instance, thinks highly of the Marxist interpretation of the problem of expropriation, humanism, dialectic principles and calls to "assimilate them".²⁶ However, he ignores the revolutionary substance of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine as a whole and of the above-mentioned principles and ideas, in particular. Modibo Keita subscribes to the political ideas of Leninism, disregarding, at the same time, the Leninist approach to economic problems. Kwame Nkrumah tends to overemphasize, out of context, certain tenets of the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution (dealing with the class struggle, the hegemony of the proletariat, etc.). As O. V. Martyshin points out, all this boils down to the desire to "use certain Marxist principles to substantiate a platform which, taken as a whole, cannot be described as Marxist".²⁷

The Marxists-Leninists have never suggested taking the above-mentioned principles of Marxist theory, just as any scientific theory, for granted, to apply them blindly and mechanically, disregarding the time, the place, and the concrete situation. Translating any scientific social theory into practice, in case it is recognized as science-based and valid, presupposes the recognition of its general principles and methodological recommendations, which should be followed in adopting concrete decisions. However, as was pointed out by Marien Ngouabi, there is a tendency for the proponents of African "national socialisms" to "overestimate the peculiarities of the African context and to elaborate various political theories aspiring to originality and at least slightly differing from capitalism and socialism".²⁸

Populist theorists often insist on taking a scientific approach to socialism, stressing that the latter as a social system is always characterized by a set of common traits and principles. Recognizing that "socialism is international", Julius Nyerere emphasizes its immutable features, such as public ownership of the means of production, equality, democracy, the spirit of cooperation prevailing in society, etc.²⁹ However, he tends to lay special emphasis on the national or regional peculiarities, on "special ways"

of restructuring society along the socialist lines. He writes: "Because men are different, and because different communities and societies have different histories, live in different geographical conditions, and have developed different customs and systems of belief, therefore the road to socialism and the institutions through which socialism is ultimately expressed will be different."³⁰ Such attitude may result in replacing the general with the particular, and refuting, in fact, the universal character of the world historical process.

It is noteworthy that in their approach to scientific socialism and Marxist-Leninist social theory many populists echo (unconsciously, of course) the attitude of the Russian Narodniks: to subscribe to Marxism means to repudiate the idea of applying it to the specific context of a backward country. Lenin pointed out that the Narodnik thinkers tended to interpret Marxism in their own way. A stand similar to that of the Narodniks is not infrequently taken by some of the populists in our time. For instance, Senghor maintains that "to mechanically apply Marx's method to Negro-African and West-African realities would mean to doubly betray Marx".³¹ Similarly, Mamadou Dia holds that it is proceeding from the spirit of Marx's doctrine that African socialists opted for their own road to socialism.³²

Some of the populist thinkers tend to believe that if Marx were in their place he would not think differently. As Nyerere put it, "if he had lived in Sukumaland, Masailand or Ruvuma, he would have written a different book than *Das Kapital*, but he could have been just as scientific and just as socialist".³³

Attempts are also made to prove that the Marxist teaching on the class struggle, the role of the working class and the importance of its alliance with the peasantry, and on the principles governing the transition to socialism cannot be applied under the specific conditions obtaining in various developing countries. V. P. Lukin described these attempts as "a secondary utopianization of scientific ideology".³⁴

This has brought us to another common feature of populist concepts, no matter when they were elaborated—their congeniality to revisionism. In their criticism of Marx's followers in Russia, Narodniks aligned, in some respects, with Bernsteinians and enriched their theoretical arsenal by borrowing from the "agrarian revisionism" of Austro-Marxists. Similarly, some of the populists today are congenial

to European social democrats.³⁵ For instance, Senghor practically repeats all the basic arguments of social-democratic theorists about "classical Marxism becoming obsolete"³⁶ despite the fact that they have been convincingly disproved by Marxism-Leninism and life itself.

Populist theorists often repeat the revisionists' and bourgeois scholars' allegation about Marxism underestimating the role of peasantry in social life and political struggles.³⁷ Of late, this allegation has again been circulated in the West. There is a tendency, for instance, to categorize Mao Zedong, Franz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral and some others as "Neo-Marxists" who, as opposed to "traditional Marxism" proceed from a correct understanding of the revolutionary nature of the peasantry.³⁸ Such allegations stem from misconception or deliberate misinterpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Neither Marx, who was the first among the ideologists of the working class to realize the necessity of the latter's alliance with the peasantry, nor Lenin can be accused of "peasantophobia".

The attraction of the "national socialists" in developing countries to revisionism is an indirect indication of their not being indifferent to Marxism and recognizing, in a peculiar way, their being influenced by Marxism. At the same time, this attraction signifies distortion of true Marxism and forfeiting valuable elements which could only enrich democratic and socialist thought in the young states. Moreover, this inevitably entails theoretical and politico-strategical weaknesses of populist concepts often pointed to even by bourgeois authors. In this connection it would be interesting to quote Frances Hill, an American scholar, who, assessing the Tanzanian concept of *ujamaa*, wrote: "This ideology of socialism as humanism or communalism lacks any sense of historical forces making socialism inevitable. In this sense Ujamaa is closer to Eduard Bernstein's revisionism than to Marx's and Engels's dialectic materialism. Socialism is desirable but not inevitable."³⁹

Populist theorists combine a selective approach to Marxism-Leninism and efforts to interpret it in a "national spirit" with criticism of both Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of world socialism. The various reasons behind this include, apart from different theoretical principles underlying populism and Marxism-Leninism, sectarian tendencies in the tactics of communist parties in some developing countries (as was noted, for instance, in the famous

letter of Aimé Césaire to Maurice Thorez⁴⁰), the effect of Western propaganda, misunderstanding Marxism-Leninism, or learning about it from the works of its vulgarizers.

For instance, Nyerere, opposing the "theology of socialism", wrote: "I think that this idea that there is one 'pure socialism', for which the recipes are already known, is an insult to human intelligence... It is imperative that socialists continue thinking. And this thinking must be more than an attempt to discover what any so-called socialist Bible or socialist Koran really says and means... Yet I am not saying that, in my view, socialism is a vague concept which can have ... many different meanings and variations... A useful definition of the basic assumption and purposes of socialism is not only possible; it is also essential. And from that basis certain practical principles do inevitably follow. But principles become effective only when they are applied to situations".⁴¹

As far as Marxism-Leninism is concerned, and it undoubtedly is among the targets of the attack, Nyerere is wide of the mark: both the founders of Marxism-Leninism and the present-day Marxists-Leninists were and are in favour of creative application of Marxist-Leninist teaching, in favour of its constant development and enrichment. It should be stressed again that the tendency to oppose Marxism is combined with an opposite tendency, characteristic first of all of the revolutionary-minded populists, to accept various elements of Marxist-Leninist theory and utilize (sometimes unwittingly) certain elements of scientific socialism.

Regional and Socio-Political Characteristics. The populist concepts described above differ from region to region and continent to continent. I shall touch upon some of the differences.

Populist ideological tendencies are most pronounced in Africa. There colonialism gained a footing later than in Asia and America; consequently, peasant communal structures have been better preserved in Africa than elsewhere. African peasants took a comparatively active part in the anti-colonial struggle. It is no accident that Africa engendered a large variety of "national socialisms" displaying strong populist ideological tendencies. Neither is it surprising that African countries have undertaken a variety of cooperative experiments and efforts to modernize the countryside with reliance on the existing communal-collectivist institutions.

The Canadian scholar John Nellis points out that since African countries do not have merchant or landlord classes "the national intelligentsia encountered few structural barriers preventing the annunciation of radical populist goals for the newly independent system".⁴² Hence the lack of general democratic elements in African populist concepts, the advancement of anti-capitalist or socialist elements, and the allegation that class struggle in Africa is non-existent.

Notworthily, many populist doctrines elaborated in African countries (especially, in Tropical Africa) are marked by intrinsic ideological and structural integrity. This is accounted for, first of all, by the integrity of African culture; populist ideological constructions are based on common African culture (Pan-Africanism) rather than national cultural or tribal traditions.⁴³

None of the modern Asian ideologists of the populist type can be ranked with Sun Yatsen, Gandhi or Sukarno. The activity of petty-bourgeois democracy is constrained by a number of factors, among them the complexity of the land problem and agrarian relations. Moreover, some of the Asian countries, among them India, have attained a sufficiently high level of capitalist development. Nonetheless, today, too, populist tendencies in a number of countries are strong enough. They retain all the characteristic features of belated bourgeois development and socio-economic backwardness necessary for the emergence or recurrence of populist ideological tendencies.

As is often pointed out in foreign literature, for Asian socio-cultural traditions the reliance on basic values has "a strongly rural focus".⁴⁴ Since the traditions of ancient Eastern civilizations still persist in the continent they will certainly nourish the ideological tendencies of the populist type for a long time to come.

In Latin America, as has already been mentioned, "rural" populism is in many respects linked to "Indianism", the problem of the Indian minority and the fate of Indian culture, although they are identified with the nation as a whole and acquire an obvious social focus. At the same time, the peculiarities of Latin American populism are determined by such social factors as latifundista landownership, on the one hand, and a comparatively high level of capitalist development in many countries of the continent, on the other. The former promotes "agrarian democratism" and the marked prevalence (in comparison, for instance, with African populist

trends) of general democratic elements over socialist ones in populist doctrines. As for the comparatively high level of capitalist development, it accounts for the spread of "urban" populism as a phenomenon of political culture (Peronism, Vargasism, etc.). In Latin America, just as in Africa, populist concepts are marked by continent-wide homogeneity which does not rule out various nationalist-oriented concepts ("Mexicanism" and the like).

The Arab region warrants special attention if only because Algerian populism, a very distinctive populist trend, emerged there. Yet in the Arab World the populist tradition is comparatively weak. There are various reasons for it. Without aspiring to provide an exhaustive explanation, I shall only point out the peculiarities of the ideological and cultural traditions in Moslem countries. There, Islam, as a rule, constitutes a dominant component of nationalist trends, ousting other forms of nationalism, among them, populist ones. This happens because the Moslem tends to attach greater importance to the confessional inter-national and inter-state entity (*umma*) than to various local, national, political, cultural, consanguineous and other social entities. This tendency manifests itself in Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism. The populist ideological tradition has thrived in the countries of "peripheral" Islam (Algeria, Indonesia) more than elsewhere, and this fact corroborates the above assertion. Moreover, historically, Islam has been always closely linked to urban culture, which to a certain degree restricted the spreading of the "rural" ideology of populism to the Arab region.

Lastly, it is important to consider the social "outlets" of the concepts in question, the types of socio-political regimes whose ideology displays populist tendencies. The fact that present-day populist trends in developing countries are considered as a single whole, from the point of view of the theoretical and ideological principles, should not be taken to mean that they are identical from the socio-political point of view. On the contrary, as has already been mentioned, populist ideological constructions may be widely different in terms of their political focus which is determined by the peculiarities of the socio-class basis they stem from, the ideological influences exerted from without, the attitude to the two world systems, etc.

Analyzing the specific character of contemporary national liberation revolutions which manifests itself in their acquir-

ing a new social dimension, N. A. Simoniya comes to a conclusion that the latter process is expressed in two basic forms: "either in a more mature and far reaching character of bourgeois-democratic transformations conducive to accelerated development of capitalism, ... or in such a modification of the bourgeois-democratic character of revolutionary social transformation (i.e. social revolution), under which the realization of the general democratic substance of the transformation is accompanied by a conscious restriction, if not complete elimination, of their so far unavoidable bourgeois-exploitive aspect",⁴⁵ i.e. in "running ahead of time". It seems that the former variant is associated with the social "outlets" of the right-wing populist ideological trend, while the latter—with populism's revolutionary wing.

Consider, for instance, the activity of those Mexican democrats who gravitate towards populism. They tend to tackle the agrarian problem in a way characteristic of populism, by combining the elimination of the feudal structure of landownership with setting up cooperative commune-type farms (*ejido*). Note that for predominantly objective reasons the Mexican agrarianists of the 1930s failed to act in a revolutionary-populist way, i.e. to considerably restrict the capitalist sector. National development took on a dual form: along with stimulating the private sector in agriculture, which accounted for the bulk of commodity output, the state vigorously promoted the *ejidos* which attracted surplus labour and the vast masses of the poorer peasants. Conducted on a wide scale in the 1930s, this kind of cooperation is still carried on today. On the whole, the practice had proved to be sufficiently effective within the bourgeois democratic framework. As the American historian Alistair Hennessy put it, "however imperfect the *ejido* may be, it provides some measure of protection for the peasant during both the industrial and agricultural revolution through which Mexico is passing".⁴⁶ The *ejido* project, as well as a series of other radical democratic measures taken by the Lazaro Cárdenas regime, testify to democratic change occurring in the country. Furthermore, they helped to mitigate the consequences of primary accumulation for the bulk of the population, accelerating bourgeois development and modernization of the country.

Kenya, as well as Senegal, provides another example of bourgeois-democratic revolution. The slogans and program-

matic guidelines formulated by their leaders are in many respects reminiscent of the concepts elaborated by the Russian liberal Narodniks. In their agrarian reforms, cooperation policy, democratization and "Africanization" of landownership the country's leaders rely on the proprietary instinct of the peasant. One may recall that Lenin, assessing the agrarian programme of national socialists, held they had certain advantages, from the point of view of democratic consistency, over the liberal-bourgeois projects. Similarly, the Kenyan and the Senegalese patterns of development are more conducive to a rapid development of bourgeois relations which are, at the same time, regulated and guarded by the state.

Coming back to the lack of correspondence between the ideological declarations and the actual practices, it should be stressed once more that it cannot be accounted for by tactical considerations. K. N. Brutents is justified in commenting that developing countries' leaders often pursue bourgeois-reformist strategies behind the screen of "national socialism". "For many non-bourgeois adherents of these theories, often including political leaders, their projection onto practices is not the result of their conscious choice, but a spontaneous outcome of policies the true sense of which is often concealed from them by the solid screen of 'supra-class' illusions."⁴⁷ Bourgeois-democratic tendencies are immanent to any populist trend. If they acquire dominant positions in it and especially if this happens in the context of the permanent self-reproduction of the petty-bourgeois element, "socialist" incantations would not be able to change the course of social processes which increasingly gravitate towards capitalist development.

Brutents's assessment of the reformist trends in "national socialism" is absolutely right. He wrote that "in principle, one cannot rule out any possibility for these concepts to evolve in a more or less progressive direction primarily by virtue of the radicalization of the petty-bourgeois forces which now support these concepts".⁴⁸ This kind of evolution is quite feasible within the framework of populism, in the direction from its right flank to the left: the social contradictions of a backward, transient society which have engendered the ideological concepts in question are sustained and even enhanced in the course of implementing a reformist populist strategy. It stands to reason that other possibilities are by no means ruled out either: a right-wing

populist regime may develop towards trivial bourgeois reformism⁴⁹ or be replaced by a military-bourgeois dictatorship.

On the whole, from the point of view of social practices, right-wing populist trends can be described as ones tending towards social transformation of the bourgeois-democratic type, with priority given to "agrarian democratism" and various cooperative experiments.

Left-wing, revolutionary populism implies not so much accelerated and "balanced" bourgeois-democratic development but, rather, running "ahead of times", i.e. efforts to shorten the bourgeois stage, and a course of development involving both a limitation of capitalist elements and organization of non-capitalist, communal-cooperative institutions. From this point of view, the populists, along with other revolutionary democrats of non-populist type and avant-garde parties, constitute a component part of revolutionary-democratic forces which seek to create socio-economic institutional and ideological prerequisites for socialism.

"Running ahead of times" may involve various degrees of constraining the private sector, different scope of peasant cooperation, various levels of nationalization, etc. Generally speaking, revolutionary populism may lead to a very high level of "socialization" of production and political mobilization of the masses, although, judging from experience, this kind of acceleration of events may often lead to adverse consequences, sometimes even to a populist regime being toppled.

Revolutionary-democratic populism may combine far-reaching social transformation with efforts to preserve the enclaves of the private-capitalist sector and small-scale private farming (for instance, in Algeria and Tanzania). In principle, revolutionary populism is capable of controlling this kind of dual development. This dualism, however, may tolerate certain, sometimes considerable, fluctuations and shifts, both rightwards and leftwards, in the policies of the leadership.

There may also exist intermediate varieties of populist social strategy (like the one in Zambia) with uncertain orientation. This variety is marked by a combination of comparatively radical programmatic principles and meaningful progressive measures with a policy tolerating bourgeois relationships which are "smoothed out" and restrained by the state.

7. POPULIST POLITICAL TRADITION IN THE UNITED STATES (THE LATE 19TH-20TH CENTURIES)

The origin of the populist political movement in the United States can be traced to the famous Homestead Act which, on the one hand, promoted the formation of a numerous farmer stratum, and, on the other, provided for its subsequent handicap.¹ Under a clause in the Act, in order to secure a homestead for himself a farmer had either to cultivate the tract allotted to him for five years or to acquire it at one dollar twenty five cents per acre after living on it for six months. Land speculators took advantage of this provision to buy up the land very cheaply through figure-heads in order to resell it to settlers at inflated prices. This, of course, was not the only way to circumvent the land law. And this was only natural: the unwritten laws of capitalist competition, commodity-money relations, the drive for maximum profit increasingly governed agricultural production and relations promoting the stratification of the farmer population. By the late 19th century, 20 per cent of the farms accounted for 33 per cent of all cultivated land and more than 50 per cent of the agricultural output.²

Railroad companies reacted by putting pressure on the farmer. They gave preference to large-scale grain suppliers, while charging a double freight for carrying small cargoes. As a result, for the majority of farmers transportation costs accounted for half of the price of the grain they supplied to the market. Their debt to railroad insurance companies and private banks grew accordingly. In 1890 as little as 25 per cent of the farmers were in full possession of their holdings and had no mortgage debts.

It is against this background that in the early 1870s the anti-monopoly movement of Grangers and Greenbackers emerged. In 1874, there were more than 20,000 local Grangers with a total membership of over 1.5 million. Besides, there were farmers' clubs, small parties (such as the Reform Party, the Independent Party and the Anti-Monopoly Party) and associations. While declaring their determination to get rid of the "monopoly tyranny", they showed preference for peaceful means of struggle and sought "agreement" between the farmers and their opponents.³

The Granger movement was supported by certain circles of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, craftsmen and small busi-

nessmen who failed to meet the challenge of competition from large-scale industrialists. The movement stimulated the growth of farmer cooperation.

The Independent, or Greenback Party was formed in 1875 in Cleveland. The Greenbackers urged that the price of money should be lowered and that the government should not entrust private banks with issuing legal-tender notes, but should rather take upon itself the issuing of greenbacks in unlimited amounts so as to help the farmers to repay their debts with cheap money. Some of the workers, who hoped that an increase in the amount of money in circulation would reduce the cost of living, sided with the movement. Many of the Grangers and Greenbackers subsequently joined the People's Party.

The third stage in the populist movement was signalled by the emergence of farmer alliances. In 1877, farmers' representatives gathered in Pleasant Valley, Texas, to urge the abolition to "the unjust credit system" which, in their opinion, was the main evil facing the farmers, and to proclaim the foundation of a farmers' organization called "Knights of Reliance". Within a year, the Knights established their lodges in southern and western states. In 1878, this organization, which set itself the goal of uniting the farmers in joint struggle and incorporated numerous local alliances, was renamed the Farmer's Alliance. By the late 1880s, the Farmer's Alliance had developed into a radical organization whose members advanced political slogans and urged to defend the interests of "the industrial classes".⁴ At the same time, the leaders of the Alliance differed on their organizations' political programmes. While some of them tended to lay emphasis on economic struggles, others gave priority to political goals.

Although the greater part of the alliances' membership was made up of small and less substantial farmers, they also involved considerable numbers of large-scale agricultural producers who were interested in raising farm product prices and limiting the prerogatives of big corporations and railroad companies. The alliances took active part in electoral campaigns putting in nominations or voting for the nominees who promised to promote their demands. In some of the states (for instance, in Georgia) farmers' alliances had nearly 75 per cent of votes in the Senate and 80 per cent in the Lower Chamber.

There gradually emerged two major farmers' organiza-

tions, the Northern and the Southern Farmer's Alliances. The farmers, however, realized the need for further consolidation of their ranks. In December 1890, the Southern Alliance invited farmers' and workers' organizations in the southern and western states to take part in the session of their supreme council held in Okala, Florida. The session considered the issue of founding "a third party", whose programme was to urge to nationalize transportation and communication facilities and establish government note-issue monopoly.

A few months later, in May 1891, the Cincinnati conference of the representatives of all farmers' and workers' organizations adopted a resolution on setting up a People's (populist) Party. The party programme replaced the call for nationalizing railways and communication facilities by a demand to establish control over them, it also incorporated a clause on the nationwide introduction of 8-hour workday.

Yet, while still in its infancy, the populist party suffered from bitter controversy between the factions: the conservatives who represented the interests of the capitalist-type farmers and the radicals representing small farmers and workers. Serious differences occurred between the more progressive representatives of the northern and western states and the more conservative representatives of the southern states. Therefore, at the party's inception, the leaders of farmers' alliances failed to reach agreement on main directions in its activity. It was only agreed that the new party "would defend the interests of the people".

Apart from the heterogeneity of the party's social composition, its activity was also hampered by the fact that as its influence grew various shady characters and professional politicians got in with it. Moreover, serious difficulties arose in connection with the efforts to unite the People's Party and the trade unions. The reformist AFL leaders, headed by Samuel Gompers, impeded all efforts towards unification, claiming that there was a world of difference between the interests of the hired workers and those of the farmers, who themselves used hired labour.⁵ Nonetheless, there was a good-sized chance to establish farmers' and workers' alliance as some of the craft unions backed the populists. During one of the metalworkers' strikes in Kansas, the strikers received food parcels from farmers. The positions of the People's Party were weaker in some

of the southern states where many of the white farmers were unwilling to unite with black farmers.

Nonetheless, during the 1892 presidential elections the populist nominee, James Weaver, won more than one million votes; the governors of four states were populists. In Kansas, the People's Party won majority in the Senate, with one of its leaders, Lorenzo D. Levelling, becoming Governor. Devis H. Waite, a People's Party member, gained wide popularity as Colorado Governor. Yet, the efforts of populist governors to undertake progressive measures in favour of the poorer strata of the population were violently opposed by the bourgeois circles. Conflicts often culminated in armed clashes. Republicans and Democrats joined forces in local bodies to torpedo bills introduced by the populists.

Thus, from its inception the populist party was impeded in its activity by the social context. The radically-minded representatives of the populist movement had to function within a well-organized bourgeois political system which either suppressed or integrated them. Therefore, "the farmers soon discovered that there had been no change for the better in their position since the time they began to elect farmers, instead of professional politicians, to local government bodies. Having left his farm to join the legislature, the farmer, for the lack of experience or for some other reasons, forfeited his political identity and became, sometimes unwittingly an obedient tool in the hands of double-dyed lobbyists".⁶ Not infrequently populist politicians fell victims to bribery. To make things worse, there was not a state, town or district where the People's Party enjoyed full control over local government bodies.

Furthermore, many of the populists were only relatively radical. Generally speaking, socialist ideas were alien to them; it is no accident that the party's leaders rejected the overtures for an alliance made by the socialists (such as Henry Lloyd or John Tyler Morgan). Thus, the 1894 Springfield Convention of the People's Party rejected the socialists' proposal to include in the programme a clause on instituting "the people's collective ownership of all the means of production and distribution".⁷

Populism in the United States has never had any well-formulated ideology. Edward Bellamy, a utopian socialist, and Henry George, an agrarian reformist, were the only two theorists with a more or less obvious affinity with the pop-

ulist party. Bellamy's followers had eight seats in the People's Party National Committee. However, their views coincided with the populist platform only in the part related to the nationalization of railroad and communication facilities.

As for Henry George, it is no accident that his works were published during an upsurge in the populist movement. Although his writings can by no means be regarded as the People's Party official ideology, the author of *Progress and Poverty* undoubtedly expressed the interests of the farmers. His programme of land nationalization and redistribution on "labour" principles, consonant with the ideas of American populism, was hailed by the Russian Narodniks, among them N. K. Mikhailovsky and Leo Tolstoy. However, in advancing apparently radical projects, the American economist proceeded from the bourgeois relations and did not reject such attributes of these relations as private ownership, hired labour and commodity. For this reason his entire system, as has been pointed out by Soviet researchers, "essentially promoted the development of capitalist production. Its petty-bourgeois 'additions' remained utopian, unrealistic wishes",⁸ expressing consistent, democratic capitalism. But even this sort of radicalism seems to be excessive for the majority of the leaders in the People's Party.

The executive hierarchy of the populist party was dominated by conservative-minded leaders, among them James Weaver, Herman E. Taubeneck, and William V. Allen, who expressed the sentiment of the bourgeois elements in the populist movement. After 1893, in a bid to earn pragmatic political success, they started to phase out the basic provisions of populist programme and to turn their party into a "single-demand party" which urged the lowering of the price of silver money and unlimited silver coinage. The prominent American sociologist Henry Lloyd described conservative populist leaders as the people who had never sought to effect social transformation. In their activity they went only as far as they were urged to go by the people and they had always been happy to react positively to any call to align with the old parties and abandon the struggle for the demands advanced by the People's Party.⁹

The first serious clash between the conservatives and the radicals took place in 1894 at the populist conference in Saint Louis. The radicals took the upper hand, they suc-

ceeded in reasserting basic populist demands and adding several new ones to them. They urged to limit the size of property, to curtail the right of inheritance and ban the use of troops against strikers. In a short while, however, the conservative leaders made their comeback: emulating the example of AFL leaders, they began to expel socialists from the People's Party and to suppress the most active and progressive-minded populists.

The conservative leadership was not the worst evil however. The populist party was petty-bourgeois by nature; no trace was left of the farmer's radicalism whenever the question of his property was raised or an intention to encroach upon private ownership in general was voiced. Small wonder then that in 1895 *National Watchmen*, a newspaper issued by the People's Party National Committee, declared, and not without reason, that populism and socialism went different ways.¹⁰

The conservative tendencies took a firm hold at the People's Convention in 1896. The Weaver-Taubeneck grouping launched a campaign to turn the party into a "silver party" reaching for one goal only: to urge unlimited minting of silver coins. The campaign was also designed to support the plans to unite the populists with the Democrats whose presidential nominee, William Bryan, intended to concentrate his efforts on promoting the "silver slogan". The new leaders of the Democratic Party, for their part, planned to "engulf" the populist party through incorporating some of populists' demands in their own programme, among them the demand to establish government control over the enforcement of the anti-trust law, institute supervision over the railroad companies, introduce a progressive income tax, ban the note-issue by private banks, etc. As a result of a bitter struggle and a series of ploys, the conservatives succeeded in breaking the resistance of the radicals and pushing through with Bryan's presidential nomination from the People's Party.

At the 1896 presidential elections Bryan was defeated, having lost 600,000 votes to the Republican nominee William McKinley. This signalled the decline of the populist party, which only continued to agonize for twelve more years.

Over the years, the populist movement developed into a significant social and political force. In its heyday the People's Party united 2 million farmers, craftsmen and

small traders. However, populism in the United States was far from posing a serious threat to capitalism. The leaders of the People's Party "have never sought to question the socio-economic foundations of the existing system. They opposed monopolies, which caused direct harm to the farmers' interests, rather than capitalism itself".¹¹ The party's leaders primarily represented the interests of big land-owners and industrialists, the owners of silver mines, who, while seeking to side with the populists, could not, naturally, enter into a lasting alliance with small rural producers. Therefore, strife within the populist party was immanent and inevitable.

Although populism as a political movement waned, its ideals persisted. The so-called progressive era in the history of the United States (the early 20th century) registered many instances of the populist heritage being utilized. Marked by political flexibility and quick to respond to the protests "from below", the American ruling class implemented some of the provisions of the populist programme by introducing a federal income tax, securing direct elections to Senate, providing for the participation of the electorate in legislation through referendums, municipalizing public utilities, etc.

The populist movement revived during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Among the problems broached in these years was the state regulation of the economy, lowering the price of silver money, establishing old-age pensions and promoting other forms of social welfare. Senator Huey P. Long from Louisiana was one of the most prominent populist statesmen of the time. In 1934, he proposed to impose a tax on capital to prevent the accumulation of family fortunes of more than 5 million dollars or incomes of more than 1 million dollars a year. The government was to use the funds thereby released to allocate a yearly sum 2,000-3,000 dollars to each needy family. Other clauses in Long's programme envisaged allocations to old-age pensions and tuition fees for the needy young people and urged a 30-hour working week and an 11-month working year as a means to combat unemployment. Long's assassination in 1935 put an end to the campaign he launched. Some of his ideas were embodied in F. D. Roosevelt's New Deal and other projects. For instance, Long's idea of an annual income guaranteed by the federal government was eventually made the law which provided for an annual family

income of 2,400 dollars and was passed by the House of Representatives in 1971.¹²

Populism attracted the attention of publicists and scholars. In the 1920s and 1930s, American historiography displayed a positive approach to populism (see the works by Charles A. Beard, Fred A. Shannon, John D. Hicks, and others). In the 1950s and 1960s an opposite tendency emerged: in the course of a lively debate, a number of scholars, among them Daniel Bell, Victor C. Ferkiss and especially Richard Hofstadter, criticized populism as a "retrograde" movement which had failed to adjust to modernization.¹³ In the 1970s, the interpretation of "old populism" became more balanced (Leonard Goodwin and others). However, what is important is not so much the academic debates, but rather the recognition of the importance of the problems raised by the populists and the awareness of the social factors which have called populism into existence.

The early 1970s saw the emergence of "new populism". Many authors noted that populism was returning to the American political scene after a more than thirty-year-long absence.¹⁴ Neo-populism came to light at the primary presidential elections of 1972. During the election campaign, the Democratic nominees George McGovern and George Wallace promised to reform the system of taxation in order to partially redistribute the incomes and solve the busing problem.

Earlier, in June 1971, Senator Fred Harris from Oklahoma disclosed his intention to run for president on the Democratic ticket and proclaimed a "populist campaign". He made public his intention to urge "redistribution of incomes", "redistribution of power", and "the revival of idealism as a foreign policy platform". Although Harris' electoral campaign never took place, as he failed to secure sufficient financial backing, he had managed to publish a book entitled *Now Is Time; A New Populist Call to Action*. The gist of the book lies in the following: the new populist majority in the Democratic Party, composed of low- and medium-income people, both white and coloured, representatives of various minorities, should narrow the gap between unequal income levels in the country.¹⁵

In another book published two years later, Harris propagated the involvement of the masses in decision-making. He proceeded from the idea that the traditional forms of

bourgeois democracy were being undermined by those who, used to manipulating the masses, had devaluated the classical political rights of the individual. He assailed the well-guarded elite and those who aspired to join it.¹⁶ He protested against the prosecution of pot-smokers, peacetime conscription and telephone tapping and defended the students' right to self-government, women's right to abortion, etc. Harris maintained that his programme was based on old populist traditions. He believed that contemporary populism differed from its older version only in its "non-racist character".

The "new populism" of the 1970s failed to develop into a mass movement, notwithstanding certain political successes it scored (Daniel Walker's becoming the Mayor of Chicago, James Abourezk's election to Senate from South Dakota, participation in presidential election campaigns). The 1970s saw the publication of a large number of books by populist authors. Mention should be made of *A Populist Manifesto: The Making of a New Majority* by Jack Newfield and Jeff Greenfield. The authors criticize the economic and political monopoly power and call to restrict it. In their opinion, in the United States there exist individuals, classes and institutions possessing riches and power the law does not provide for; they use their power and wealth in their own interests to the detriment of society. Their power, predominantly in the economic area, undermines the political process and guards itself against effective criticism.¹⁷

In the opinion of the authors of the *Manifesto*, the populist programme yet to be elaborated should urge, among other things, the following: a 90-per cent inheritance tax; free medical care; public ownership of municipal facilities and enterprises; restricting the right of individual and cooperative ownership of land; new anti-trust legislation spearheaded not only against the monopolies, but also against other forms of concentration in industry; expanding the social insurance system; free and equal access to television for all politicians; strict control over private banks' profits; exemption of the market from the control of the corporations, etc.¹⁸

The "new populists" of the 1970s were active not only as writers, but also as organizers of various events. In the early 1970s, Ralf Nader organized a Conference on Corporate Accountability attended by many prominent states-

men and scientists, among them John Kenneth Galbraith. The participants stressed "the essentially public character of the great corporation" and this running counter to "its private exercise of what is, in fact, a public power",¹⁹ an idea congenial to the Marxist assertion about capitalism's fundamental contradiction between the social character of labour and the private form of appropriation. The speakers indicated that the budgets of major states were much smaller than the incomes of major corporations, and that the decisions adopted by corporations had much greater effect on the fate of society than legislation in any of the states. However, the conclusions drawn from this analysis are not too constructive. In fact, they boil down to recipes for the renovation of capitalism through passing legislation designed to limit corporate activity and to re-establish, eventually, the conditions obtaining under pre-monopoly capitalism.

A similar lack of correspondence between the substance of criticism and practical conclusions marks other efforts of Ralf Nader who gained popularity through his "raids" and attacks on General Motors for polluting the environment. Nader suggested counteracting the company's activity with purely palliative "ecotactics": collecting scrap metal, using electric power sparingly, periodically fining the company, etc.²⁰

As is often pointed out in literature, populism is one of the most important characteristics of the American political tradition,²¹ dating back to the 1870s-1890s, or, probably, to an even earlier period, the years of Andrew Jackson's presidency. In the American political life populism is a left-wing movement, second only to Communists. Yet, even in its heyday, a century ago, it failed to attain a high level of organizational cohesion and political influence; in fact, it never was anything more than a radical wing within the Democratic Party. Its leftism and radicalism have always been relative: on the whole, populism has never gone beyond the limits of a bourgeois ideology, despite the fact that some representatives of the populist movement tended to advocate ideas congenial to socialist ones.

In the past, populism addressed a heterogenous social group, consisting of both toiling and capitalistic farmers. The "new populism" of today caters for an even more heterogenous audience, "the average American", "the small

man", etc. That is why the populist rolls include such antipodes as tireless and somewhat quixotic Ralph Nader, seeking to defend the rank-and-file Americans from the monopolies, and the Alabama Governor George Wallace, who, while making advances to the masses, remains basically loyal to the Establishment. For this reason, to quote the Soviet researcher Yu. M. Kagramanov, in a populist environment "the difference between 'a people's defender' and a demagogue often proves to be ... imperceptible".²²

Accordingly, the kaleidoscopic conglomeration of ideas advocated by the populists is a far cry from a clearly recognizable political ideology. Among the obvious contradictions inherent in the set of populist ideas is, as was pointed out by Richard Hofstadter, the populists' appeal to rely on the state, their belief in "the responsibility of government for the common welfare" and in its "active role" in protecting society's interests against large owners and monopolies,²³ on the one hand, and their insistence on decentralizing economic and political life, securing free market, stimulating private enterprise, etc., on the other. This, just as other ideological and political contradictions inherent in American populism, reveals the latter's petty-bourgeois character, a factor curtailing its opportunities as a social movement.

CONCLUSION

POPULISM: A FAREWELL TO THE PAST OR AN INVITATION TO THE FUTURE? PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER EVOLUTION OF POPULIST TRENDS

What is populism in general and contemporary populism in particular? What is populism with its search for "the people" (an entity which is being stratified and deformed), with its attraction towards the traditions (which are being modernized), with its ideological and political ambivalence which turns its adherents now into sages, now into dictators, now into advocates of cooperation and now into proponents of marketing? Is it a drawn-out, two-century-long leavetaking, a lingering farewell to the past or an attempt to forestall the present? Is populism an agrarian utopia, or is it, on the contrary, a factor determining historical reality?

It is not easy to answer these questions even upon an extensive study. In part, this can be accounted for by the fact that, in keeping with the proviso made at the beginning of the book, it has considered the populists' socio-political activity only in passing. However, a special analysis of this aspect would have hardly provided an exhaustive answer, either. Twenty or thirty years, during which populist trends and political forces have been active, are not sufficient to allow a considered judgement.

Moreover, it is impossible to unequivocally qualify populism as a historical phenomenon because of the diversity—in terms of their ideological, political, and social functions—of the populist trends in developed and developing countries. Of course, there exists meeting ground between them. Before describing it, I shall dwell on the difference between the two varieties of populism.

Let us start with the populism in the present-day developing world. In Western literature, an opinion has been

expressed that by virtue of its ideological contradictoriness and amorphous organizational and political nature, populism constitutes the ideology of transition to modernization undertaken by other political forces, or "to other kinds of institutionalized revolutionism".¹ One can hardly agree with this. It stands to reason that certain (at times, quite serious) transmutations of populist trends are not only possible, but inevitable. However, the social context determined by "peripheral development of capitalism" and conducive to the emergence of populism, as well as the objective social tasks populism seeks to tackle, are bound to persist in the developing world for quite a long time. Therefore, the populist vision, avant-garde and "massophilic", combining traditionalism and modernism, focusing on the national ways of development and, at the same time, increasingly streamlined, will retain its attractiveness, both for the intelligentsia and the masses, for a long time to come.

Populist theories and ideologies have often been qualified as utopias. Lenin pointed out the utopian element in the Russian Narodniks' reveries. However, to interpret the word "utopia" as pure fantasy or chimera would mean to oversimplify the matter. Lenin elucidated the true meaning of the Narodnik utopia by describing one of the possible approaches to realize it as "American", democratic, comparatively progressive way of developing capitalism. Therefore, it would be more correct to interpret utopia, as applied to major, socially important ideological phenomena, as a method of social action, a form of social practice. The results it may lead to are often different from what its advocates hoped for (this is not a rare occurrence in history). It is important that utopia does yield results and these do not always signal historical regress.

Over the last decade populism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America has not simply been turbulent, generating theories and programmes, but also sought to translate them into life. In a number of developing countries populists have gained political power, becoming engaged, for the first time, in the making of history. Although it is only recently that populists have embarked upon this sort of activity, one can already identify two main trends in the practical realization of populist ideological doctrine.

First, populism as an ideological programme and social strategy may objectively (and at times, subjectively) con-

duce to "democratic capitalism", accelerating and activating bourgeois-democratic transformation. Illustrative in this respect is the situation in Mexico in the 1930s.

Second, populism may provide an ideological basis for a non-capitalist development strategy. The latter implies imposing restrictions on the bourgeois elements and a gradual transition to a socialist orientation. It has been characteristic of the revolutionary-democratic wing of populism in such countries as Algeria and Tanzania. Other variants are also conceivable. They may be more rightist or more leftist in terms of their socio-political focus, the rate of changes effected, the methods of mobilizing the masses, the character of agrarian-communal experiments, etc. However, the two major variants described above are the optimal methods of practical realization of contemporary populist ideologies within the framework of the objective problems and tasks which face the populist leaders or which are in some form advanced as imperatives of action.

The future will show to what degree the populists in the developing world will succeed in reaching the goals they set themselves. It is practically impossible for an ideology to perfectly suit reality. At the same time, the discrepancy between an ideology and actual practice can be tolerated only to a certain degree; beyond certain limits, the outlines of an ideology become dim and indistinct and it turns into mere demagoguery. As we see it, the future of populism depends on the following three factors.

First, much will depend on the degree to which populism will succeed in implementing the strategy of economic egalitarianism, namely, in redistributing the revenue in favour of the masses and involving them, thereby, in the process of development. It would be unjust to say that in the political practices of populist regimes this strategy remains the matter of mere declarations. For instance, in Tanzania the gap between the highest and the lowest incomes has been reduced from 70:1 in 1967 to 6:1¹². The *ujamaa* project involved exempting the peasantry from taxation, granting various kinds of public assistance to the rural population (in housing construction, improving the water supply system, building better roads, bettering health services, etc.), achieving a greater reduction in the discrepancy between the prices of manufactured and farm goods in comparison with other capitalist-oriented African coun-

tries.³ In Mexico, the introduction of the *ejido* system opened up better opportunities for the poorer strata of the population. Nonetheless, social contrasts still persist under populist regimes, even under radical ones. In the latter, the place of social contradictions of the "economic", bourgeois type is taken by social and property contrasts between the privileged managerial stratum and the rest of the population.

Second, populist regimes are usually marked by a considerable political gap between the elite and the masses, which runs counter to the officially proclaimed aim of creating "true democracy" and establishing the government of the people. In populist-governed systems, political mobilization of the masses is often a unilateral process when the masses passively approve of the actions of the leaders, while the "feed-back", the initiative "from below", and elements of political decentralization and self-government are lacking. Curiously enough, these features are especially typical of leftist populist regimes. The result is a paradox described in the recent comparative analysis of the participation of the masses in political life in socialist-oriented Tanzania and in bourgeois-oriented Kenya undertaken by Frank Holmquist, a Swedish expert in African studies: a policy designed to meet the interests of the masses, when pursued in a one-sided centralization form, may lead to a decline of political initiative from below, while rightist regimes of the Kenyan type may, objectively, leave certain outlets for the political initiative of the masses.⁴

It goes without saying that the setbacks suffered by the populist leaders of the developing world in their attempts to create democratic political structures are not accidental. They are largely caused by objective factors, by the insufficiently high level of political, ideological and cultural development of the masses. Subjective factors include the elitist ambitions of the populist leaders, their drive for the bourgeois, consumption-oriented life style, their not being prepared, culturally and morally, to tolerate institutions capable of fostering the political initiative of the masses. This is not to say, however, that populists in developing countries are not making or will not make efforts to translate into life, in good faith, the ideals of democratic people's government.

Thirdly, the success of populism in transitional societies will largely depend on their ability to implement, in one

form or another, the idea of relying on communal-collectivist institutions as a means of fostering social progress and non-capitalist development. This issue merits a more careful consideration than can be afforded within the space of this book. Still, since it is highly relevant to this analysis, let us discuss it, albeit in brief. The problem of utilizing collectivist traditions is of long standing. Apart from the populists, it has been studied by the Marxist-Leninist theorists whose works offer illuminating approaches to its solution.

In principle, the founders of Marxism gave a positive answer to the question whether the elements of archaic communal collectivism may serve as a kind of building material in the process of non-capitalist development and socialist transformation of the village. Engels thought it possible, even as applied to Germany in the mid-19th century, "to revive the mark not in the old, obsolete, but in a rejuvenated form; through the renovation of communal land ownership the latter would not only secure for the small peasant commune villages all the advantages of large-scale farming ... but would also make it possible for them to organize, alongside with agriculture, large-scale industry based on the use of water and steam power, and to organize it unaided, without capitalists, at that".⁵ Engels believed that the revolutionaries could well use "the remainder of communal ownership and the corresponding popular traditions ... as a powerful means of considerably shortening the process of development towards socialist society".⁶

The founders of Marxism believed that in Russia, too, communal institutions could be transformed along progressive lines. Marx wrote: "The fact that the peasant in Russia is accustomed to *artel* conditions of labour makes it easier for him to effect the change from a parcelled system of economy to a cooperative one..."⁷ While criticizing the "agrarian mysticism" of the Russian Narodniks, Marx and Engels thought that in principle it was possible for Russia to develop along non-capitalist lines, through making use of the surviving communal traditions. Admittedly, they maintained that it was possible provided a proletarian revolution triumphed in developed European countries.

While exposing the weaknesses of Narodnik "peasant socialism", Lenin stressed that Marxists had never supported "foolish projects for forcibly abolishing the community and forcibly introducing some other, similar system of

land ownership, such as are usually concocted by the present-day opponents of the village community, who favour gross interferences in the peasants' life and attack the village community from anything but the standpoint of the peasants' interests".⁸ The commune is a form of cooperation, and cooperation, according to Lenin, makes it possible to effect socialist change in the countryside "by means that are the *simplest, easiest and most acceptable to the peasant*".⁹

In the period following the October Revolution, Soviet power's approach to the institute of the commune was not negative, as it took into account "the drive of the absolute majority of the peasantry, especially of the peasants of the average means, to egalitarian-communal land-tenure, which they had been fighting for as passionately and resolutely as they had fought for the land and for the elimination of large-scale private landownership".¹⁰ Many of the communes, abolished in the years of the Stolypin reform, were restored. In the mid-1920s, the overwhelming majority of farms in the central areas of the country belonged to the communal sector.¹¹ In the course of the implementation of Lenin's project of cooperation, peasant communes or, as they were referred to in those years, "land societies," constituted a prerequisite for the transition to machine, credit, and farming cooperatives and other primary forms of cooperation. In any case, the collective farm was closer to the commune than to the individual peasant holding. Communal forms had a still greater role to play in the process of social transformation in the outlying areas and republics of the USSR, where they could be successfully used in affecting political and agrarian changes.¹²

As for the present-day developing countries, Marxist scholars hold divergent views on the positive potential of communal structures and the possibility of using their collectivist traditions in the socialist transformation of the village. As regards this potential, there are optimists and pessimists.¹³ To judge from the modest results attained in the non-capitalist-oriented countries, there are more reasons to be pessimistic than optimistic. But it is too early to arrive at conclusions. It should be borne in mind that the present-day progressive regimes in the developing world function under conditions different and more complicated than those in the USSR. Their economic and political capability is different and their type of commune is more archaic. Karl Marx was justified in emphasising, in his

letter to Vera Zasulich, that the Russian land commune had the advantage of being free from family and clan survivals.¹⁴ As for Africa, the picture of communal relationships is dominated by relations typical of clans and tribes. In the African commune, the power of traditional leaders and inequality, including the inequality of sexes, age groups, and castes, persist. Prejudices and religious inhibitions are still strong.

At the same time, communal collectivism has certain advantages. As has been pointed out by many scholars, the approval of fellow-villagers is a much stronger incentive for a member of the commune than material remuneration.¹⁵ Neighbourly assistance and various collective forms of labour are widespread. However, in the process of non-capitalist peasant cooperation, these positive elements should be resolutely and skillfully separated from the obsolete and stagnant ones. According to the prominent French scholar Jean Suret-Canale, "the African village commune will be able to adapt to socialism only through far-reaching democratization, involving the elimination of family particularism and all traditional forms of inequality".¹⁶

It may well be that this conservative aspect of archaic relationships, the opposition on the part of the traditional leaders, the primitivism of the communal institutions are not always fully taken into account, for all their critical attitude to the drawbacks inherent in traditional forms, by the populist-oriented national democrats. The African author Thomas Nsenga Kanza, who now works in the United States, believes that the theorists of communal socialism "underestimate the social, tribal and racial distinctions which have emerged in African society through contact with the colonialists".¹⁷

Apart from this, the inefficiency of cooperation experiments in the young states (insufficient profitability of the newly-formed cooperatives and limited commercial output) is caused by both objective and subjective factors, among them the lack of means and experience and the scarcity of skilled personnel. Moreover, of great harm is administrative haste which leads to unjustified, artificial acceleration of the rate of cooperation and to purely formal organization of cooperatives, on the one hand, and fosters thriftlessness and disregard of the principle of profitability and marketability of the economy, on the other.

The latter is important not only in terms of economic

expediency, but also in principle. It is essential for the present-day revolutionary populist ideologists and activists to understand that non-capitalist development should not be reduced to a simple "leap" from the archaic to the most advanced forms of production and social life. While bypassing the capitalist stage as the stage of bourgeois private ownership, the society should not bypass the progressive socio-production achievements which are acquired through capitalist "schooling" which provides for discipline in production, for production and social culture, cultivation of initiative and self-sufficiency in individuals. Otherwise, as was pointed out by Marx and Engels, socialism may turn into primitive-egalitarian "barrack-type" communism, which "has not only failed to go beyond the private property, but has not yet even reached it".¹⁸ This warning is valid in the context of present-day realities in the developing countries.

The future will show whether contemporary progressive populism will succeed in finding adequate politico-organizational, social and economic forms to implement the programme of non-capitalist development on the basis of utilizing traditional collectivist relationships and customs. Without attempting to forecast the ultimate result, I shall only note that, in principle, traditional institutions prove to be adaptable to modern structures, as can be testified to, for example, by the development of bourgeois structures in Japan subsequent to the Meiji revolution. If traditional institutions and values have fit into capitalism, why should not they, provided they are appropriately transformed, serve the cause of socialism?

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The foregoing brings us to the Marxist assessment of modern populist trends in developing countries, an assessment based on methodological principles which were applied by the founders of Marxism-Leninism to various democratic trends in general and to populist trends in particular. A condescending, haughty approach to democratic doctrines is alien to Marxists-Leninists; they give them a careful consideration, examining their socio-class content, discerning progressive elements in their teachings and movements, examining the social problems engendering these

movements and creatively solving these problems on the basis of the theory of scientific socialism.

This can be illustrated by Lenin's concept of Narodism. Lenin took a differentiated approach to Narodism, distinguishing between democratism and utopianism in its doctrines, setting apart the revolutionary and the liberal Narodniks, and discriminating between democratic-progressive and philistine-bourgeois tendencies in the latter. These principles are fully applicable to contemporary populism in developing countries.

At the same time, in comparison with similar movements of the past, the national and revolutionary democracy has a greater potential today, when the world socialist system and the international communist movement have come to the foreground of history and when the emergent states are engaged in increasingly militant anti-imperialist struggles. Proceeding from Lenin's instructions that "the Marxists must carefully extract the sound and valuable kernel of sincere, resolute, militant democracy of the peasant masses from the husk of Narodnik utopias",¹⁹ Marxism-Leninism today has every reason to support, and is actually supporting, the "non-capitalist kernel" of the national liberation movement, including populist-type revolutionary trends.

This is not to say, of course, that Marxism-Leninism is prepared to agree with the representatives of non-Marxist socialism on all points. A comradely discussion is going on between Marxists-Leninists and national democrats from developing countries on a wide range of issues, including the question of the people and its social structure, class struggle, forms of transition to socialism, etc.

True Marxism-Leninism, a creative doctrine which is a far cry from its vulgarized versions from which populists in developing countries sometimes proceed, has never sought to belittle the importance of the problem of the people and the necessity to defend the interests of the working people as a whole. However, it approaches the problem from different positions, from the socio-class angle, which is usually repudiated by populist theorists. Classics of Marxism-Leninism repeatedly stressed that, historically, the working class is a forward-looking class capable of expressing the interests of all the working and exploited people. The Marxist-Leninist approach is not only better substantiated in terms of theory, but also more realistic in terms of practice as it takes into account the growing social differ-

entiation and the formation of classes in developing countries, including non-capitalist-oriented ones. Whenever the representatives of non-Marxist socialism underestimate these phenomena, they have to pay for it. At the same time, Marxism-Leninism does not accept leftist theories overemphasizing violent forms of class struggle or indiscriminately seeking to involve all the strata of the population into class struggle.

Similarly, Marxists-Leninists do not agree with the interpretation of socialism as "a just system of distribution", often advanced in populist writings. As is pointed out by Yu. I. Fedorov, this kind of distortion can be observed in the concept of "Indian socialism".²⁰ Socialism implies, above all, production relations organized in a qualitatively new manner, and providing a basis for the regulation of exchange, distribution and consumption.

While pointing out these and other defects in the populist-type ideological structures, Marxism-Leninism takes into account that populist trends have been given rise to by certain social conditions and problems obtaining in developing countries. They are deeply rooted in the petty-bourgeois-peasant milieu, and represent, in one form or another, the interests of these strata. This largely determines their actions, irrespective of personal views and intentions of this or that ideologist.

This does not rule out the possibility for an ideological evolution of populist-oriented national democrats in the direction of scientific socialism. In recent years, this tendency has manifested itself in the emergence, in young states, of avant-garde working people's parties whose principles are close to Marxist-Leninist ones. The African scholar F. Awogu maintains that "if traditional African socialism fails in the end to achieve social justice", other national democratic forces may also turn to scientific socialism.²¹

However, this process is a complex and prolonged one and it is hardly expedient to accelerate it. There exists a characteristic tendency in the ideological evolution of populism which can be outlined in the following way: as the left, revolutionary-democratic wing of populism develops, it exceeds the ideological framework of populism proper and starts to incorporate principles of scientific socialism. However, the reverse tendencies may also occur (consider, for instance, the case of J. Narayan). The Russian

revolutionary intelligentsia, as Lenin put it, "achieved Marxism through suffering". The reverse is also true: immature Marxism, which has not been "achieved through suffering" and has no socio-class, proletarian roots, tends to compromise the theory and practice of scientific socialism. This can be illustrated by numerous examples both from the past and the present.

It should be noted that while criticizing Narodnik theories or approving of the rational elements they contained, Lenin by no means expected to persuade the Narodniks to adopt Marxist ideas. The influence exerted pursued a different goal: to persuade the Narodniks to be more consistent in adhering to their own declared principles, the course of revolutionary democratism which was conducive to the proletariat's cause. Lenin's tactics of "making the best" of the Narodnik movement seems to be fully applicable to the progressive populist movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America today. The populist movements and trends in question are yet to play a significant historical role in resolving the complicated tasks of economic, political and cultural development in former colonial and dependent countries.

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In developed or sufficiently developed bourgeois societies, populism has so far had a less prominent role to play. As a rule, it has been pushed into the background of ideological and political life. Admittedly, there were cases when populism turned into a force which helped to regulate social and political structures in bourgeois society (the United States, Canada) or promoted national capitalism (Argentina, Brazil). However, these cases emerged as an unintended result of the populists' activity, and were not in accord with their ideological and political intentions. Sometimes populists became yes-men of pro-fascist forces and had an overtly reactionary role to play (consider, for instance, the case of Poujadism in France).

On the whole, populism's more than one hundred-year-long record in capitalist countries shows it to be something unimportant, politically indistinct, ideologically vague, and organizationally weak. The populists' drive to raise above the class structure, to represent the interests of "the en-

tire people" was the result of populism having no class roots and its indifference about having a firm socio-class hold. For this reason, populism as political culture may alternatively rely now on urban and now on rural strata, now on the petty-bourgeois and now on the workers. Such lack of an "addressee", a definite class to cater for, has pushed populism into the lower ranks among the bourgeois parties. At the same time, populism could not match the working-class movement in terms of class orientation. Owing to the lack of precisely oriented ideological programmes, populist ideological rhetoric did not sound convincing. Populist radical phraseology, as a rule, hung in mid-air. Whenever populism succeeded in achieving some practical results, it was even worse: its lack of independence as a social movement, the demagogic character of its "anti-capitalist" opposition, its bourgeois nature became even more vivid.

A conclusion may suggest itself that populism under the conditions obtaining in bourgeois societies, has no prospects. In my view, however, this would be a premature conclusion. Indeed, at the stage of rising, developing capitalism there was no use for populism; the best thing the latter could do was to integrate in the ideological and political life of bourgeois society performing the function of local opposition and a peculiar kind of political culture. At the stage of mature, "overripe" capitalism things have changed. The evils inherent in bourgeois industrial, urban civilization have become even more pronounced. The West is plagued not only by ecological and energy but also by profound social and cultural crises: the all-consuming utilitarianism and pragmatism, which have turned into the basic incentives of human activity, consumption-oriented life styles, the defencelessness of the individual in the face of powerful technocratic and other structures and organizations. In the modernized world, in the kingdom of mechanistic rationality alien to the man in the street, the latter perceives himself as "a small man" and seeks refuge in various kinds of informal contacts, in reviving the half-forgotten forms of traditional solidarity.

In this context, populism (what we have in mind is not its concrete forms obtaining today, but populism per se, as a system of values and intentions), with its protest against the suppression of Man by the Organization, against the domination of incorporation in economy and politics, may

acquire greater weight. The focus on the national heritage, on "the spirit of the people" and traditional values, characteristic of populism as an ideology, acquires a new meaning and turns into a kind of protective screen against exaggerated Modernity.

In some respects (anti-monopolism, repudiation of elitarian political regulation, demands to ensure the rights of the individual), modern populist movements turn, or tend to turn, into a *neo-democratic* reaction to modern state-monopoly capitalism, under which bourgeois democracy is increasingly distorted and emaciated. Not only does the neo-democratic protest have every prospect for further development, but it also provides a basis for an alliance between populism in the capitalist world and that in the developing countries. Despite the difference in their development levels and other socio-historical parameters, the post-traditional societies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the post-industrial capitalist countries in the West are similar, and in this I fully agree with the Soviet orientalist L. I. Reisner, in that in both groups of countries there is a constantly growing gap between the elite and the rest of the population, the managers and the managed.

Moreover, populism in the developed countries and populism in the developing world are drawing closer together by virtue of the growing universality of the historical process and increasing interdependence of the world's various regions and social manifestations. As has been mentioned above, modern populism in developing countries relies for its argumentation on the self-criticism of bourgeois civilization; conversely, the populist concentration on traditional cultural values may gain the sympathy of the intelligentsia in the developed bourgeois world, exasperated by excessive "modernity".

A good example of the rapprochement between the populist tendencies in the developed and developing worlds is provided by the works of the prominent sociologist and economist Ernst F. Schumacher, an advocate of "intermediate technology" designed for the developing countries and called upon to alleviate the painful unemployment in these countries. Schumacher not so much focuses on the technico-economic aspect of the project, but rather offers the developing world, the world of "two million villages", a pattern of development which rings of Gandhi's ideas and proposes to combine selective, carefully dosed modern-

ization with cultivating the more viable elements of the socio-cultural heritage, traditional institutions and ideas. Schumacher gradually broadened his criticism of "occidentocentric patterns" of development imposed on former colonial and dependent countries and started to criticize bourgeois civilization in general, urging total reorientation of the West, repudiation of excessive industrial growth and transition to the forms of life the pivot of which would be "work on the land", with society divided into small territorial-production groups, reminiscent of communes or cooperatives.²² Without attempting to provide a detailed analysis of this concept, which, although in some respects utopian, enjoys popularity in developing countries, I shall only point out that it displays unmistakably populist features. Schumacher has never proclaimed his adherence to populism; however, his works are illustrative of the ideas and methods of argumentation modern populism may resort to in developed capitalist countries.

I say "may resort" because present-day populist trends in the West have so far confined themselves to the framework of specific political culture. It may well be expected that the deep-reaching crisis experienced by modern capitalism may impart new importance to the complex of ideas generated by the long-standing populist tradition in various bourgeois countries. The future will show what kind of contribution populist trends will be able to make to the progressive transformation of the capitalist world.

NOTES

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PART I

POPULISM AS A WORLD-WIDE PHENOMENON. AN ATTEMPT TO BUILD AN HISTORICO-SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL

A. POPULISM OF DEVELOPING SOCIETIES: A SEARCH FOR NON-CAPITALIST (OR NON-CLASSICAL BOURGEOIS) WAY OF DEVELOPMENT

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27. V. I. Pavlov, "On the Conditions of Capitalism's Coming-to-Be in Afro-Asian Society", *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No. 10, 1973, p. 109. I shall not dwell on the very special and challenging problem of the different predisposition of "Eastern" and "Western" civilizations to bourgeois development. Broached quite a short time ago and still open to question, this subject cannot be tackled within the space of this book. Yet, even at this stage, there is sufficient ground to believe that the coming-to-be of capitalism in Asia and Africa was, and still is, impeded not only by various phenomena given rise to by the backward societies coming into contact with the developed capitalist West, but also by certain peculiarities inherent in the historical development of Eastern civilizations, as well as by ecological, socio-structural, political, ideological and cultural factors which have been conducive to the stagnation of Eastern societies. Among recent works on the subject worthy of note are, for instance, the extremely interesting works of Kolontayev. (see: A. P. Kolontayev, *Primary Forms of Production in the Countries of South and South-East Asia*, Nauka, Moscow, 1975, pp. 5-74; idem. "Technological Revolution and the Machine Stage of Production in Developing Countries". In: *Technological Progress and Developing Countries*, Nauka, Moscow, 1976 (all in Russian).
- Similarly, I shall not consider the factors that made for the development of capitalism in the West, but have been unfavorable for the developing countries. They are associated with colonial robbery as such, and their role in the development of world capitalism is well known. The case of "belated" capitalism is of interest to us in its "pure" form, i. e. as the involvement of young states in the worldwide process of bourgeois development against the background of "old", well-developed and well-established capitalism.
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30. V. M. Kollontai, *The Ways of Overcoming Economic Backwardness. A Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Economic Theories*, Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya Publishers, Moscow, 1967, p. 259 (in Russian).

31. *Developing Countries...*, p. 246.
32. *The Ways and Methods of Economic Development in African Countries*, Issue No. 2, Institute for African Studies, the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1975, p. 95 (in Russian).
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34. See: L. Reisner, "Is Transition from Sector to the Capitalist Mode of Production Possible? (On the Limits of Capitalist Transformation in Emergent Countries)", *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 11, 1978, p. 29 (in Russian).
- 35-37. Andrzej Walicki, *The Controversy over Capitalism. Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969, p. 129.
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41. Mary Elisabeth Jackman, "Recent Population Movement in Zambia. Some Aspects of the 1969 Census", *Zambian Papers* (Lusaka), No. 8, 1973, p. 27.
42. K. T. de Graft-Johnson, "Population Growth and Rural-Urban Migration, with Special Reference to Ghana", *International Labour Review* (Geneva), Vol. 109, Nos. 5-6, 1974, p. 481.
43. Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, Vol. II, Op. cit., p. 1242.
44. M. Volkov, "Contemporary Productive Forces and the Peculiarities of Capitalist Development in the Third World", *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya*, No. 10, 1974, p. 121.
45. Pierre Metge, "Politiques migratoires: les migrations et la transformation de la société rurale traditionnelle au Sénégal". In: *Structures traditionnelles et développement*, Editions Eyrolles, Paris, 1968, p. 58.
46. V. V. Krylov, "Characteristic Features of Socio-Economic Processes in Developing Societies", *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 9, 1976, p. 105.
47. For instance, the Soviet historian I. F. Gindin is justified in observing that a more or less successful utilization of the technological and economic experience accumulated by the advanced countries is possible only in politically independent countries which have succeeded in securing the domestic market for their newly-developed industries and protecting themselves against foreign competition by high customs tariffs. This was not possible in colonies and in some of Asian and Latin American countries, which, while enjoying political independence de jure, were dependent on the West de facto. See: I. F. Gindin *Problems of Modernization and Industrialization: Their Modification from the 16th to the 20th Century*. Papers for the 5th International Congress on Economic History, Nauka, Moscow, 1970 (in Russian).
48. *Lenin Miscellany* XI, Politizdat, Moscow, 1929, p. 397 (in Russian).
49. Samir Amin, *Le développement inégal. Essai sur les formations sociales du capitalisme périphérique*, Les Editions de minuit, Paris, 1973, p. 329.
50. *Developing countries...*, p. 30.

51. Samir Amin, *L'accumulation à l'échelle mondiale. Critique de la théorie du sous-développement*, Editions anthropos, Paris, 1971, p. 79.
52. *Overseas Business Report* (Washington), No. 32, 1975, p. 1.
53. Samir Amin, *Le développement inégal*, Op. cit., p. 172.
54. V. G. Rastaynikov, *The Agrarian Evolution in Multistructural Society. Independent India's Experience*, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, p. 9 (in Russian).
55. Amin Samir, *Le développement inégal*, Op. cit., pp. 173, 208.
56. Ibid., p. 209.
57. T. S. Pokatayeva, *Developing Countries: Problems of Urbanization*, Moscow, Nauka, 1977, pp. 230-231 (in Russian).
58. Samir Amin, *Le développement inégal*, p. 309.
59. L. Reisner, *Is the Transition...*, Op. cit., p. 32.
60. Although the concept of peripheral capitalism, for instance, is essentially congenial to "economic romanticism", a trend supported, among others, by Russian Narodnik economists, it would be hardly reasonable to ignore it completely. Samir Amin, Arghiri Emmanuel, Selso Furtado, Raul Prebisch and other modern-day economists, just as their Russian predecessors, describe in one way or another some of the basic tendencies inherent in the socio-economic processes unfolding in developing countries. It stands to reason, however, that a Marxist scholar may not always agree with the conclusions they make.
61. See: A. I. Levkovsky, *The Third World in the Current International Scene*, Nauka, Moscow, 1970; *The East and the Present Time*, Vol. 1, Op. cit., pp. 19-34 (all in Russian).
62. J. H. Boeke, *Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by Indonesia*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1953.
63. Tamás Szentes, *The Negative Impact of the Dualistic Socio-Economic Structure on Domestic Market, Capital Formation and Labour*. Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 1976.
64. V. V. Krylov, *The Productive Forces in Developing Countries and the Formation of Their Socio-Economic Structure*. Synopsys of Thesis prepared by Candidate, Moscow, 1974, p. 23.
65. Ibid., p. 24.
66. V. I. Lenin, "Petty-Bourgeois and Proletarian Socialism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, 1962, p. 439.
67. *L'agriculture africaine et le capitalisme*, Editions anthropos-idep, Paris, 1975, pp. 109, 131.
68. Jose Carlos Mariategui, *Siete ensayos de interpretacion de la realidad peruana*, Casa de las Americas, Havana, 1973, p. 46.
69. Modibo Keita, *A Collection of Speeches*, Op. cit., p. 96.
70. Enrico Bartolucci, *Africa: seconda indipendenza*, Editrice Nigrizia, Bologna, 1970, p. 99.
71. Compare this to the objectivist assertion by the well-known bourgeois sociologist Eisenstadt that modernization is bound to be accompanied by "processes of disorganization and dislocation, with the continual development of social problems, cleavages and conflicts between various groups, and movements of protest, resistance to change". (S. H. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs [N. J.], 1966, p. 20).

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75. Basil Davidson, "Questions about Nationalism", *African Affairs* (Oxford), Vol. 76, No. 302, 1977, p. 45.
76. *Iran dust: The Motive Forces of the Kemalist Revolution*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1928, p. 95 (in Russian).
77. See: A. F. Miller's Introduction to K. Atatürk, *Selected Speeches*, Moscow, 1966, p. 21 (Russian translation). Admittedly, contemporary Turkish author Nejat Kaymaz ranks Kemalism among the varieties of Narodism. However, the criteria of this concept (nationalism, anti-imperialism, reliance on the masses), as described by Kaymaz, look rather vague. His description of Kemalism seems to be interesting from another angle, that of persisting attraction to populist-type ideas in today's Turkey (Nejat Kaymaz, "Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın Tarihsel Konumu ve niteliği", *Üç Ayda Biz Çıkar* [Ankara], Vol. XI, No. 160, 1976).
78. See: V. I. Danilov, *The Middle Strata in the Political Life of Turkey Today*, Nauka, Moscow, 1968, p. 138 (in Russian). One should note that predominance of liberal-reformist or bourgeois-nationalist trends, as well as the capitalist orientation, in some country are no guarantee against the emergence or revival of populist ideological tendencies. For instance, in the Philippines which has been justifiably dubbed a "social volcano", populist tendencies are to be discerned in the outlook of many national ideologists, including President Marcos. These tendencies have not yet developed into a major independent trend. A revival of populist tendencies is also conceivable in Indonesia and some other countries.

3. SOCIO-CLASS MECHANISM OF POPULIST TREND FORMATION

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2. *Conflict Tension and Cultural Trend in India*, Punthi Pustak, Calcutta, 1969, p. 48.
3. Ferdinand Mount, "The Sense of Dispossession", *Encounter* (London), Vol. XXXIX, No. 6, December 1972.
4. See also: Jean Suret-Canale, *La République de Guinée*, Op. cit., pp. 140-141.
5. I. V. Podberezsky, *Sampaghita, the Cross and the Dollar*, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, p. 297 (in Russian).
6. See: *Developing Countries...*, p. 159.
7. *The African Experience*, Vol. I, *Essays*, North-Western University Press, Evanston, 1970, p. 40.
8. V. G. Rastyannikov, *The Agrarian Evolution in Multistructural Society. Independent India's Experience*, Op. cit., p. 352.
9. Leonard Plotnicov, "Rural-Urban Communications in Contemporary Nigeria: the Persistence of Traditional Social Institutions", *Journal of Asian and African Studies* (Leiden), Vol. V, No. 1-2, 1970.
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11. N. K. Mikhailovsky, *Works*, Vol. I, Published by N. N. Mikhailovsky, St. Petersburg, 1911, p. 440 (in Russian).
12. Frantz Fanon, *Sociologie d'une révolution* (L'an V de la révolution algérienne), François Maspero, Paris, 1968, p. 29.
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16. Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, Vol. II, Op. cit., pp. 1063-64.
17. R. Buijtenhuijs, *Le mouvement "Mau-mau", une révolte paysanne et anticoloniale en Afrique Noire*, Paris-La Haye: Mouton, 1971, pp. 109-11.
18. R. A. Ulyanovsky, *Socialism and Newly-Free Countries*, Nauka, Moscow, 1972, p. 313 (in Russian).
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4. THE LOGICAL-STRUCTURAL ASPECT OF POPULIST IDEOLOGY

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2. The antinomial character of populist thinking has also been stressed by Rashkovsky (See: Ye. B. Rashkovsky, *On One of the Socio-Psychological Prerequisites...*, Op. cit., p. 72).
3. Lucien Sebag, *Marxisme et Structuralisme*, Payot, Paris, 1964, p. 193.
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5. B. S. Yerasov, "The Social Content of Socialist Theories in Asian and African Countries". In: *A History of Socialist Doctrines*, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, p. 346 (in Russian).
6. Jacques Berque, "Nouvelles logiques du progrès", *Diogenes* (Paris), No. 92, October-December, 1975, p. 66.
7. Jean Pierre Biondi, *Le tiers-socialisme. Essai sur le socialisme et le "Tiers-Monde"*, Flammarion, Paris, 1976, pp. 36-37.
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12. N. A. Simoniya, *The Eastern Countries: Way of Development*, Nauka, Moscow, 1975, p. 231 (in Russian).
13. See: V. I. Lenin, "Two Utopias", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, 1973, p. 358; idem., "Democracy and Narodism in China", Op. cit., pp. 168-69.
14. T. Goncharova, *The Concept of Indian Identity...*, Op. cit., p. 92.
15. In the early years of his political career, Julius Nyerere wrote: "Socialism—like democracy—is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind... It has nothing to do with the possession or non-possession of wealth. Destitute

people can be potential capitalists—exploiters of their fellow human beings. A millionaire can equally well be a socialist...” (Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa. Essays on Socialism*, Oxford University Press, Dar es Salaam, 1968, p. 1).

16. Peter Worsley, *The Third World*, Op. cit., p. 165.
17. *African Experience*, Vol. I, *Essays*, Op. cit., p. 41.
18. *Populism...*, Op. cit., pp. 159, 160.
19. J. Daumal et M. Leroy, *Gamal Abd-el-Nasser avec ses textes essentiels*, Seghers, Paris, p. 18.
20. *Populism...*, Op. cit., p. 203.
21. Characteristic in this respect is the political approach of Russian people's socialists who contemplated the transfer of land to the peasants within the framework of bourgeois-democratic law, through the Constituent Assembly.
22. *Socialism in the Third World*, Praeger, New York e. a., 1975, p. V.
23. Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen soziologie*, Buske, Leipzig, 1935.
24. P. L. Lavrov, *Philosophy and Sociology*, Vol. 2, Mysl, Moscow, 1965, p. 109 (in Russian).
25. Julius K. Nyerere, *Man and Development*, Op. cit., pp. 10-11.
26. See: I. Kablits (Yuzov), *The Foundation of Narodism*, Part 1, Printed by N. A. Lebedyev, St. Petersburg, 1888, pp. 100-13 (in Russian).
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29. Andrzej Walicki, *The Controversy over Capitalism*, Op. cit., p. 27.
30. See: N. P. Shmelyov, *Problems of Economic Growth in Developing Countries*, Nauka, Moscow, 1970, p. 53 (in Russian).
31. Hermann Hänsel, "The Rural Development Strategy of Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania", In: *Zeitschrift für ausländische Landwirtschaft*, Vol. 15, Part 2, Frankfurt (Main), p. 181.

B. POPULISM IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: A VARIETY OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN BOURGEOIS SOCIETY

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2. Yu. M. Kagramanov, "The New Populism: Aims and Means", *USA: Economy, Politics, Ideology* (Moscow), No. 7, 1975, p. 85.
3. Fred R. Harris, "The New Populism", *Saturday Review Press*, New York, 1973, pp. 192, 207-08.
4. M. J. Coldwell, *Canadian Progressives on the March. The Story of the Rise of the C.C.F.*, League for Industrial Democracy, New York, 1945, pp. 9, 14.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
6. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism. The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan. A Study in Political Sociology*, Doubleday, Garden City (N. Y.), 1968.
7. C. B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta. The Theory and Practice*

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8. Robert J. Alexander, *Juan Domingo Peron: a History*, Western Press, Boulder (Colorado), 1979, pp. 62-63.
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 11. Robert J. Alexander, Op. cit., p. 147.
 12. Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform. From Bryan to F.D.R.* Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1956, p. 47.
 13. G. P. Kuropyatnik, *The Farmer's Movement in the United States*, Nauka, Moscow, 1971, pp. 200-01 (in Russian).
 14. For more detail see: *Populism...*, Op. cit., pp. 99-117.
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 19. Norman Pollak, *The Populist Response to Industrial America*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1962, pp. 11-12.
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PART II

HISTORICAL FORMS AND NATIONAL VARIANTS OF POPULISM

1. EARLY POPULIST TRENDS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES (THE 17th-19th CENTURIES)

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3. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discours sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité parmi les hommes". In: *Oeuvres complètes*, Op. cit., p. 122.
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5. Ibid., pp. 926-27.
6. Ibid., p. 905.

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- 9a. See: Heinrich Wilhelm Bensen, *Die Proletarier. Eine historische Denkschrift*, Franck, Stuttgart, 1847.
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11. Otto Lünning, "Politik und Sozialismus". In: *Dies Buch gehört dem Volke*. Herausgegeben von Dr. O. Lünning. Zw. Jahrgang. Verlag von August Helmich, Bielefeld, 1845, p. 7.
12. See: Ye. B. Rashkovsky, "Polish Revolutionary Democrats and Early Polish Socialists". In: *Contacts Between the Revolutionaries in Russia and Poland in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries*, Nauka, Moscow, 1968 (in Russian).
13. See: *Bourgeois and Petty-Bourgeois Economic Concepts of Socialism (Critical Studies)*, Mysl, Moscow, 1974, pp. 137-139, 145-46 (in Russian).
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15. See: *Bourgeois and Petty-Bourgeois Economic Concepts of Socialism*, Op. cit., pp. 213-27.

2. THE NARODNIK MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA (THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19th AND THE EARLY 20th CENTURIES)

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3. A. I. Herzen, *Collected Works*, in 30 volumes, Vol. XIV, USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1958, p. 175 (in Russian).
4. Ibid., p. 171.
5. Ibid., p. 155.
6. Ibid., Vol. XII, 1957, p. 186.
7. Ibid., Vol. VII, 1956, p. 112.
8. Ibid., Vol. XV, 1959, p. 146.
9. Ibid., Vol. XII, p. 112.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., Vol. XIV, p. 169.
12. Ibid., Vol. VII, 1956, p. 143.
13. Ibid., Vol. XII, p. 431.
14. Ibid., Vol. XV, p. 148.
15. Ibid., Vol. XVI, 1959, p. 138.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 141.

18. Ibid., pp. 140-41.
19. Ibid., Vol. XIV, p. 174.
20. V. I. Lenin "In Memory of Herzen", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 27.
21. A. I. Herzen, *Collected Works*, in 30 volumes, Vol. XVIII, Op. cit., Moscow, 1959, p. 469.
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23. Ibid., p. 363.
24. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 389.
25. For more detail see: I. K. Pantin, *Socialist Thought in Russia: Transition from Utopia to Science*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1973, pp. 121-26 (in Russian).
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27. V. I. Lenin, "The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, 1962, p. 256.
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29. V. V. (V. P. Vorontsov), *The Fate of Capitalism in Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1882, pp. 22, 18.
30. Nikolai-on (N. F. Danielson), "Studies in Our Post-Reform Public Economy", *Slovo* (St. Petersburg), No. 9, 1880, p. 118.
31. Ibid., p. 275.
32. Ibid., p. 15.
33. Ibid., p. 16. Here, as we see, the term "non-capitalist road" is used literally. In the majority of cases, Narodnik thinkers, from Herzen on, tended to describe the phenomenon as "bypassing capitalism", "avoiding capitalism", etc. Whatever the phrase, what was meant was non-capitalist development in the direction of socialism, on the basis of communal traditions. It stands to reason that in the 19th and early 20th centuries the content of the problem of non-capitalist development (especially, in the works by Narodnik theorists) was different from that in our time. Yet there seems to be every reason to speak about the continuity of this topic in populist-type ideologies.
34. Ibid., p. 68.
35. Ibid., p. 202.
36. Ibid., p. 124.
37. P. P. Chervinsky, "Critical Studies in Social Problems", *Nedelya* (St. Petersburg), No. 11, 1875, p. 358.
38. Andrei Walicki, *The Controversy...* Op. cit., p. 129.
39. V. V. (V. P. Vorontsov), Op. cit., p. 222.
40. See: E. S. Vilenskaya, *The Revolutionary Underground in Russia (the 1860s)*, Nauka, Moscow, 1965; B. S. Itenberg, *The Revolutionary Narodnic Movement*, Nauka, Moscow, 1965; M. G. Sedov, *The Heroic Period of Revolutionary Narodism*, Nauka, Moscow, 1966 (all in Russian); Franko Venturi, *Roots of Revolution; A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in 19th-Century Russia*, Knopf, New York, 1960.
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the 1870s", In: *The Popular Movement in Post-Reform Russia*, Nauka, Moscow, 1965, p. 338, in Russian). Add to this all those who hid or assisted the revolutionaries in many other ways, and the figure will be trebled or even quadrupled.

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47. V. I. Lenin, "An Anaemic Duma or an Anaemic Petty Bourgeoisie", *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, 1977, p. 338.
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49. Andrzej Walicki, *The Controversy...*, Op. cit., p. 27.
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51. Richard Wortman, Op. cit., pp. 16-17.
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3. For more detail see: L. N. Borokh, *The China Revival Union*, Nauka, Moscow, 1971, pp. 65-97 (in Russian).
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6. Sun Yatsen, *China's Capitalist Development*, Gosizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1925, p. 228 (Russian translation).
7. See: Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, pp. 364-65.
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10. Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, p. 118.
11. Ibid., p. 544.

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13. See: L. N. Borokh, *The Traditional Sources of Sun Yatsen's Socio-Economic Programme*, Op. cit., pp. 159-62.
14. Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, p. 324.
15. Ibid., p. 320.
16. A. V. Meliksetov, "On the Assessment of Sun Yatsen's Views", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1969, pp. 88-89.
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49. It is often difficult to distinguish between bourgeois and petty-bourgeois reformism. And still, the latter usually displays more consistent democratism (especially, agrarian democratism) and more pronounced socialist phraseology.

7. POPULIST POLITICAL TRADITION IN THE UNITED STATES (THE LATE 19th-20th CENTURIES)

1. The subjective intentions of the authors and inspirers of the Homestead Act were reminiscent of the Russian Narodnik theories about the farmer's "hard-earned property". The size of the plot of land allotted to a farmer was limited to 160 acres (so as to restrict the concentration of land property); the owner of a tract of land was to live on and cultivate the tract; he was supposed not to use hired labour etc. (for more detail see: A. V. Yefimov, *The USA: Ways of Capitalist Development [the Pre-Imperialist Period]*, Nauka, Moscow, 1969, p. 163, in Russian). However, under the conditions of objective bourgeois development, these provisions could not be implemented.
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